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The Procedure of Patent Eligibility 
Paul R. Gugliuzza* 
A decade ago, the patent-eligible subject matter requirement was defunct. 
Several recent Supreme Court decisions, however, have made eligibility the most 
important issue in many patent cases. To date, debates over the resurgent 
doctrine have focused mainly on its substance. Critics contend that the Supreme 
Court’s case law makes patents too easy to invalidate and discourages 
innovation. Supporters emphasize that the Court’s decisions help eradicate the 
overly broad patents often asserted by so-called patent trolls. 
Yet one important consequence of eligibility’s revival has been procedural. 
Because district courts often view eligibility to present a pure question of law, 
they are—for the first time ever—invalidating patents on motions to dismiss, 
ending infringement cases before the costly discovery process begins. The test 
for eligibility adopted by the Supreme Court, however, compares the claimed 
invention to the technology that predated the patent. That comparison, this 
Article argues, often involves disputes of fact, which means that courts should be 
more cautious about deciding eligibility on the pleadings than they currently are. 
In two noteworthy decisions issued in early 2018, the Federal Circuit held 
that the question of patent eligibility does indeed have factual underpinnings, 
brushing aside precedent that seemed to treat eligibility as a purely legal matter. 
But these new decisions may go too far. By making it extremely easy for plaintiffs 
to create a factual dispute that prevents pre-trial adjudication, they threaten to 
nullify what this Article identifies as a key policy function of the eligibility 
requirement: providing a means for courts to quickly and cheaply dismiss 
infringement claims so plainly lacking merit that discovery is unwarranted. 
In addition to examining the legal-versus-factual nature of eligibility 
doctrine, the Article analyzes several other important questions about procedure 
in eligibility cases that the lower federal courts—including judges and panels of 
the Federal Circuit—have answered in wildly divergent ways. Those questions 
range from the role of claim construction in the eligibility analysis, to the 
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relevance of the statutory presumption of patent validity, to whether courts 
should decide eligibility when a case can be terminated on another ground. By 
engaging these vexing issues, the Article sketches a procedural framework for 
resolving eligibility that would allow courts to quickly invalidate “bad” patents 
while reducing the danger they will erroneously invalidate a “good” patent on 
an inadequately developed record. 
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Introduction 
For most of the past forty years, the patent-eligible subject matter 
requirement was a dead letter.1 In 1980, the Supreme Court suggested that 
“anything under the sun that is made by man” is eligible for patenting.2 The 
Patent Office and the Federal Circuit took the Court up on its suggestion, 
issuing and upholding many thousands of patents on business methods and 
computer software,3 as well as patents on human gene sequences and other 
building blocks of the biotechnology industry.4 This broad conception of 
patentability triggered numerous complaints. Critics argued that software and 
business method patents were too broad, too vague, and facilitated patent 
assertions, often by so-called patent trolls, against too many unsuspecting 
businesses working with information technology.5 In the realm of 
biotechnology, scholars suggested that patents on early stage research were 
hindering the development of diagnostic tests and therapeutic tools.6 
In the past decade, the Supreme Court has responded to these critiques 
by making it harder for patentees to enforce patents and easier for accused 
infringers to invalidate them.7 The Court has eliminated the presumption that 
a patentee who proves infringement is entitled to an injunction,8 which 
reduces patentees’ bargaining power in settlement negotiations. The Court 
has made it easier for accused infringers to prove that a patent is invalid as 
obvious.9 Most controversially, the Court, in a string of four decisions, has 
reinvigorated the patent-eligible subject matter requirement, holding that 
inventions directed to laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas 
are not eligible for patenting unless they also contain an “inventive 
concept.”10 Applying that test, the Court has struck down patents on financial 
 
1. Mark A. Lemley et al., Life After Bilski, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1315, 1318 (2011). 
2. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (quoting S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5 
(1952); H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 6 (1952)). For criticism of how the Court characterized the 
relevant legislative history, see Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 642 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring 
in the judgment). 
3. JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, 
AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 150–51 (2008). 
4. Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms 
of Science, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77, 119 (1999). 
5. See, e.g., DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS 
CAN SOLVE IT 27 (2009). 
6. See, e.g., Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The 
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 699 (1998). 
7. For empirical evidence of the “anti-patent” trend of recent Supreme Court decisions, see 
Gregory N. Mandel, Institutional Fracture in Intellectual Property Law: The Supreme Court Versus 
Congress, 102 MINN. L. REV. 803, 812 (2017). 
8. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 393–94 (2006). 
9. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 420–22 (2007). 
10. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014). 
 
GUGLIUZZA.HEADERFIXED (DO NOT DELETE) 2/14/2019 11:26 PM 
574 Texas Law Review [Vol. 97:571 
 
risk management techniques,11 computer software designed to carry out 
business strategies,12 naturally occurring DNA,13 and methods of medical 
diagnosis and treatment.14 
The Supreme Court’s decisions on eligibility have transformed patent 
litigation. Eligibility was rarely litigated less than a decade ago, but it is now 
the central concern in many cases.15 This change has been bad for patentees. 
Since 2014, they have lost over sixty percent of eligibility decisions in the 
federal district courts.16 As Mark Lemley and I showed in a recent study, 
patentees’ loss rate grows to over ninety percent in cases that are appealed to 
the Federal Circuit.17 
The Supreme Court has sparked tremendous controversy by 
reinvigorating the eligibility requirement. Detractors condemn the Court’s 
case law as confusing and lower courts’ decisions as unpredictable.18 They 
assert that restricting patent eligibility improperly weakens innovation 
incentives.19 And they contend that the eligibility requirement, which stems 
from the Court’s interpretation of § 101 of the Patent Act,20 is legally 
 
11. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 609 (2010). 
12. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2357. 
13. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 591 (2013). 
14. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 79–80 (2012). 
15. See ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 101–02 (7th ed. 2017) (providing statistics on the growing number of cases 
raising eligibility issues). 
16. Jeffrey A. Lefstin, Peter S. Menell & David O. Taylor, Final Report of the Berkeley Center 
for Law & Technology Section 101 Workshop: Addressing Patent Eligibility Challenges, 33 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 551, 576 tbl.1 (2018). By comparison, patentees lose only about forty percent 
of validity challenges overall (that is, taking into account all possible grounds on which a patent’s 
validity might be challenged, including eligibility). John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & David L. 
Schwartz, Understanding the Realities of Modern Patent Litigation, 92 TEXAS L. REV. 1769, 1787 
fig.4 (2014). 
17. Paul R. Gugliuzza & Mark A. Lemley, Can a Court Change the Law by Saying Nothing?, 
71 VAND. L. REV. 765, 787 & fig.8 (2018). 
18. See, e.g., David O. Taylor, Confusing Patent Eligibility, 84 TENN. L. REV. 157, 158–59 
(2016). 
19. See, e.g., Kevin Madigan & Adam Mossoff, Turning Gold into Lead: How Patent Eligibility 
Doctrine Is Undermining U.S. Leadership in Innovation, 24 GEO. MASON L. REV. 939, 941 (2017). 
20. Section 101 reads, in full: “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may 
obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.” 35 U.S.C. § 101 
(2012); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 601–02 (2010) (“The Court’s precedents provide 
three specific exceptions to § 101’s broad patent-eligibility principles: ‘laws of nature, physical 
phenomena, and abstract ideas.’ While these exceptions are not required by the statutory text, they 
are consistent with the notion that a patentable process must be ‘new and useful.’” (citation 
omitted)). 
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redundant because other sections of the statute already require patents to be 
inventive21 and not too broadly or abstractly described.22 
That said, the loosened standards of patentability mentioned above have, 
in at least some cases, allowed patentees to assert patents of questionable 
social value and to use the high cost of discovery and attorneys’ fees—which 
the defendant must usually bear itself, even if it wins the case—to extract 
what appear to be unwarranted settlement payments.23 The eligibility 
requirement, despite its potential substantive flaws, does provide a useful 
procedural mechanism to end those weak cases quickly and cheaply. When 
district courts strike down patents on eligibility grounds, they frequently do 
so on a motion to dismiss.24 Those motions are decided based on the 
pleadings alone, without any evidentiary hearing, usually before discovery 
begins. Courts justify resolving eligibility at such an early stage by reasoning 
that it presents a question of law devoid of factual considerations.25 This cost-
saving procedural shortcut of pleading-stage dismissal is, as I have pointed 
out in prior work, simply not available for other validity doctrines such as 
novelty and nonobviousness, which are widely recognized to turn on 
 
21. Specifically, the novelty requirement of § 102 mandates that a patent be “new” as compared 
to preexisting technology (the “prior art,” in the parlance of patent lawyers), and the nonobviousness 
requirement of § 103 forbids patents on inventions that “would have been obvious . . . to a person 
having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains.” 35 U.S.C. §§ 102–103 
(2012). 
22. In particular, § 112(a) requires a patent to “contain a written description of the invention, 
and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms 
as to enable any person skilled in the art . . . to make and use the same.” Id. § 112(a). And § 112(b) 
contains a definiteness requirement, which ensures that a patent “inform[s], with reasonable 
certainty, those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention.” Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig 
Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2124 (2014). For a discussion of the eligibility requirement’s 
potential superfluity in light of other requirements of the Patent Act, see John M. Golden, 
Redundancy: When Law Repeats Itself, 94 TEXAS L. REV. 629, 701–03 (2016) (defending “the 
Supreme Court’s move to revive subject-matter eligibility doctrine and to do so in a way that 
involves doctrinal overlaps,” but citing critical commentary). 
23. See Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113 
COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2173 (2013). For a discussion of how litigation costs can incentivize 
patentees to bring weak claims, see Greg Reilly, Linking Patent Reform and Civil Litigation Reform, 
47 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 179, 199–203 (2015) (noting also that high costs are “not a patent problem but 
instead a civil litigation problem common to so-called ‘mega cases’—complex, high stakes, and 
contentious cases”). Though the Supreme Court has recently made it easier for prevailing defendants 
to recover their attorneys’ fees in patent litigation, see Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & 
Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1756 (2014), fee awards are still reserved—by statute—for 
“exceptional cases.” 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2012); see also Paul R. Gugliuzza, Patent Litigation Reform: 
The Courts, Congress, and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 95 B.U. L. REV. 279, 292 (2015) 
(discussing changes to Civil Rule 26 that could encourage courts to more frequently shift the costs 
of discovery). 
24. Lefstin, Menell & Taylor, supra note 16, at 23 tbl.2. 
25. E.g., In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig., 87 F. Supp. 3d 773, 798 (E.D. Va. 2015), 
aff’d, 823 F.3d 607 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
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questions of fact and therefore cannot be resolved until summary judgment 
at the earliest and often must wait until trial.26 
Yet there are several reasons to pause before praising this trend toward 
quick invalidations as an unalloyed good. To begin with, patents invalidated 
as ineligible frequently cover complex technology such as tests for genetic 
mutations,27 computer systems for processing financial transactions,28 and 
blood assays for particular diseases.29 That technology can be difficult for 
courts to understand on a motion to dismiss, which a court decides based on 
the pleadings alone and without any evidentiary submissions from the parties. 
Moreover, under the terms of the federal patent statute, all patents are 
presumed valid.30 Pleading-stage eligibility decisions, however, often ignore 
that presumption on the ground that, because eligibility presents a question 
of law, evidentiary presumptions do not apply.31 Finally, the test for 
eligibility adopted by the Supreme Court asks, as noted, whether the patent 
contains an “inventive concept” as compared to previously existing 
technology.32 That comparison of the patent to the state of the art can be 
difficult for a court to perform without looking beyond the pleadings.33 
The Supreme Court’s resurgent interest in patent eligibility has spawned 
a voluminous scholarly literature,34 but lower courts’ procedural innovations 
in implementing the Court’s decisions have mostly eluded analysis. 
Similarly, although the Federal Circuit has decided well over one hundred 
patent-eligible subject matter cases in the past four years,35 the court has said 
little about process. The court’s ambivalence toward eligibility procedure is 
well-captured in its recent statement that “[c]ourts may . . . dispose of patent-
 
26. Paul R. Gugliuzza, Quick Decisions in Patent Cases, 106 GEO. L.J. 619, 651 (2018). 
27. E.g., Genetic Techs. Ltd. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 72 F. Supp. 3d 521, 527 (D. Del. 
2014), aff’d sub nom. Genetic Techs. Ltd. v. Merial L.L.C., 818 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
28. E.g., Smart Sys. Innovations, LLC v. Chi. Transit Auth., No. 14 C 08053, 2015 WL 
4184486, at *1 (N.D. Ill. July 10, 2015), aff’d, 873 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
29. E.g., Cleveland Clinic Found. v. True Health Diagnostics, LLC, No. 1:15 CV 2331, 2016 
WL 705244, at *7 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 23, 2016), aff’d, 859 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
30. 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012) (“A patent shall be presumed valid. . . . The burden of 
establishing invalidity of a patent . . . shall rest on the party asserting such invalidity.”). 
31. See, e.g., Wireless Media Innovations, LLC v. Maher Terminals, LLC, 100 F. Supp. 3d 405, 
411 (D.N.J. 2015), aff’d, 636 F. App’x 1014 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see also infra section II(E)(1) 
(discussing additional cases). 
32. See, e.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2357 (2014). 
33. For an analysis questioning whether eligibility can be accurately resolved on the minimal 
factual record available at the pleading stage, see Andres Sawicki, The Central Claiming 
Renaissance, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 645, 694 (2018) (“[I]t may turn out that at least some of the 
same expensive fact development is required to answer eligibility questions as is required to answer 
novelty and non-obviousness ones.”). 
34. For a collection of recent articles, see Gugliuzza & Lemley, supra note 17, at 791 n.98. 
35. Id. at 787. 
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infringement claims” on eligibility grounds “whenever procedurally 
appropriate.”36 
As I was finishing the initial draft of this Article, the Federal Circuit 
finally engaged some key procedural issues that frequently arise in eligibility 
disputes. In two opinions issued in early 2018 (both authored by the same 
judge), the court overturned district court rulings that had invalidated patents 
as ineligible on pre-trial motions.37 The Federal Circuit asserted that a key 
portion of the eligibility analysis, specifically, determining whether a patent 
covers “well-understood, routine and conventional” activity (and therefore 
lacks the required inventive concept), is a question of fact that, in some 
circumstances, is inappropriate for early-stage resolution by the judge.38 
These new decisions appear to offer some clarity on the law/fact 
distinction in eligibility law. But, in fact, they are in tension with prior 
Federal Circuit precedent that had seemingly embraced the notion—
expounded by many district courts—that patent eligibility is entirely a 
question of law.39 As I show throughout this Article, on the rare occasions 
the Federal Circuit has actually addressed procedural issues relevant to patent 
eligibility, this type of inconsistency is not unusual.40 The Federal Circuit’s 
lack of coherent guidance has caused deep disagreements among district 
courts on procedural issues in eligibility disputes—another theme that 
frequently recurs in this Article.41 The Federal Circuit’s tolerance of this 
confusion is, it should be noted, highly questionable given that the court was 
created for the specific purpose of achieving uniformity in patent law.42 
 
36. Bascom Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 
2016). 
37. Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc., 882 F.3d 1121, 1130 (Fed. Cir. 2018) 
(Moore, J.) (vacating grant of motion to dismiss); Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1370 (Fed. 
Cir. 2018) (Moore, J.) (vacating grant of summary judgment), petition for cert. filed, No. 18-415 
(U.S. Sept. 28, 2018). 
38. Berkheimer, 881 F.3d at 1368; see also Exergen Corp. v. Kaz USA, Inc., 725 F. App’x 959, 
965 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (nonprecedential opinion, also by Judge Moore, affirming a district court 
decision denying the defendant’s post-trial motion for judgment of ineligibility, noting that “[t]he 
district court’s conclusion that [the patent’s] claim elements were not well-understood, routine, and 
conventional is a question of fact to which we must give clear error deference”). 
39. See, e.g., Amdocs (Isr.) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2016) 
(“We review the district court’s determination of patent eligibility under § 101 without deference, 
as a question of law.”); see also Aatrix, 882 F.3d at 1130 (Reyna, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (“I respectfully disagree with the majority’s broad statements on the role of 
factual evidence in a § 101 inquiry. Our precedent is clear that the § 101 inquiry is a legal 
question.”); infra notes 200, 222 (citing district court decisions explicitly treating eligibility as a 
“pure” question of law). 
40. See, e.g., infra section II(A)(1) (discussing conflicting Federal Circuit opinions on whether 
courts must address patent eligibility “at the threshold,” that is, before considering other 
requirements of patentability or issues of infringement). 
41. See infra Part II. 
42. See Paul R. Gugliuzza, Rethinking Federal Circuit Jurisdiction, 100 GEO. L.J. 1437, 1453–
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Despite what the Federal Circuit’s precedent (or lack thereof) might 
suggest, procedural considerations are key to evaluating the consequences of 
eligibility doctrine’s resurgence. If courts are deciding the issue too early in 
litigation and without sufficient factual development, they may be 
erroneously invalidating patents that actually do satisfy the requirements of 
the Patent Act. In the long run, a pattern of erroneous invalidations will 
dampen the innovation incentives patents are supposed to provide.43 But if 
courts wait too long to invalidate patents, accused infringers must bear the 
costs of unjustified litigation. That could lead potential infringers to simply 
ignore the existence of patents because they know they will be sued 
anyway,44 or, worse, to stop engaging in the innovative activity that 
embroiled them in litigation.45 
This Article is the first to analyze in detail the evolving procedures 
through which courts decide the crucial question of patent eligibility. Along 
the way, it makes both descriptive and prescriptive contributions to the 
emergent literature on the procedural design of the patent system.46 
Descriptively, the Article identifies numerous difficult procedural questions 
courts have confronted (or, sometimes, ignored) in the wake of the Supreme 
Court’s revival of the eligibility requirement, and it chronicles the conflicting 
answers courts have provided. Those questions include: Is patent eligibility 
a “threshold” question that a court must resolve before deciding other issues, 
or can the court ignore eligibility and decide the case on other grounds, such 
as anticipation (that is, lack of novelty), obviousness, or noninfringement?47 
Can a court determine eligibility without conducting a Markman hearing in 
which the court construes the patent’s claims?48 Does the statutory 
 
64 (2012) (summarizing the Federal Circuit’s history and purpose); see also Raymond A. Mercado, 
Resolving Patent Eligibility and Indefiniteness in Proper Context: Applying Alice and Aristocrat, 
20 VA. J.L. & TECH. 240, 326 (2016) (noting the “need [for] guidance from the Federal Circuit” on 
the “procedures leading up to . . . an eligibility determination”). 
43. See Louis Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis, 23 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 307, 380 (1994) (“When adjudication both creates incentives for ex ante behavior and 
affects future conduct, accuracy tends to be more valuable.”). 
44. See Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 19, 21, 31 (2008) 
(exploring the costs (and benefits) of widespread ignorance of patents, particularly in the 
information technology industry). 
45. See Keith N. Hylton, When Should a Case Be Dismissed? The Economics of Pleading and 
Summary Judgment Standards, 16 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 39, 47 (2008) (“[B]y permitting substantial 
litigation costs to be imposed on . . . defendants [who did not act unlawfully], failures to dismiss 
low merit claims weaken incentives to comply with the law and to take socially desirable actions.”). 
46. For an introduction to that literature, see, in addition to the works cited throughout this 
Article, the sources cited in Ryan Vacca, The Federal Circuit as an Institution, in RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (Peter S. Menell, David L. 
Schwartz & Ben Depoorter eds., forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 50–54), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2706849 [https://perma.cc/SXZ9-8DED]. 
47. See infra subpart II(A). 
48. See infra subpart II(D); see also Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 
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presumption of validity apply when a court analyzes patent eligibility?49 And, 
perhaps most fundamentally, the question that has recently captured the 
Federal Circuit’s attention: Is patent eligibility a pure question of law, or does 
it have factual aspects?50 
In the course of answering those questions, the Article makes several 
prescriptive recommendations that would allow courts to better balance 
speed and accuracy in the adjudication of patent eligibility. To start, the 
Article critiques the Federal Circuit’s periodic efforts to characterize 
eligibility as a jurisdiction-like issue that must be resolved at the outset of the 
case,51 arguing instead that courts should retain their well-established 
discretion over when, exactly, to decide potentially dispositive issues such as 
patent eligibility.52 
Turning to the legal-versus-factual nature of the eligibility question 
itself, the Article argues that the Federal Circuit is on the right track by 
recognizing that eligibility can involve factual inquiries even though, like all 
other requirements of patentability, it is ultimately a question of law.53 The 
Federal Circuit’s two recent decisions on the law/fact distinction have been 
controversial and could conceivably be reconsidered by the full court sitting 
en banc or by the Supreme Court at some point in the future.54 But binding, 
settled appellate precedent acknowledging the potential relevance of facts 
 
372 (1996) (holding that the judge, not a jury, must determine the meaning of a patent’s claims). 
The claim construction ruling is the most important ruling in many patent cases because it is often 
dispositive of infringement and is important to determining validity. See Markman v. Westview 
Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 989 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (Mayer, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (“[T]o decide what the claims mean is nearly always to decide the case.”), aff’d, 517 U.S. 
370. 
49. See infra subpart II(E). 
50. See infra subpart II(B). 
51. See, e.g., Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1330 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
52. See infra section II(A)(2). 
53. See Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 96–97 (2011) (“‘While the ultimate 
question of patent validity is one of law,’ the same factual questions underlying the PTO’s original 
examination of a patent application will also bear on an invalidity defense in an infringement 
action.” (citations omitted) (quoting Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966))). But see 
infra notes 196–98 and accompanying text (discussing Federal Circuit case law treating some issues 
of patent validity as entirely factual). 
54. Over a dissent, the Federal Circuit denied petitions for rehearing en banc in both cases. 
Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc., 890 F.3d 1354, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2018); 
Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 890 F.3d 1369, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2018). A cert. petition is currently pending 
in Berkheimer, see Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, HP Inc. v. Berkheimer, No. 18-415 (U.S. filed 
Sept. 28, 2018), and, as this Article was going to press, the Supreme Court issued an order calling 
for the views of the Solicitor General. HP Inc. v. Berkheimer, No. 18-415, 2019 WL 113064 (U.S. 
Jan. 7, 2019). As I explain in a forthcoming article, such an order increases by more than sevenfold 
the probability that the Court will grant certiorari. Paul R. Gugliuzza, The Supreme Court Bar at the 
Bar of Patents 38 (Jan. 25, 2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (finding that, from 
2002 through 2016, cert. petitions in patent cases that received a call for the views of the Solicitor 
General were granted 46.7% of the time, compared with an overall patent case grant rate of 6.6%). 
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would clarify the procedure of patent eligibility in several ways: It would 
ensure that courts resolve eligibility on the pleadings only when the reasons 
for invalidation are found in the patent itself or are matters about which the 
court may take judicial notice. It would ensure that courts deciding eligibility 
at the pleading stage resolve factual doubts in favor of the patentee, rather 
than simply rendering a yes-or-no decision on validity, as they sometimes 
seem to do. And it would allow courts to apply the statutory presumption of 
validity, reconciling the eligibility analysis with the plain language of the 
patent statute, which unequivocally states that patents “shall be presumed 
valid.”55 
That said, the Federal Circuit’s recent decisions injecting factual 
considerations into the eligibility analysis have some serious flaws. Most 
alarmingly, they appear to allow a patentee to defeat a motion to dismiss or 
a motion for summary judgment by offering nothing more than its own, self-
serving statements about the patent’s inventiveness as compared to 
preexisting technology.56 By allowing cases to proceed to discovery or even 
to trial on evidence of such limited probative value, the decisions threaten to 
defeat what I suggested above is a key policy justification for the very 
existence of the eligibility requirement: providing a means to quickly and 
cheaply dispose of infringement claims that obviously lack merit. 
Though this Article focuses mainly on the intersection of procedural law 
and eligibility doctrine, its analysis has implications for patent law and the 
patent system more broadly. For instance, the Article shows how courts 
resolving eligibility disputes frequently (though implicitly) treat the 
subsidiary question of claim construction as factual,57 casting doubt on the 
Federal Circuit’s insistence that claim construction usually presents a 
question of law subject to de novo appellate review.58 If the Federal Circuit 
were to recognize that claim construction is often factual, as numerous 
eligibility cases illustrate, the court would be forced to defer more frequently 
to district courts’ rulings about the scope of patent claims, decreasing the cost 
and increasing the predictability of patent litigation more generally. In 
addition, the Article shows how the Federal Circuit’s difficulties in 
distinguishing between law and fact in the eligibility analysis mirror 
questionable doctrines the court has often embraced—and the Supreme Court 
 
55. 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012). 
56. See Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc., 882 F.3d 1121, 1128 (Fed. Cir. 
2018) (holding that allegations in the complaint about the patent’s inventiveness precluded the 
district court from granting a motion to dismiss); Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1370 (Fed. 
Cir. 2018) (holding that statements about the patent’s inventiveness in the patent itself created a 
genuine issue of material fact for trial), petition for cert. filed, No. 18-415 (U.S. Sept. 28, 2018); see 
also infra subparts II(B)–(C) (discussing the Berkheimer and Aatrix cases in more detail). 
57. See infra subparts II(C)–(D). 
58. See infra notes 339–41 and accompanying text. 
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has often overturned—on other transsubstantive issues in patent cases, such 
as matters of jurisdiction and procedure.59 The court’s missteps in eligibility 
procedure provide another reason to question the success of the Federal 
Circuit “experiment” in judicial specialization.60 
The remainder of this Article consists of three parts. Part I provides 
background on the doctrine of patent-eligible subject matter and explains 
how recent changes to the substance of that doctrine have translated into 
procedural reform. Part II, the heart of the Article, thoroughly examines the 
procedures courts have used to resolve the newly important question of patent 
eligibility, and it makes a detailed case for the law-reform recommendations 
described above. Finally, Part III explores the broader implications of the 
Article’s analysis of eligibility procedure for matters such as the right to a 
jury trial on patent validity and the centralization of appeals in the Federal 
Circuit. 
I. The Law, Policy, and Practice of Patent Eligibility 
In less than a decade, the eligibility requirement has revolutionized the 
practice of patent litigation in the United States. This part of the Article 
begins by discussing how the Supreme Court reinvigorated eligibility 
doctrine and synthesizing the Federal Circuit’s subsequent decisions into 
rough guidelines about the boundaries of patent eligibility. It concludes by 
highlighting how the recent changes to the substance of eligibility doctrine 
have dramatically altered the procedures through which courts resolve 
infringement disputes. 
 
A. The Supreme Court’s Revival of the Eligibility Requirement 
Section 101 of the Patent Act permits patents on “any new and useful 
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.”61 Despite that 
broad language, courts have held that § 101 contains an “implicit exception” 
that prohibits patenting laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract 
 
59. See Paul R. Gugliuzza & Megan M. La Belle, The Patently Unexceptional Venue Statute, 
66 AM. U. L. REV. 1027, 1028–29 (2017) (collecting case examples); see also Peter Lee, The 
Supreme Assimilation of Patent Law, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1413, 1451 (2016) (noting the Supreme 
Court’s “focus [in recent patent decisions] on transcendent areas of law that touch upon patent 
doctrine as well as other doctrinal areas, such as appellate review of district courts and agencies, 
jurisdiction, and remedies”). 
60. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 
64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1989) (characterizing the Federal Circuit as “a sustained experiment in 
specialization”); Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity Principle, 
101 NW. U. L. REV. 1619, 1620 (2007) (“[C]ommentators have increasingly turned to evaluating 
the Federal Circuit’s precedents on the merits. . . . The answers thus far have not been 
encouraging.”). 
61. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
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ideas.62 All inventions, the thinking goes, involve those basic principles, so 
the eligibility requirement limits patent protection to specific applications of 
those principles, ensuring that patents do not encompass the “building blocks 
of human ingenuity.”63 Thus, in its twentieth-century cases sketching out the 
eligibility requirement, the Supreme Court struck down patents on a 
composition of naturally occurring bacteria64 and a mathematical formula for 
converting decimal numerals into binary numbers.65 Conversely, the Court 
upheld patents on a genetically modified bacterium because it did not occur 
in nature66 and on a process for molding rubber that merely used a 
mathematical formula.67 
By many accounts, in the 1990s and early 2000s, the Federal Circuit and 
the Patent Office significantly relaxed the eligibility requirement. They 
regularly approved patents on computer software68 and methods of doing 
business69 despite the frequently abstract nature of those inventions. They 
also approved patents on isolated DNA sequences even though those 
sequences appear in nature.70 Commentators blamed generous standards of 
patentability for many emerging problems in the patent system. Broad and 
overlapping patents in the information technology industry created patent 
thickets71 and contributed to the emergence of patent assertion entities (PAEs, 
or, more controversially, patent trolls).72 Concerns also began to surface that 
disaggregated ownership of DNA patents, and the difficulty of inventing 
around them, was inhibiting downstream developments in biotechnology, 
such as gene therapies and diagnostic tools.73 
 
62. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014). 
63. Id. 
64. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 131–32 (1948). 
65. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71–72 (1972). 
66. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980). 
67. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981). 
68. See Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software 
Industry, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 11–12 (2001) (providing examples). 
69. E.g., State St. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp, 149 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
70. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303, 
1343–44 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Moore, J., concurring in part) (summarizing the history of patents on 
human genes), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad 
Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576 (2013). 
71. FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF 
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 6–7 (2003), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/promote-innovation-proper-balance-
competition-and-patent-law-and-policy/innovationrpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/4DWF-D4QY]. 
72. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PATENT ASSERTION AND U.S. INNOVATION 8 (2013), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent_report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5RVF-K9SP]. 
73. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Biotechnology’s Uncertainty Principle, 54 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 691, 730 (2004); Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & James P. Evans, From Bilski Back to 
Benson: Preemption, Inventing Around, and the Case of Genetic Diagnostics, 63 STAN. L. REV. 
 
GUGLIUZZA.HEADERFIXED (DO NOT DELETE) 2/14/2019 11:26 PM 
2019] The Procedure of Patent Eligibility 583 
 
In 2006, the Supreme Court flirted with the patent-eligible subject 
matter requirement in a case it ultimately dismissed as improvidently 
granted.74 A year later, the Federal Circuit—apparently taking the hint—
returned some bite to the eligibility requirement in two opinions issued on 
the same day. The first rejected a patent on a transitory signal because it did 
not fall within the four categories of patent-eligible subject matter listed in 
§ 101 (“process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter”).75 The 
second held ineligible a patent on a method of requiring and conducting 
arbitration because it impermissibly claimed “mental processes.”76 
Eligibility’s renaissance began in earnest in 2010, when the Supreme 
Court, in Bilski v. Kappos,77 held ineligible a patent on a method of hedging 
financial risk because it claimed an abstract idea.78 Though the Court was 
unwilling to say that business methods could never be patented, it made clear 
that one could no longer obtain a patent by merely performing a longstanding 
business practice on a computer or over the Internet.79 
Two years later, the Supreme Court considered a patent-eligible subject 
matter dispute in the field of medical diagnostics, Mayo Collaborative 
Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.80 The patent-in-suit claimed a 
method of administering a particular drug to a patient, measuring the drug’s 
metabolite levels in the body, and comparing those levels to ranges disclosed 
in the patent to determine whether dosage should be increased or decreased.81 
The Supreme Court held that the patent did not satisfy the eligibility 
requirement because it recited the correlation between metabolite levels and 
drug safety and efficacy—a “law of nature,” in the Court’s view—and it 
contained no other “inventive concept.”82 Rather, in telling doctors to 
administer the drug and determine its metabolite levels, the patent simply 
recited “well-understood, routine, conventional activity” that doctors already 
engaged in.83 
After a 2013 decision holding that isolated DNA segments are not patent 
eligible because they are “product[s] of nature,”84 the Court in 2014 decided 
 
1349, 1370 (2011). 
74. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 125 (2006) (per 
curiam). 
75. In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
76. In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2007). The court later revised its original 
opinion but reached the same result. In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 981 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
77. 561 U.S. 593 (2010). 
78. Id. at 609. 
79. See id. at 611. 
80. 566 U.S. 66 (2012). 
81. Id. at 74–75. 
82. Id. at 72–73. 
83. Id. at 79–80. 
84. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 580, 591 (2013). In 
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its most recent eligibility case, Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International.85 Alice 
involved patents on a computer program that used an intermediary to mitigate 
the risk that only one party to a financial transaction would perform its 
obligation.86 In its opinion invalidating the patents, the Court drew on Mayo 
to articulate a two-step test that serves as the foundation for eligibility 
analysis under current law. According to the Court, the first step is to 
determine whether the patent claim is directed to a “patent-ineligible 
concept[],” namely, a law of nature, product of nature, natural phenomenon, 
or abstract idea.87 If so, the court then asks whether there are “additional 
elements” that “transform” the claim into a patent-eligible application of the 
underlying concept.88 Quoting Mayo, the Court in Alice explained that this 
second step is “a search for an ‘inventive concept’—i.e., an element or 
combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice 
amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] 
itself.’”89 
Applying that test to the facts of the case, the Court first determined that 
using intermediaries to mitigate risk was an abstract idea, in part because, 
like risk hedging in Bilski, intermediated settlement “is a fundamental 
economic practice long prevalent in our system of commerce.”90 On the 
second step, the Court concluded that merely performing that abstract idea 
on a general-purpose computer, as the patent instructed, did not represent the 
“inventive concept” required for eligibility.91 In terms of what would 
constitute an inventive concept, the Court observed that the patents-in-suit 
“[did] not, for example, purport to improve the functioning of the computer 
itself,” nor did they “effect an improvement in any other technology or 
technical field.”92 
B. Patent Eligibility at the Federal Circuit 
Since the Supreme Court issued its Alice opinion in 2014, the Federal 
Circuit has decided over one hundred cases involving the patent-eligible 
subject matter requirement. Like the Supreme Court’s recent rulings, the vast 
 
the same decision, the Court upheld patents on synthetically created DNA on the rationale that 
synthetic DNA does not occur in nature. Id. at 595. 
85. 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). 
86. Id. at 2351–52. 
87. Id. at 2355. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72–73 
(2012)). 
90. Id. at 2356 (quoting Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010)). 
91. Id. at 2357–58. 
92. Id. at 2359 (citing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 177–78 (1981), which upheld a patent 
on a process for molding rubber even though the process included a previously known mathematical 
equation). 
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majority of those decisions—over ninety percent of them93—have found the 
claimed invention not to be patent eligible. But the Federal Circuit has upheld 
several patents against eligibility challenges. Practically all eligibility 
disputes involve inventions in one of two categories: information technology 
and biotechnology. It is easiest to consider the emerging doctrine separately 
for each category. 
In the field of information technology, the Federal Circuit has built on 
Bilski and Alice to strike down patents that claim advances in what are 
sometimes called “non-technological disciplines,” such as business and 
law.94 The court has held ineligible for patenting inventions on methods of 
optimizing prices,95 guaranteeing performance of a transaction,96 and 
managing a bingo game,97 even though those inventions were implemented 
on computers. Conversely, the court has upheld patents on inventions that, as 
the Supreme Court suggested in Alice, improved the functioning of a 
computer, such as a patent on a “self-referential table for a computer 
database,”98 or solved a problem unique to computers or the Internet, 
including a patent on blending together two different Internet web pages to 
create a new, integrated page.99 
In the realm of biotechnology, inventions are likely to survive eligibility 
challenges if the patent covers a new process or the making of a new thing, 
as opposed to the isolation or detection of a naturally occurring chemical. In 
Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc.,100 for example, the Federal 
Circuit invalidated a patent on methods of detecting fetal DNA that floats 
freely in the mother’s body.101 Though the discovery of fetal DNA in the 
mother’s blood enabled safer and cheaper genetic testing,102 the court 
invalidated the patent under Mayo because fetal DNA appears naturally in 
the mother’s blood and the techniques used to detect and amplify it were well-
known.103 By contrast, in Rapid Litigation Management Ltd. v. CellzDirect, 
 
93. Gugliuzza & Lemley, supra note 17, at 787 & fig.8. 
94. Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC (Ultramercial III), 772 F.3d 709, 721 (Fed. Cir. 2014) 
(Mayer, J., concurring). 
95. OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
96. buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
97. Planet Bingo, LLC v. VKGS LLC, 576 F. App’x 1005, 1006 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
98. Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
99. DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
100. 788 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
101. Id. at 1376. 
102. Rachel Rebouché, Testing Sex, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. 519, 527 & n.43 (2015). 
103. Ariosa, 788 F.3d at 1376–77; accord Cleveland Clinic Found. v. True Health Diagnostics 
LLC, 859 F.3d 1352, 1360–63 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (applying similar reasoning to invalidate patents on 
methods of testing for the presence of an enzyme associated with cardiovascular disease), cert. 
denied, 138 S. Ct. 2621 (2018); Genetic Techs. Ltd. v. Merial L.L.C., 818 F.3d 1369, 1375–78 (Fed. 
Cir. 2016) (same, in a case involving methods of analyzing DNA sequences). 
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Inc.,104 the Federal Circuit upheld the eligibility of a patent on a method of 
preserving hepatocytes, a type of liver cell.105 Even though the patent turned 
on the discovery that hepatocytes could survive multiple freeze-thaw 
cycles—a natural trait of the cells—the Court emphasized that, unlike in 
Ariosa, the patent claimed a new, physical method of preservation, not 
merely observation.106 
C. Patent Eligibility as Procedural Reform 
The Supreme Court’s strengthening of patent eligibility doctrine has 
been criticized, not without some justification. The aspects of the eligibility 
inquiry that examine whether the patent improves on the prior art and whether 
it preempts use of basic research tools overlap with other patentability 
requirements, including novelty, nonobviousness, and the disclosure 
mandates of § 112 of the Patent Act.107 Also, although the Federal Circuit’s 
eligibility decisions can be synthesized into somewhat coherent rules (as I 
attempted to do in the preceding section), inconsistencies among those 
decisions potentially make it difficult to predict the outcomes of future cases. 
For example, the claims in some of the information technology patents the 
Federal Circuit has upheld as improving the function of a computer have been 
rather vague, consisting mostly of generically described computer parts and 
processes.108 Though the use of a generic computer is usually insufficient to 
avoid invalidation under Alice,109 the court has sometimes relied on details in 
the patent’s specification to save those patents from invalidation.110 The 
Federal Circuit’s decisions relying on the specification to uphold validity are 
also in tension with the court’s precedent stating that the eligibility analysis 
 
104. 827 F.3d 1042 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
105. Id. at 1045, 1052. 
106. Id. at 1050–52. 
107. See Brief of Professors Jeffrey A. Lefstin and Peter S. Menell as Amici Curiae in Support 
of Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 23, Sequenom, Inc. v. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 2511 
(2016) (mem.) (No. 15-1182). For a summary of those requirements, see supra notes 21–22. 
108. See, for example, Visual Memory LLC v. NVIDIA Corp., 867 F.3d 1253, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 
2017), in which a panel of the court, in a split decision, upheld a patent that recited “[a] computer 
memory system connectable to a processor and having one or more programmable operational 
characteristics,” with the “system” comprising “a main memory” and “a cache,” and with the 
“programmable operational characteristic” “determin[ing] a type of data stored by [the] cache.” 
That claim, on my reading, seems to recite nothing more than a general-purpose computer 
programed to perform some vaguely defined type of data analysis. Accord id. at 1263 (Hughes, J., 
dissenting). 
109. See, e.g., Mortg. Grader, Inc. v. First Choice Loan Servs. Inc., 811 F.3d 1314, 1324–25 
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[G]eneric computer components do not satisfy the inventive concept 
requirement.”). 
110. See, e.g., Amdocs (Isr.) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288, 1300–01 (Fed. Cir. 
2016) (relying on a passage from the specification to conclude that the claimed invention “entails 
an unconventional technological solution (enhancing data in a distributed fashion) to a technological 
problem (massive record flows which previously required massive databases)”). 
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should focus on the patent’s claims alone.111 In the realm of biotechnology, 
it is not always easy to understand what the Federal Circuit perceives to be 
the line between specific applications of natural laws (patent eligible) and 
claims directed to the natural laws themselves (ineligible).112 Finally, cases 
such as Ariosa, in which the court struck down a patent on a seemingly 
innovative method of detecting fetal abnormalities, illustrate the risk that the 
eligibility requirement may exclude some socially valuable inventions from 
patent protection.113 
Yet the newly revitalized eligibility requirement has redeeming 
qualities. Among other things, as I have discussed in prior work, eligibility 
provides a useful “quick look” at patent validity that allows courts to dispose 
of patents that are plainly invalid before the costly discovery process 
begins.114 Because courts frequently treat eligibility as a question of law 
lacking factual considerations, they often invalidate patents on eligibility 
grounds at the pleading stage on a motion to dismiss or for judgment on the 
 
111. See, e.g., Two-Way Media Ltd. v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC, 874 F.3d 1329, 1338 
(Fed. Cir. 2017) (“The main problem that [the patentee] cannot overcome is that the claim—as 
opposed to something purportedly described in the specification—is missing an inventive 
concept.”), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 378 (2018). 
112. See, for example, Vanda Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. West-Ward Pharmaceuticals 
International Ltd., 887 F.3d 1117 (Fed. Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Hikma Pharms. 
USA Inc. v. Vanda Pharms., No. 18-817 (U.S. Dec. 27, 2018), in which the Federal Circuit found a 
method patent to be patent eligible, reasoning: 
Here, the . . . patent claims recite the steps of carrying out a dosage regimen based on 
the results of genetic testing. . . . These are treatment steps. In contrast, . . . the claim 
in Mayo stated that the metabolite level in blood simply “indicates” a need to increase 
or decrease dosage, without prescribing a specific dosage regimen or other added steps 
to take as a result of that indication. 
Id. at 1135. By contrast, Chief Judge Prost in dissent found the patent indistinguishable from the 
patent ruled ineligible in Mayo: 
As the majority notes, the . . . patent claims a method of treating schizophrenia with 
iloperidone “that is safer for patients . . . .” This is no more than an optimization of an 
existing treatment of schizophrenia, just as the claims in Mayo concerned “optimizing 
therapeutic efficacy” of thiopurine drugs. Mayo warned against “drafting effort[s] 
designed to monopolize the law of nature itself.” The majority does not heed that 
warning. 
Id. at 1142 (Prost, C.J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
113. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Diagnostics Need Not Apply, 21 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 256, 
286 (2015) (discussing the unclear policy implications of excluding diagnostic tests from patent 
eligibility). But see W. Nicholson Price II, Grants, 33 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (forthcoming 2019) 
(manuscript at 49), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3174769 [https://perma.cc/LC23-BRSN] (noting that 
government grants can provide incentives for the development of diagnostic tests in the absence of 
patent protection); Colleen V. Chien & Arti K. Rai, An Empirical Analysis of Diagnostic Patenting 
Post-Mayo 3–4 (Jan. 16, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (showing no decline 
in patenting of diagnostic methods or investment in them since the Supreme Court’s invigoration of 
the eligibility requirement). 
114. See Gugliuzza, supra note 26, at 651. 
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pleadings.115 Such early, dispositive decisions are not possible on issues such 
as novelty, nonobviousness, or infringement because those issues usually 
turn on hotly disputed questions of fact that cannot be resolved until summary 
judgment or trial.116 
As discussed in the introduction, much of the criticism of the eligibility 
requirement attacks the substance of the courts’ case law.117 But that criticism 
can be understood in procedural terms, too. For instance, critiques about 
eligibility’s overlap with other patentability doctrines arguably reflect 
concern that courts are resolving questions of inventiveness and overbreadth 
too early in the case. Even if the eligibility requirement did not exist, courts 
would resolve similar questions under the sections of the Patent Act that 
require patents to be novel, nonobvious, and disclosed with some degree of 
detail. But those decisions would typically occur later in the case—on 
summary judgment or at trial—when there is a more developed record about 
the scope of the patent’s claims and the content of the prior art.118 
Arguments about excluding meritorious inventions from the patent 
system and about the unpredictability of case outcomes can be understood in 
procedural terms, too. At summary judgment, when a patent’s scope has been 
defined through claim construction and there is a factual record addressing 
the extent of the patent’s improvement on preexisting technology, it seems 
less likely that a court would erroneously invalidate a patent that actually 
does satisfy the requirements of the Patent Act. The better developed record 
and clearer definition of claim scope should also make it easier for the parties 
to predict the court’s result. 
It is not beyond doubt, however, that the process of developing a more 
elaborate evidentiary record is necessary to ensure accurate decisions on 
patent validity. Some empirical evidence suggests that many patents that do 
not satisfy the eligibility requirement also do not satisfy at least one other 
patentability requirement,119 indicating that eligibility can reliably be used as 
 
115. See Lefstin, Menell & Taylor, supra note 16, at 578 tbl.2 (reporting that, from June 2014 
to February 2017, 69.4% of district court decisions on eligibility (249 of 359) were made on a 
motion to dismiss or for judgment on the pleadings and that 63.1% of those pleading-stage decisions 
(157 of 249) invalidated the patent). 
116. Gugliuzza, supra note 26, at 651. 
117. See supra notes 18–22 and accompanying text. 
118. Cf. PETER S. MENELL, MARK A. LEMLEY & ROBERT P. MERGES, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 301 (2017) (“How can a court know whether the 
implementation of an abstract idea is inventive (i.e., well-understood, conventional or routine) 
without collecting evidence on what is known in the art?”). 
119. See Dennis Crouch & Robert P. Merges, Operating Efficiently Post-Bilski by Ordering 
Patent Doctrine Decision-Making, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1673, 1686 (2010) (finding, based on 
a sample of 117 decisions by the Patent Office’s appellate board, that 94% of patents rejected as 
ineligible were also rejected on another ground); Saurabh Vishnubhakat, The Antitrusting of 
Patentability, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 71, 103 (2017) (finding, based on a random sample of 800 
patent applications, that 87% of applications rejected as ineligible were also rejected on another 
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a quick-look proxy for more fact-driven doctrines. In addition, experimental 
evidence suggests that the Supreme Court’s test for patent eligibility may not 
be as unpredictable as critics claim.120 In any case, the point here is not to 
argue that courts’ eligibility decisions are always perfectly accurate; rather, 
it is simply to highlight that any normative analysis of eligibility doctrine 
must acknowledge that the doctrine, whatever its substantive merits, 
decreases process costs by facilitating quicker and cheaper resolutions than 
were previously possible.121 
Moreover, and regardless of any critiques of eligibility doctrine, the 
reality is that pleading-stage decisions on that issue will likely remain 
common for the foreseeable future,122 as the trend toward adjudicating patent 
 
ground). This evidence also responds to the concern that the error costs of an incorrect decision on 
patent eligibility are not borne equally by the parties. If a court reaches an erroneous conclusion that 
an invention is patent eligible, the defendant can still defend the case on other grounds. But if a 
court erroneously concludes that an invention is not patent eligible, the case is immediately over 
and the patentee loses its patent forever. See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 
U.S. 313, 350 (1971) (holding that a patentee is estopped from asserting the validity of a patent that 
has been declared invalid in a prior suit against a different defendant). If patents invalidated as 
ineligible would likely be invalidated on another ground anyway, any concern about asymmetry in 
error costs seems much diminished. 
120. See Jason D. Reinecke, Is the Supreme Court’s Patentable Subject Matter Test Overly 
Ambiguous? An Empirical Test, 2019 UTAH L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 3), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3123524 [https://perma.cc/WGQ5-2PCH] (survey using a sample of 
eligibility cases that had actually been litigated and finding that, based on the patent claims alone, 
patent prosecutors were able to correctly predict how the court ruled 67.3% of the time and patent 
litigators correctly predicted outcomes 59.7% of the time). 
121. For a summary of the traditional law-and-economics theory of litigation, under which the 
normative aim is to minimize both error costs and process costs, see Richard A. Posner, An 
Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 400 
(1973). Providing a mechanism for quick and cheap decisions is not, of course, the only possible 
policy justification for eligibility doctrine’s existence. The doctrine could also be defended on 
substantive grounds as filling gaps left by other requirements of patentability. See, e.g., Kevin 
Emerson Collins, Patent-Ineligibility as Counteraction, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 955, 1002, 1019 
(2017); Golden, supra note 22, at 710–11; Lemley et al., supra note 1, at 1329–31. But eligibility’s 
capacity to facilitate early resolution stands independently of those substantive justifications. In 
other words, whether eligibility doctrine (a) usefully fills substantive gaps left by other patentability 
requirements or (b) is redundant of those requirements, the quicker and cheaper adjudication the 
doctrine makes possible still provides a social benefit by reducing process costs. 
122. It is possible that eligibility motions (at all stages of litigation) will decrease in frequency 
once patents issued prior to the Supreme Court’s recent decisions are no longer being asserted, 
though some evidence suggests that the Patent Office is still issuing software patents, which are the 
target of many eligibility challenges, at a rapid clip. See Maulin Shah, Software Patents Are Resilient 
in the Wake of Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, PATENTVUE (Sept. 9, 2015), 
http://patentvue.com/2015/09/09/software-patents-are-resilient-in-the-wake-of-alice-corp-vs-cls-
bank [https://perma.cc/9UUW-Y4KU] (noting also that the Patent Office continues to issue business 
method patents post-Alice, though in smaller numbers). In addition, eligibility motions could 
decrease if Congress passes legislation to weaken or eliminate the eligibility requirement, but 
legislative action currently seems unlikely. See Dennis Crouch, AIPLA On Board with Statutory 
Reform of 101, PATENTLYO (May 16, 2017), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2017/05/aipla-statutory-
reform.html [https://perma.cc/XZK6-M94S] (summarizing legislative proposals to amend § 101). 
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validity on the pleadings is consistent with developments in American 
procedural law more generally. The “textbook” model of civil procedure, 
under which a case proceeds in an orderly fashion from the pleadings to 
discovery to summary judgment to trial and appeal, has, in many respects, 
disappeared, with judges increasingly resolving fact-intensive questions at 
preliminary stages on motions to dismiss, for class certification, or for 
summary judgment.123 Like eligibility’s resurgence in response to worries 
about “litigation abuse” by patent trolls,124 these broader procedural changes 
have occurred in response to concerns (some valid, some not) about the high 
cost and low merit of particular types of litigation.125 
The recent Federal Circuit decisions mentioned in the introduction (and 
discussed in more detail below) appear intended to push against this trend 
toward expedited resolution by emphasizing fact questions embedded in the 
patent eligibility analysis.126 But initial indications are that early eligibility 
decisions will persist in one form or another.127 Thus, the key objective for 
 
123. See Alexandra D. Lahav, Procedural Design, 71 VAND. L. REV. 821, 823 (2018). 
124. See Paul R. Gugliuzza, Patent Trolls and Patent Litigation Reform, OXFORD HANDBOOKS 
ONLINE (Mar. 2017), http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb 
/9780199935352.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199935352-e-15?print=pdf [https://perma.cc/U3QU-
8PWK]. 
125. Lahav, supra note 123, at 863. 
126. See Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc., 882 F.3d 1121, 1129–30 (Fed. 
Cir. 2018) (vacating grant of motion to dismiss because of factual allegations in the complaint that 
the claimed invention was not “well understood” or “conventional”); Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 
F.3d 1360, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (vacating grant of summary judgment because of fact questions 
about the patent’s purported improvement over the prior art), petition for cert. filed, No. 18-415 
(U.S. Sept. 28, 2018); see also infra subparts II(B)–(C) (discussing those decisions in more detail). 
127. See, e.g., Automated Tracking Sols., LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 723 F. App’x 989, 996 (Fed. 
Cir. 2018) (affirming judgment on the pleadings of ineligibility, two days after Aatrix); Intellectual 
Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 725 F. App’x 976, 979 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (post-Berkheimer 
decision affirming summary judgment of ineligibility); Maxon, LLC v. Funai Corp., 726 F. App’x 
797, 798 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (affirming grant of motion to dismiss on eligibility grounds); Voter 
Verified, Inc. v. Election Sys. & Software LLC, 887 F.3d 1376, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (same), cert. 
denied, No. 18-549, 2019 WL 113159 (U.S. Jan. 7, 2019); Burnett v. Panasonic Corp., No. 2018-
1234, 2018 WL 3434533, at *2 (Fed. Cir. July 16, 2018) (same), cert. denied, No. 18-414, 2018 
WL 4757064 (U.S. Dec. 3, 2018); SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 
2018) (affirming grant of motion for judgment on the pleadings); Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, 
Inc., 896 F.3d 1335, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (same); MyMail, Ltd. v. ooVoo, LLC, 313 F. Supp. 3d 
1095, 1113 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (Koh, J.) (granting post-Aatrix motion for judgment on the pleadings 
of ineligibility), appeal docketed, No. 18-1758 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 3, 2018); ChargePoint, Inc. v. 
SemaConnect, Inc., No. MJG-17-3717, 2018 WL 1471685, at *4, *23 (D. Md. Mar. 23, 2018) 
(granting motion to dismiss for lack of eligibility, refusing to consider expert declarations submitted 
by the patentee that purported “to establish the convention of the field and the subsequent 
inventiveness of the claims”), appeal docketed, No. 18-1739 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 29, 2018); CardioNet, 
LLC v. InfoBionic, Inc., No. 17-CV-10445-IT, 2018 WL 5017913, at *8 (D. Mass. Oct. 16, 2018) 
(granting motion to dismiss for lack of eligibility, noting: “Here, there are no disputes of fact as the 
court accepts the Plaintiffs’ non-conclusory factual assertions in the complaint and the patent as 
true. On the facts as alleged, . . . Plaintiffs’ asserted claims are not directed to any improvement in 
the computer technology itself . . . .”), appeal docketed, No. 19-1149 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 2, 2018). 
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those interested in the procedural design of the patent system should be to 
determine how courts can decide early eligibility motions in a way that 
maximizes decisional accuracy and minimizes litigation costs.128 The next 
part of this Article takes a step in that direction. 
II. The Procedure of Patent Eligibility 
Courts’ newfound flexibility to resolve patent validity at the pleading 
stage has raised many questions of process that they have answered in 
dramatically different ways or, in some circumstances, completely ignored. 
This part of the Article breaks new ground in patent law scholarship by 
identifying the five most important unresolved questions about the procedure 
of patent eligibility. It also suggests answers to those questions that would 
help maximize the eligibility requirement’s cost-saving potential while 
minimizing the risk that courts invalidate meritorious patents. 
A. Analyzing Eligibility at the “Threshold” 
One procedural question relevant to patent eligibility that the Federal 
Circuit has discussed in extensive detail is whether a court must analyze 
eligibility “at the threshold”—that is, before resolving other issues of 
patentability and infringement—or whether a court may avoid deciding 
eligibility and resolve the case on other grounds if that would be easier. The 
degree to which the Federal Circuit has fixated on this issue is perplexing. 
Federal courts generally have significant discretion over how they manage 
their dockets,129 and courts usually decide only the issues the parties 
contest.130 Yet a surprising amount of Federal Circuit case law states that 
courts must decide patent eligibility before analyzing other issues, regardless 
of what the parties want or what the court thinks is most efficient. This 
puzzling insistence that patent eligibility is, like subject matter jurisdiction, a 
mandatory threshold issue, has spurred some Federal Circuit judges and 
scholars to embrace another extreme: analogizing to principles of 
constitutional avoidance, they assert that courts should never address 
eligibility if a case can be resolved on other grounds.131 This section makes 
the case for why neither of those inflexible approaches is optimal. 
 
128. See Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Resilience of the Patent System, 95 TEXAS L. REV. 
1, 56 (2016) (arguing that, because recent changes to patent law seem to have had little effect on 
patent acquisition and enforcement, reformers should instead “look out for opportunities to simplify 
patent litigation, making it quicker and cheaper” (emphasis added)). 
129. See, e.g., Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936) (Cardozo, J.) (recognizing the 
“power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy 
of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants”). 
130. But see infra notes 168–69 and accompanying text for a discussion of scholarship 
questioning that norm. 
131. See MySpace, Inc. v. GraphOn Corp., 672 F.3d 1250, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Crouch & 
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 1. Conflicting Case Law on the “Threshold” Question.—To start, a 
review of the relevant case law will help illuminate why the debate over 
whether eligibility must be decided at the outset of the case is so contentious. 
(As with many of the procedural topics explored in this Article, the relevant 
precedent has, to my knowledge, never before been collected in one place.) 
One of the earliest judicial references to eligibility being the first issue 
that must be addressed in the patentability analysis is in Parker v. Flook,132 a 
1978 Supreme Court decision holding that a method of updating alarm limits 
during catalytic conversion was not eligible for a patent because its only 
inventive feature was a mathematical formula.133 In rejecting the argument 
that the Court’s approach to eligibility “improperly import[ed] into § 101” 
(the portion of the Patent Act that is the basis for the eligibility requirement) 
“the considerations of ‘inventiveness’ which are the proper concerns of 
§§ 102 and 103” (the portions that require patents to be novel and 
nonobvious, respectively), the Court noted that the eligibility requirement 
“rests . . . on the more fundamental understanding that” certain inventions 
“are not the kind of ‘discoveries’ that the statute was enacted to protect.”134 
Accordingly, the Court continued, “[t]he obligation to determine what type 
of discovery is sought to be patented must precede the determination of 
whether that discovery is, in fact, new or obvious.”135 
Viewed in context, it is not clear that the Supreme Court in Flook 
intended to mandate a strict sequence of deciding the various requirements 
of patentability. Given that the relevant portion of the opinion was defending 
the very existence of the judicial exceptions to the categories of patent-
eligible subject matter recited in § 101 (processes, machines, manufactures, 
and compositions of matter),136 the Court could be understood to have been 
emphasizing the fundamental importance of having an eligibility inquiry—
not suggesting that eligibility must always be decided before novelty and 
nonobviousness. Nevertheless, a year later, the Court of Customs and Patent 
Appeals (one of the Federal Circuit’s predecessors) drew on Flook in writing 
that “[t]he first door which must be opened on the difficult path to 
patentability is § 101.”137 The Supreme Court referred to § 101 as a 
 
Merges, supra note 119, at 1691; Vishnubhakat, supra note 119, at 103–04. 
132. 437 U.S. 584 (1978). 
133. Id. at 594–95. 
134. Id. at 592–93 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 101: “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful 
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement 
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title” 
(emphasis added)). 
135. Id. at 593 (emphasis added). 
136. Id. 
137. In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 960 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (Rich, J.) (citing Flook, 437 U.S. at 593), 
vacated as moot sub nom. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 444 U.S. 1028 (1980). 
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“threshold” requirement for the first time in a 1981 decision,138 and the 
Federal Circuit repeated the notion that eligibility is the “first door” to be 
opened in its landmark 1998 decision in State Street, which held that business 
methods are, in fact, patent eligible.139 
None of those cases, however, presented any issue other than eligibility, 
so the characterization of § 101 being a threshold issue had little practical 
impact. At the beginning of the eligibility requirement’s recent renaissance, 
however, the Federal Circuit gave some teeth to the principle that eligibility 
is the first issue that must be decided. In the court’s 2007 decision in In re 
Comiskey, which held that a method of compelling and conducting arbitration 
was not patent eligible, the court insisted that the eligibility inquiry “must 
precede the determination of whether [the] discovery is . . . new or 
obvious.”140 The court implemented that principle by refusing to review the 
case on the ground it was decided below (obviousness) and instead concluded 
that the claims were “barred at the threshold by § 101.”141 A year later, in its 
en banc opinion in Bilski, the Federal Circuit tried to back away from that 
emphatic ruling, writing that “[a]lthough our decision in Comiskey may be 
misread by some as requiring in every case that the examiner conduct a § 101 
analysis before assessing any other issue of patentability, we did not so 
hold.”142 The Supreme Court’s opinion in Bilski ultimately did not tackle this 
question of sequencing, but the Court did refer to § 101 as a “threshold 
test”143 (though, again, no other issue of patentability was present in that 
case). 
Except for State Street, all of these cases characterizing § 101 as a 
threshold issue were appeals from examination proceedings at the Patent 
Office. Unlike a court, which typically resolves only the issues raised by the 
parties, the Patent Office must decide that an application complies with every 
patentability requirement before it grants a patent.144 Because of the 
 
138. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188 (1981) (holding that the claimed process for curing 
rubber was “not barred at the threshold by § 101”). 
139. State St. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., 149 F.3d 1368, 1372 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1998) 
(quoting Bergy, 596 F.2d at 960). 
140. In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (quoting Flook, 437 U.S. at 593). 
The Federal Circuit later revised its opinion, but the portion relevant to this discussion remained 
unchanged. In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 973 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
141. Comiskey, 499 F.3d at 1371 (quoting Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188). 
142. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 950 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), aff’d sub nom. Bilski v. 
Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010). 
143. Bilski, 561 U.S. at 602; accord id. at 621 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(“Section 101 imposes a threshold condition.”). 
144. See MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2103(I) (9th ed. Jan. 2018 rev.) 
(“[E]ach claim should be reviewed for compliance with every statutory requirement for 
patentability . . . .”); see also Maschinenfabrik Rieter, A.G. v. Greenwood Mills, 340 F. Supp. 1103, 
1108 (D.S.C. 1972) (“[I]t is the duty of the Patent Office carefully to examine each patent 
application in the light of all statutory requirements for patentability . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
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comprehensive nature of examination, there is at least a plausible ground for 
suggesting that the Patent Office should start with § 101—the first 
patentability requirement presented in the patent statute.145 But the notion that 
eligibility must be addressed at the outset has increasingly appeared in 
Federal Circuit opinions in infringement litigation, too. The initial 
appearances were largely as boilerplate recitations of the law that introduced 
the eligibility analysis.146 More recently, however, panels and judges of the 
Federal Circuit have become deeply divided over the question of whether a 
court must first address eligibility before deciding any other issue in an 
infringement case. 
Three distinct camps have formed. First, as the discussion thus far 
suggests, there remains significant support in both Federal Circuit and 
Supreme Court case law for the view that eligibility must be addressed at the 
outset regardless of whether the proceeding is examination at the Patent 
Office or litigation in court.147 Second, the Federal Circuit has sometimes 
stated precisely the opposite view: that courts should avoid analyzing 
eligibility if a case can be resolved on other grounds. This notion of what I 
will call “eligibility avoidance” first appeared in a 2012 case, Dealertrack, 
Inc. v. Huber,148 in which a district court had before it several different 
summary judgment motions.149 The district court granted a motion to 
invalidate the patent for not reciting eligible subject matter, and the Federal 
Circuit affirmed.150 But Judge Plager dissented, arguing that the court “should 
exercise its inherent power to control the processes of litigation and insist that 
litigants, and trial courts, initially address” novelty, nonobviousness, and the 
disclosure doctrines of § 112, “and not foray into the jurisprudential morass 
of § 101 unless absolutely necessary.”151 The majority (Judge Linn, joined by 
Judge Dyk—the author of Comiskey and its “must precede” declaration) 
responded by referencing the case law discussed above and noting, simply 
 
145. See 35 U.S.C. pt. II (“Patentability of Inventions and Grant of Patents”). 
146. See, e.g., Ultramercial, LLC v. Hulu, LLC (Ultramercial I), 657 F.3d 1323, 1326 (Fed. 
Cir. 2011) (“[A]s § 101 itself expresses, subject matter eligibility is merely a threshold check; claim 
patentability ultimately depends on ‘the conditions and requirements of this title,’ such as novelty, 
nonobviousness, and adequate disclosure.”), cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom. 
WildTangent, Inc. v. Ultramercial, LLC, 566 U.S. 1007 (2012) (mem.); Classen Immunotherapies, 
Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057, 1063 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (section of opinion titled “The § 101 
Threshold”). 
147. In addition to the cases discussed above, see the cases and opinions cited infra notes 152, 
160–61. 
148. 674 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
149. Id. at 1318. 
150. Id. at 1334. 
151. Id. at 1335 (Plager, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citation omitted). 
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(and accurately), that “the Supreme Court characterizes patent eligibility 
under § 101 as a ‘threshold test.’”152 
Undeterred, Judge Plager worked his eligibility avoidance view into a 
majority opinion less than two months later. In MySpace, Inc. v. GraphOn 
Corp.,153 the district court granted summary judgment of invalidity on the 
grounds of anticipation and obviousness, and the Federal Circuit affirmed.154 
This time, Judge Mayer dissented, insisting that “§ 101 is an ‘antecedent 
question’ that must be addressed before this court can consider whether 
particular claims are invalid as obvious or anticipated.”155 In response, Judge 
Plager, the author of the majority opinion (joined by Judge Newman), 
expanded on his dissent from Dealertrack, writing that courts should “avoid 
the swamp of verbiage that is § 101” and insist that litigants first address all 
of the Patent Act’s other patentability requirements.156 Avoiding § 101, 
according to Judge Plager’s opinion for the court, “would make patent 
litigation more efficient, conserve judicial resources, and bring a degree of 
certainty to the interests of both patentees and their competitors in the 
marketplace.”157 Judge Plager’s opinion drew parallels to the principle of 
constitutional avoidance, noting that § 101 “can be thought of as the patent 
law analogy to the Bill of Rights” and that, accordingly, the court should “put 
aside the § 101 defense” unless it is “clear and convincing beyond 
peradventure” that the claim is ineligible.158 
With Judge Plager’s opinion in MySpace still on the books today, two 
irreconcilable lines of Federal Circuit authority exist, both justified by 
appeals to efficiency in adjudication. First, the avoidance view, enshrined in 
the MySpace opinion and supported by concerns about the difficulty of 
applying the Supreme Court’s test for patent eligibility.159 And, second, the 
threshold view, supported by the long line of case law discussed above and 
perhaps most staunchly by Judge Mayer, as evidenced by his dissent in 
MySpace and several other opinions in subsequent cases.160 The basic policy 
 
152. Id. at 1330 n.3 (majority opinion) (quoting Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 602 (2010)). 
153. 672 F.3d 1250 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
154. Id. at 1258. 
155. Id. at 1264 (Mayer, J., dissenting) (quoting In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 975 n.7 (Fed. 
Cir. 2009)). 
156. Id. at 1260 (majority opinion). 
157. Id. 
158. Id. at 1260–61. 
159. Since MySpace, Judge Plager has continued to tout the virtues of avoiding questions of 
patent eligibility. See Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc., 896 F.3d 1335, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2018) 
(Plager, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[A] district court in an appropriate case might 
choose to exercise control over its docket by instructing a defendant who raises an ‘abstract ideas’ 
§ 101 defense that the court will defer addressing that defense until first having the issues in §§ 102, 
103, and 112 addressed.”). 
160. See, e.g., Alexsam, Inc. v. IDT Corp., 715 F.3d 1336, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (Mayer, J., 
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justification for the threshold view is that it can help end litigation quickly 
and inexpensively. As Judge Mayer has written, eligibility “can often be 
resolved without lengthy claim construction, and an early determination [of 
ineligibility] can spare both litigants and courts years of needless 
litigation.”161 
In contrast to the two extremes of the threshold and avoidance 
approaches, a third approach embraces the compromise position that courts 
should have discretion about when, exactly, to address the issue of eligibility. 
As noted above, the Federal Circuit’s Bilski opinion suggested that a patent 
examiner might have flexibility to address alternative grounds for rejection 
before eligibility. Judge Lourie’s concurrence in the Federal Circuit’s deeply 
divided en banc decision in Alice suggested that a more flexible approach 
would be permissible in litigation, too.162 He wrote: “[S]ome have argued that 
because § 101 is a ‘threshold test,’ district courts must always consider 
subject-matter eligibility first among all possible bases for finding invalidity. 
That is not correct.”163 “District courts,” Judge Lourie continued, “are rightly 
entrusted with great discretion to control their dockets and the conduct of 
proceedings before them, including the order of issues presented during 
litigation.”164 According to Judge Lourie, “district courts may exercise their 
discretion to begin elsewhere when they perceive that another section of the 
Patent Act might provide a clearer and more expeditious path to resolving a 
dispute.”165 
 
2. The Virtues of a Flexible Approach.—Of the three approaches to the 
timing of eligibility decisions, the flexible approach articulated by Judge 
Lourie in Alice—for which there is actually the least support in Federal 
Circuit case law—makes the most sense, and, based on my own exhaustive 
review of the relevant case law, best reflects the actual practice in the district 
courts, regardless of what the Federal Circuit’s precedent says.166 
 
dissenting) (“Whether claims are directed to statutory subject matter is a ‘threshold’ question, which 
must be addressed before this court can consider subordinate issues related to obviousness and 
infringement.” (citation omitted)); accord Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 
1307, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Mayer, J., concurring); see also cases cited infra note 161. 
161. I/P Engine, Inc. v. AOL Inc., 576 F. App’x 982, 996 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (Mayer, J., 
concurring); accord Ultramercial III, 772 F.3d 709, 718–20 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (Mayer, J., concurring) 
(noting that resolving eligibility at the outset “will conserve scarce judicial resources” because it 
can be resolved on a motion to dismiss without formal claim construction). 
162. CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d 1269, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc) (Lourie, J., 
concurring), aff’d, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). Judges Dyk, Prost, Reyna, and Wallach joined Judge 
Lourie’s opinion. 
163. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 602 (2010)). 
164. Id. 
165. Id. 
166. See, e.g., CertusView Techs., LLC v. S&N Locating Servs., LLC, 111 F. Supp. 3d 688, 
731 (E.D. Va. 2015) (granting the defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings of ineligibility 
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The threshold approach—for which there is the most precedential 
authority in Federal Circuit law—makes the least sense, particularly in 
litigation as compared to examination. For starters, it would be unusual in 
our adversarial system to force parties to litigate an issue they do not want to 
or to force a judge to decide an issue the parties do not contest.167 Some 
commentators have criticized courts’ tendency to give the parties control over 
issue selection, particularly when their presentation might lead the court to 
make an inaccurate pronouncement about the law.168 But a fact-specific 
decision on patent validity—particularly at the district court level—has 
almost no precedential significance.169 A related concern is that a defendant 
with a colorable ineligibility defense might not raise that defense for fear of 
creating precedent that will cast doubt on the validity of its own patents. 
While that dynamic surely exists in some cases,170 treating eligibility as a 
threshold issue would do little to change it, as a defendant worried about 
creating bad precedent for its own patents in a similar field of technology 
 
and denying as moot motions for summary judgment of anticipation, obviousness, and 
noninfringement), aff’d, 695 F. App’x 574 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (per curiam); TNS Media Research, 
LLC v. TRA Glob., Inc., 984 F. Supp. 2d 205, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (granting the defendants’ 
motion for summary judgment of noninfringement and denying as moot a motion for summary 
judgment of invalidity on eligibility grounds (among others)), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, vacated 
in part sub nom. TNS Media Research, LLC v. TiVo Research & Analytics, Inc., 629 F. App’x 916 
(Fed. Cir. 2015). 
167. See 21B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE § 5122 (2d ed. 2018) (“Under the American system of party initiation and party 
presentation, the judge does not roam about the countryside like the Lone Ranger seeking wrongs 
to right; one or both of the parties must bring their dispute to court . . . .”). One exception is, of 
course, with nonwaivable issues of jurisdiction, a point I discuss below. See infra notes 175–78 and 
accompanying text. 
168. See Amanda Frost, The Limits of Advocacy, 59 DUKE L.J. 447, 452–53 (2009); see also 
GARY LAWSON, EVIDENCE OF THE LAW 147–92 (2017) (exploring the circumstances in which the 
scope of adjudication is “entirely up to the parties” as well as the instances in which “the legal 
system . . . [has] the right, and even the obligation . . . , to tell the parties what they need to be 
arguing about”). 
169. Cf. Frost, supra note 168, at 511–12 (noting that, because “[d]istrict courts do not set 
precedent, . . . issue creation is less vital” at that level, but also observing that district courts are 
uniquely positioned to inject new issues into a case early—when fact development is still possible 
and the parties’ expectations are less settled). 
170. In the Myriad case, for example, Myriad’s DNA patents were challenged only when the 
American Civil Liberties Union and the Public Patent Foundation stepped in to represent a group 
of plaintiffs that included researchers, physicians, cancer patients, and nonprofit organizations. See 
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 186–89 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. granted,  
judgment vacated sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 566 U.S. 902 
(2012), opinion vacated, appeal reinstated, 467 F. App’x 890 (Fed. Cir. 2012), aff’d in part, rev’d 
in part, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular 
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576 (2013). Earlier suits by Myriad against other 
entities offering clinical genetic testing settled, with the defendants in each case agreeing to 
discontinue their allegedly infringing activity. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 689 F.3d at 1315. 
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would avoid challenging validity on any ground, not just eligibility.171 
Moreover, the patents most vulnerable to eligibility challenges are 
overwhelmingly in the information technology industry,172 and the 
defendants most often accused of infringing those patents—large tech 
companies such as Amazon, Apple, and Samsung173—have a reputation for 
not caring much about strong legal protection for patents.174 Those 
defendants thus have a clear incentive to raise the ineligibility defense as 
quickly as possible because, unlike any other ground of invalidity, it can 
allow them to win the case before discovery begins. 
Setting aside practical considerations, a doctrinal justification for the 
threshold approach, which Judge Mayer has embraced, is to characterize 
§ 101 as a “jurisdictional” requirement that cannot be waived by the parties 
or avoided by the court.175 But that argument is on shaky ground. The 
Supreme Court in recent years has significantly narrowed the class of legal 
requirements considered to be jurisdictional and therefore mandatory for a 
court to resolve at the outset of a case.176 Instead, the Court has enhanced 
lower courts’ flexibility to decide cases on the easiest ground available.177 
Patentable subject matter, which defines the validity of a patent and is 
essential to deciding a claim of infringement, would almost certainly fall on 
the merits, not jurisdictional, side of the divide.178 And yet, despite all these 
flaws in the threshold approach, both practical and doctrinal, district courts 
sometimes declare that eligibility must be resolved first because of the 
 
171. Instead, the defendant would likely pin its defense on noninfringement or simply settle. 
See Roger Allan Ford, Patent Invalidity Versus Noninfringement, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 71, 109–14 
(2013) (discussing various reasons why defendants in patent infringement suits sometimes avoid 
challenging validity). 
172. Lefstin, Menell & Taylor, supra note 16, at 580 fig.2. 
173. See Jacqueline Bell, Patent Litigation in US District Courts: A 2016 Review, LAW360 
(Mar. 1, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/895435/patent-litigation-in-us-district-courts-a-
2016-review [https://perma.cc/8X5J-83P2]. 
174. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 5, at 4. 
175. Ultramercial III, 772 F.3d 709, 718 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (Mayer, J., concurring) (noting that 
as a “gateway to the Patent Act,” eligibility analysis “bears some of the hallmarks of a jurisdictional 
inquiry”). 
176. See Howard M. Wasserman, The Demise of “Drive-by Jurisdictional Rulings,” 105 NW. 
U. L. REV. 947, 947–48 (2011). 
177. See, e.g., Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 425 (2007) 
(holding that a court may dismiss a case on forum non conveniens grounds without determining 
whether personal or subject matter jurisdiction exist). 
178. See Wasserman, supra note 176, at 948 (distinguishing “[a]djudicative-jurisdictional 
rules” from, among other things, “substantive-merits rules that . . . determin[e] the validity and 
success of a plaintiff’s claim”); see also Scott Dodson, Jurisdiction and Its Effects, 105 GEO. L.J. 
619, 634, 636 (2017) (“Jurisdiction[] . . . determines forum in a multiforum system. . . . Any law 
that does not determine forum . . . cannot be called jurisdictional.”). 
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significant amount of Federal Circuit (and Supreme Court) precedent 
embracing that perspective.179 
At the other extreme, some commentators have praised the virtues of 
eligibility avoidance. Drawing on Judge Plager’s opinion in MySpace, they 
note that avoiding eligibility can reduce “the total cost of deciding validity 
issues, given that § 101 is the most vague and contentious of all the validity 
doctrines.”180 These scholars have buttressed their arguments with the 
empirical evidence I mentioned above, which suggests that most patent 
applications rejected by examiners as ineligible are also rejected on another 
ground, such as anticipation or obviousness. That evidence, in their view, 
illustrates that it is often unnecessary to consider the sometimes difficult 
question of eligibility.181 
The avoidance approach has possible appeal in examination. Eligibility 
is essentially a common law doctrine that requires the decisionmaker to 
analogize and distinguish judicial precedent. That is a mode of analysis 
familiar to lawyers and judges but not to nonlawyer patent examiners.182 
Also, eligibility’s inquiry into whether an activity is “well-understood” or 
“conventional” in the field could, in some circumstances, require a more 
difficult and time-consuming investigation into the state of the art than it 
takes to resolve questions of novelty and nonobviousness, which mainly 
require the examiner to read technical documents.183 As the Federal Circuit 
has noted, “[t]he mere fact that something is disclosed in a piece of prior 
art”—which can be sufficient to invalidate a patent for lack of novelty and 
 
179. See, e.g., Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 6:15-CV-0029-WSS-JCM, 
2015 WL 3757497, at *4 (W.D. Tex. June 12, 2015) (noting that § 101 “must be satisfied before a 
court can proceed to consider subordinate validity issues” and that “[t]he Federal Circuit’s 
declaration on this point is rooted in sound policy” (quoting Ultramercial III, 772 F.3d at 718 
(Mayer, J., concurring))), report and recommendation adopted by No. W-15-CV-029, 2015 WL 
11622489 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 23, 2015), aff’d, 838 F.3d 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2016); SmartGene, Inc. v. 
Advanced Biological Labs., SA, 852 F. Supp. 2d 42, 51 (D.D.C. 2012) (stating that “a 35 U.S.C. 
§ 101 subject matter patentability inquiry is the threshold analysis for determining patent validity”), 
aff’d, 555 F. App’x 950 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
180. Crouch & Merges, supra note 119, at 1691; accord Vishnubhakat, supra note 119, at  
103–04. 
181. Crouch & Merges, supra note 119, at 1686; Vishnubhakat, supra note 119, at 94, 103–04. 
182. Greg Reilly, Decoupling Patent Law, 97 B.U. L. REV. 551, 592 (2017). If, however, the 
Patent Office had substantive rulemaking authority, the Office could potentially articulate principles 
of eligibility law better suited to application by examiners. For a suggestion that the Patent Office 
should be given the authority to promulgate substantive rules of eligibility, see John M. Golden, 
Patentable Subject Matter and Institutional Choice, 89 TEXAS L. REV. 1041, 1074–75 (2011) 
(arguing that “courts’ performance in forming and applying tests for patentable subject matter has 
been fairly poor” and that the Patent Office, by contrast, must deal with questions of claim “drafting, 
scope, and invention classification” on a daily basis “in the process of examining patent 
applications”). 
183. Jacob S. Sherkow, And How: Mayo v. Prometheus and the Method of Invention, 122 YALE 
L.J. ONLINE 351, 356–57 (2013). 
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can provide a basis for a ruling of obviousness—“does not mean it was well-
understood, routine, and conventional”184—a key element of a defense of 
ineligibility. That said, it is not beyond doubt that avoiding eligibility in 
examination would result in greater efficiency. A rejection on all applicable 
grounds at once can ultimately streamline the examination process. And as 
discussed further below, the claims and specification in the patent application 
itself often make plain that the claimed invention is directed to an ineligible 
principle with no inventive concept, mitigating concerns about examiners 
having to conduct expansive investigations into the state of the art.185 
In any case, the potential justifications for avoiding eligibility in 
examination do not translate to litigation. To begin with, the data indicating 
that many patents fail to satisfy both eligibility and at least one other 
requirement could actually be interpreted to support resolving litigation on 
pleading-stage eligibility motions. As discussed above, that data suggests 
that, by relying on the eligibility requirement to invalidate a patent on a 
motion to dismiss, courts can quickly and cheaply reach the exact same result 
they would have reached later in the litigation at summary judgment or trial. 
Moreover, even assuming early eligibility adjudications are more 
frequently erroneous than adjudications at later stages (which, again, 
empirical and experimental evidence indicates may not be the case186), there 
remain important considerations about process to be weighed. In 
examination, the examiner can consider all grounds of patentability at the 
same time, and failure to satisfy any one of them will stop the patent from 
issuing. In litigation, however, eligibility is practically the only ground of 
patentability that can be decided before discovery begins. Consequently, in 
litigation, unlike in examination, a finding that a patent fails to satisfy § 101 
can be made earlier in the process and at lower cost than findings of 
unpatentability on other grounds.187 
Finally, the notion that courts should avoid eligibility, and thereby treat 
that requirement differently from practically any other issue that might arise 
in a patent case, resembles the exceptionalist approach to procedural matters 
that the Supreme Court has repeatedly condemned in the past decade.188 The 
best approach to resolving patent eligibility in litigation, then, would seem to 
 
184. Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed, No. 
18-415 (U.S. Sept. 28, 2018). 
185. See infra notes 302–07 and accompanying text. 
186. See supra notes 119–20. 
187. See David Swetnam-Burland & Stacy O. Stitham, Patent Law 101: The Threshold Test as 
Threshing Machine, 21 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 135, 147 (2013) (“[I]n at least some cases Section 
101 questions can be asked and answered early in litigation before the parties and the court have 
invested considerable resources . . . in discovery, claim construction, and summary judgment 
practice.”). 
188. See Lee, supra note 59, at 1416. 
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be to resolve it like any other potentially dispositive issue—whenever the 
parties raise it and the court thinks it is ripe for decision.189 
B. Eligibility as Law, Fact, or Both 
Doctrinally, the reason courts are able to decide eligibility at the 
“threshold” via a motion to dismiss or for judgment on the pleadings is that 
they often view it as a question of law involving no factual considerations. 
Yet the test for eligibility developed by the Supreme Court seems to invite 
inquiry into matters that would conventionally be considered factual because 
they turn on the particularities of a given case,190 including whether the patent 
recites a “fundamental economic practice”191 or claims “conventional 
activity” in a specific field of technology.192 In this section, I suggest that 
eligibility should be understood to present a question of law based on 
underlying facts—just like other patentability requirements such as 
nonobviousness. Though the Federal Circuit has recently taken steps to 
recognize eligibility’s factual underpinnings, the court’s decisions may make 
it too easy for patentees to raise a factual dispute, defeating eligibility’s key 
function of providing a means to quickly and cheaply end infringement cases 
that plainly lack merit. 
 
1. Inconsistent Case Law on the Law-Versus-Fact Question.—To start, 
it will again be helpful to analyze the deep conflicts in the case law about 
whether eligibility is a question of law, a question of fact, or a mix of both. 
At the broadest level, the Supreme Court has said, repeatedly, that “the 
ultimate question of patent validity is one of law.”193 Nevertheless, the Court 
has recognized that the legal question of validity can have factual 
underpinnings.194 For example, the Court has explained that the 
nonobviousness requirement “lends itself to several basic factual inquiries” 
about the scope of the prior art, the differences between the prior art and the 
 
189. See id. at 1463 (arguing that patent law exceptionalism is not appropriate “where a well-
established standard exists for a discrete issue in general litigation”). 
190. See Gary Lawson, Proving the Law, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 859, 882 n.68 (1992) 
(distinguishing pure questions of law, which “can meaningfully be asked in the abstract, without 
reference to the facts of particular cases,” from “mixed” questions that cannot be decided “without 
reference to specific facts”). 
191. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2356 (2014); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 
593, 611 (2010). 
192. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 79–80 (2012). 
193. E.g., Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966). Though some nineteenth-century 
precedent treated patent validity as a question of fact for the jury, see, e.g., Battin v. Taggert, 58 
U.S. (17 How.) 74, 85 (1854), the demise of that rule was apparently tied to the development of 
more elaborate administrative processes for reviewing validity before the patent issued, see John F. 
Duffy, Jury Review of Administrative Action, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 281, 296–99 (2013). 
194. See Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 96–97 (2011). 
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claimed invention, the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art, and 
“secondary considerations,” such as commercial success and failure of 
others.195 The Federal Circuit, contrary to the Supreme Court’s declaration 
that patent validity is ultimately a question of law, has treated some 
patentability requirements as entirely factual, including utility,196 novelty,197 
and written description.198 
As for eligibility, the Federal Circuit has frequently stated that it is a 
question of law reviewed de novo on appeal—end stop.199 Judges on both the 
Federal Circuit and in the district courts have at times interpreted those 
statements as meaning that eligibility is a purely legal question that involves 
no factual issues.200 But a long line of often-overlooked Federal Circuit cases 
actually recognizes that the eligibility requirement can implicate questions of 
fact. 
The earliest eligibility case in which the Federal Circuit discussed the 
salience of facts is the court’s 1992 opinion in Arrhythmia Research 
Technology, Inc. v. Corazonix Corp.201 In that case, the court stated that 
analyzing eligibility “may require findings of underlying facts specific to the 
particular subject matter and its mode of claiming.”202 Ultimately, however, 
the court found it unnecessary to address any factual issues to decide 
eligibility in that case.203 
In the early days of eligibility’s renaissance, the Federal Circuit again 
 
195. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17. 
196. Raytheon Co. v. Roper Corp., 724 F.2d 951, 956 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
197. Brown v. 3M, 265 F.3d 1349, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
198. Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
For an overview of the Federal Circuit’s less-than-coherent approach to the law/fact distinction on 
validity issues, see MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 15, at 913–14. 
199. E.g., Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Erie Indem. Co., 850 F.3d 1315, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2017) 
(“Patent eligibility under § 101 is an issue of law . . . we review without deference.”); Fort Props., 
Inc. v. Am. Master Lease LLC, 671 F.3d 1317, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“Issues of patent-eligible 
subject matter are questions of law and are reviewed without deference.” (quoting CyberSource 
Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2011))); In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 
967, 975 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“It is well-established that ‘whether the asserted claims . . . are invalid 
for failure to claim statutory subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101[] is a question of law which we 
review without deference.’” (first alteration in original) (quoting AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc’ns, 
Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). 
200. See, e.g., Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc., 882 F.3d 1121, 1130 (Fed. 
Cir. 2018) (Reyna, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“I respectfully disagree with the 
majority’s broad statements on the role of factual evidence in a § 101 inquiry. Our precedent is clear 
that the § 101 inquiry is a legal question.”); CMG Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Pac. Tr. Bank, 50 F. Supp. 3d 
1306, 1314 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (“[T]he determination of whether a claim is drawn to patent-eligible 
subject matter is a pure question of law.”), aff’d, 616 F. App’x 420 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (per curiam); 
Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 127 F. Supp. 3d 687, 691 (W.D. Tex. 2015) (same), 
aff’d, 639 F. App’x 652 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see also infra note 222 (providing additional examples). 
201. 958 F.2d 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
202. Id. at 1056. 
203. See id. 
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alluded to the possible relevance of facts, but those statements, too, were 
dicta.204 The most extensive discussion of the role of facts appears in the 
court’s 2013 opinion in Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC (Ultramercial II).205 
In contrast to the court’s prior statements that there could perhaps be factual 
aspects to the eligibility analysis, Chief Judge Rader’s opinion for the court 
declared that the analysis is “rife with underlying factual issues” including 
whether there are “limitations in the claims that narrow or tie the claims to 
specific applications of an otherwise abstract concept,” “whether the patent 
embraces a scientific principle or abstract idea,” and whether the claim recites 
activities that were “routine, well-understood, or conventional” at the time 
the application was filed.206 The Supreme Court, however, vacated the 
Federal Circuit’s opinion in Ultramercial II after deciding Alice,207 and the 
Federal Circuit’s final opinion in the case, issued after Chief Judge Rader 
retired, did not discuss the role of facts in the eligibility inquiry.208 Other 
Federal Circuit cases around that time also stated that facts could be relevant 
to the eligibility inquiry, but all of those decisions ultimately concluded that 
there was no real dispute of fact in the case at hand.209 
The Federal Circuit’s failure to find an actual factual dispute—even in 
the rare cases in which it acknowledged the potential relevance of facts—
might be one reason why eligibility has often been viewed to present a pure 
question of law. Another reason might be that numerous Federal Circuit 
eligibility opinions have, without directly addressing the law/fact distinction, 
implicitly downplayed the relevance of facts. For instance, in a 2017 
decision, the court held that district courts, when deciding whether a patent 
contains the inventive concept required by § 101, may completely ignore the 
testimony presented by the parties on the issues of novelty and 
nonobviousness, which are widely acknowledged to involve questions of 
fact.210 Allowing courts to ignore that evidence seems questionable given that 
eligibility, novelty, and nonobviousness all revolve around the similar 
 
204. E.g., Comiskey, 554 F.3d at 975 (“While there may be cases in which the legal question as 
to patentable subject matter may turn on subsidiary factual issues, Comiskey has not identified any 
relevant fact issues that must be resolved in order to address the patentability of the subject matter 
of Comiskey’s application.”). 
205. 722 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
206. Id. at 1339. 
207. WildTangent, Inc. v. Ultramercial, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 2870 (2014). 
208. See generally Ultramercial III, 772 F.3d 709 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
209. See Mortg. Grader, Inc. v. First Choice Loan Servs. Inc., 811 F.3d 1314, 1325–26 (Fed. 
Cir. 2016); Accenture Glob. Servs., GmbH v. Guidewire Software, Inc., 728 F.3d 1336, 1340–41, 
1346 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
210. Two-Way Media Ltd. v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, 874 F.3d 1329, 1339–40 (Fed. Cir. 
2017) (holding that the district court correctly disregarded expert and inventor testimony addressing 
those issues), cert. denied, No. 18-124, 2018 WL 3626097 (U.S. Oct. 15, 2018). 
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question of what, exactly, the inventor added to preexisting technology.211 
The Federal Circuit offered no justification for its approach besides the self-
evident observation that eligibility and those other doctrines “are separate 
inquiries.”212 
Additional illustrations of the Federal Circuit implicitly downplaying 
the relevance of facts come from a pair of opinions that, on their face, 
purported to do precisely the opposite—emphasizing the importance of 
factual considerations when deciding eligibility at the pleading stage. The 
first case, McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games America Inc.,213 involved a 
patent on a computerized process of syncing animation with sound.214 The 
Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling of ineligibility on a motion 
for judgment on the pleadings, writing that the accused infringers “provided 
no evidence that the process previously used by animators is the same as the 
process required by the claims.”215 Yet this reference to the accused 
infringers’ failure to present evidence is puzzling in light of the case’s final 
outcome. Instead of vacating the judgment on the pleadings and remanding 
to allow the accused infringers to develop a factual record about prior art 
processes, the Federal Circuit held that the asserted claims were patent 
eligible, period.216 This definitive holding of eligibility seriously undercuts 
the court’s assertion that the accused infringers needed to present “evidence” 
to establish their defense. 
Similarly, in another opinion reversing a pleading-stage dismissal on 
eligibility grounds, Visual Memory LLC v. NVIDIA Corp.,217 the Federal 
Circuit twice asserted that, in deciding whether the patent was directed to an 
abstract idea, it was drawing all “factual inferences” in favor of the patentee, 
citing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).218 Yet the opinion again 
concluded by definitively ruling that the claimed invention was patent 
eligible.219 Viewed in light of that final outcome, the references to factual 
inferences and the case’s procedural posture seem like nothing more than 
 
211. For that reason, some courts have considered evidence of novelty or nonobviousness when 
deciding eligibility. See, e.g., YYZ, LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 137 F. Supp. 3d 675, 686 (D. Del. 
2015) (noting “how . . . the § 101 ‘inventiveness’ [analysis] involves questions of fact which 
intersect with those raised in the context of §§ 102 and 103”). 
212. Two-Way Media, 874 F.3d at 1340. 
213. 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
214. Id. at 1303. 
215. Id. at 1314 (emphasis added). 
216. See id. at 1316 (“[W]e reverse and hold that [the asserted claims] are patentable under 35 
U.S.C. § 101.”). 
217. 867 F.3d 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
218. Id. at 1261–62. 
219. Id. at 1262 (“[T]he claims of the ‘740 patent are not directed to patent-ineligible subject 
matter under § 101. . . . Because the district court erred in dismissing Visual Memory’s complaint 
on the ground that the ‘740 patent claimed patent-ineligible subject matter, we reverse.”). 
 
GUGLIUZZA.HEADERFIXED (DO NOT DELETE) 2/14/2019 11:26 PM 
2019] The Procedure of Patent Eligibility 605 
 
hollow argumentation offered to buttress a ruling favoring the plaintiff/
patentee. When it came down to it, the court simply resolved eligibility as a 
matter of law, foreclosing the defendant from presenting any factual evidence 
to establish its eligibility defense at a later stage of the case. 
All of this Federal Circuit case law downplaying the role of facts—
either implicitly or explicitly—makes it unsurprising that district courts, too, 
have frequently discounted the potential for factual considerations to enter 
the eligibility analysis. For instance, they usually allow the jury to decide the 
issues of anticipation and obviousness, but not eligibility.220 None of the 
leading model patent jury instructions even mention patent-eligible subject 
matter.221 In fact, numerous district courts have explicitly stated that patent 
eligibility is a “pure” question of law.222 Even the Patent Office has gotten in 
on the act. Summarizing prevailing case law, the most recent revision to the 
agency’s Manual of Patent Examining Procedure states that the Federal 
Circuit “does not require ‘evidence’ that a claimed concept is [ineligible], 
and generally decides the legal conclusion of eligibility without resolving any 
factual issues.”223 
 
2. Berkheimer and the Fact Questions Embedded in the Eligibility 
Analysis.—The upshot is that, for many years and in many fora, the role of 
facts in the eligibility analysis was minimal if not nonexistent, even though 
the Federal Circuit had sometimes suggested that facts could be relevant. This 
casual disregard of fact questions ended abruptly in February 2018. In two 
opinions issued less than a week apart, the Federal Circuit identified a 
 
220. See, e.g., Final Jury Instructions at 17–18, 20, DDR Holdings, LLC v. Digital River, Inc., 
No. 2:06-cv-42-JRG, 2012 WL 10056883 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 12, 2012); accord ContentGuard 
Holdings, Inc. v. Apple Inc., No. 2:13-CV-1112-JRG, 2016 WL 1637280, at *6 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 25, 
2016) (“Patent eligibility is a matter of law and is not properly submitted to a fact-finder such as a 
jury.”), aff’d, 701 F. App’x 957 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
221. See AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, MODEL PATENT JURY INSTRUCTIONS (2017), 
https://www.aipla.org/home/news-publications/model-patent-jury-instructions 
[https://perma.cc/3ZMQ-35TA]; FED. CIRCUIT BAR ASS’N, MODEL PATENT JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
(2016), https://fedcirbar.org/IntegralSource/Model-Patent-Jury-Instructions [https://perma.cc 
/ED5A-47FP]; MODEL PATENT JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF 
CALIFORNIA (2015) [hereinafter “N.D. CAL. MODEL PATENT JURY INSTRUCTIONS”] 
http://www.cand.uscourts.gov/juryinstructions [https://perma.cc/H92V-MBNF]. 
222. E.g., Lumen View Tech. LLC v. Findthebest.com, Inc., 984 F. Supp. 2d 189, 204 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“Whether a patent is valid under Section 101 is a pure question of law.”); accord 
DietGoal Innovations LLC v. Bravo Media LLC, 33 F. Supp. 3d 271, 277 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), aff’d, 
599 F. App’x 956 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (per curiam); Big Baboon, Inc. v. Dell, Inc., No. CV 09-1198, 
2011 WL 13124454, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2011); see also additional cases cited supra note 200. 
223. MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, supra note 144, § 2106.07(a)(III). As 
discussed below, in the wake of the Federal Circuit’s two recent decisions on the law-versus-fact 
distinction in the eligibility analysis, the Patent Office issued revised guidance to its examiners 
clarifying that factual determinations can be relevant to the eligibility determination. See infra note 
388 and accompanying text. 
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specific question of fact embedded within the eligibility analysis, overturned 
district court decisions resolving eligibility pre-trial, and threw the patent bar 
into a tizzy.224 Most pertinent to the present discussion of the law/fact 
distinction is Berkheimer v. HP Inc.225 In that opinion, the Federal Circuit 
vacated a district court decision granting summary judgment of ineligibility, 
ruling that a genuine dispute of material fact existed on the second step of the 
Alice test: whether the patent claims activity that is merely conventional in 
the field.226 
Because of Berkheimer’s importance to both the law/fact distinction and 
several other procedural issues discussed later in this Article, a detailed 
review of the case will prove useful. The plaintiff, Berkheimer, had sued HP 
for infringing his patent, which related to “digitally processing and archiving 
files in a digital asset management system.”227 The district court granted HP’s 
motion for summary judgment, holding that several claims of Berkheimer’s 
patent were ineligible under § 101.228 The Federal Circuit, in an opinion by 
Judge Moore, vacated that decision. Applying the first step of the Alice test, 
the court determined that the patent was directed to the abstract idea of using 
a generic computer to manipulate data.229 Turning to the second step, the 
court wrote that it is satisfied “when the claim limitations ‘involve more than 
performance of ‘well-understood, routine, [and] conventional activities 
previously known to the industry.’’”230 Then, directly addressing the law/fact 
question, the court stated: 
The question of whether a claim element or combination of elements 
is well-understood, routine and conventional to a skilled artisan in the 
relevant field is a question of fact. Any fact, such as this one, that is 
 
224. For a small sample of the commentary discussing the Federal Circuit’s decisions, see 
Meredith Addy, Is There a Light at the End of the Alice Tunnel?, IPWATCHDOG (Feb. 18, 2018), 
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/02/18/light-end-alice-tunnel/id=93883 [https://perma.cc/4U72-
4WP3], Dennis Crouch, Eligibility: A Factual Dispute Requires Alleged Facts, PATENTLYO 
(Feb. 22, 2018), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2018/02/eligibility-factual-requires.html [https:// 
perma.cc/8RS5-GKUH], and Ryan Davis, Recent Patent-Eligibility Cases Leave Unanswered 
Questions, LAW360 (Mar. 12, 2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/1020953/recent-patent-
eligibility-cases-leave-unanswered-questions [https://perma.cc/9S2M-5FJ5]. 
225. 881 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed, No. 18-415 (U.S. Sept. 28, 2018). 
226. Id. at 1370. 
227. Id. at 1362. 
228. Berkheimer v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 224 F. Supp. 3d 635, 637 (N.D. Ill. 2016), aff’d in 
part, vacated in part sub nom. Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018), petition for 
cert. filed, No. 18-415 (U.S. Sept. 28, 2018). 
229. Berkheimer, 881 F.3d at 1366. 
230. Id. at 1367 (alteration in original) (quoting Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. 
Wells Fargo Bank, 776 F.3d 1343, 1347–48 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank 
Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2359 (2014))). 
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pertinent to the invalidity conclusion must be proven by clear and 
convincing evidence.231 
Though, as discussed, the Federal Circuit had previously suggested that there 
might be factual questions relevant to the eligibility analysis, this 
identification of a particular issue of fact—whether the claimed invention is 
conventional in the field—is unprecedented in Federal Circuit law. 
Turning to the case at hand, the Federal Circuit—again for the first time 
ever in an eligibility ruling—found that a factual dispute actually existed. The 
patentee had argued, drawing on Alice, that the patent’s inventive concept 
was that it improved the function of a computer.232 Assessing that argument, 
the Federal Circuit noted that the patent’s specification “explains that the 
claimed improvement increases efficiency and computer functionality over 
the prior art systems,” and the court quoted at length from the relevant 
portions of the specification.233 Then, relying entirely on the patent’s own 
statements about its purported inventiveness—and without citing any other 
evidence from the record—the Federal Circuit concluded that “[t]he 
improvements in the specification . . . create a factual dispute regarding 
whether the invention describes well-understood, routine, and conventional 
activities.”234 Summary judgment was, therefore, inappropriate.235 
The Federal Circuit offered only minimal justification for its assertion 
that the inquiry into “conventionality” is a question of fact. The court relied 
primarily on the Supreme Court’s decision in Mayo, which suggested that the 
§ 101 inquiry “might sometimes overlap” with what the Federal Circuit in 
Berkheimer characterized as “other fact-intensive inquiries” such as novelty 
under § 102.236 Still, an inquiry into whether the claimed technology is well-
known in a particular field does seem intuitively like the sort of determination 
the law would usually consider to be factual, as it requires the court to 
determine conditions that exist (or have existed) in the world outside the 
courtroom.237 
 
231. Id. at 1368. 
232. Id. at 1369; see also Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2359 (invalidating the patents-in-suit because they 
“[did] not, for example, purport to improve the functioning of the computer itself”). 
233. Including a long block quote stating, in part: 
By eliminating redundancy in the archive . . . , system operating efficiency will be 
improved, storage costs will be reduced and a one-to-many editing process can be 
implemented wherein a singular linked object, common to many documents or files, 
can be edited once and have the consequence of the editing process propagate through 
all of the linked documents and files. 
Berkheimer, 881 F.3d at 1369 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 7,447,713 col. 16 ll.52–60). 
234. Id. 
235. Id. at 1370. 
236. Id. at 1368 (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 90 
(2012)). 
237. See Stephen A. Weiner, The Civil Nonjury Trial and the Law-Fact Distinction, 55 CALIF. 
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Indeed, despite the large amount of pre-Berkheimer case law treating 
eligibility as a purely legal question, the Supreme Court has never so held. 
On the contrary, the Court has frequently based its eligibility rulings on 
“undisputed” propositions that look like facts and on evidence extrinsic to 
the patent itself—including on the first step of the Alice analysis, which asks 
if the patent is directed to an ineligible principle. For instance, in Myriad, in 
which the Court invalidated patents on DNA sequences for claiming a 
“product of nature,” the Court wrote: “It is undisputed that Myriad did not 
create or alter any of the genetic information encoded in the [claimed] 
genes,”238 the implication being that a future case could raise a factual dispute 
about whether a claimed invention occurs in nature. Similarly, in both Alice 
and Bilski, the Court cited extrinsic evidence, including textbooks, treatises, 
and academic journal articles, to support the conclusion that the patents 
claimed the abstract ideas of intermediated settlement and risk hedging, 
respectively.239 To be sure, none of the Supreme Court’s recent cases were 
themselves resolved at the pleading stage.240 But the Court’s reliance on 
extrinsic evidence and “undisputed” propositions suggests that the Court 
would embrace the notion that the eligibility inquiry can involve questions of 
fact.241 
To that end, Berkheimer may not be the revolutionary decision it has 
been portrayed to be.242 In contrast to the district courts that had treated 
eligibility as a pure question of law, other pre-Berkheimer district court 
 
L. REV. 1020, 1020 (1967) (“A question of reconstructing . . . conditions which have actually 
existed[] can . . . be defined as a question of fact . . . .”). 
238. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 590 (2013) 
(emphasis added). 
239. See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2356 (2014) (citing Henry Crosby 
Emery, Speculation on the Stock and Produce Exchanges of the United States, in 7 STUDIES IN 
HISTORY, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC LAW 283, 346–56 (New York, Columbia Univ. 1896); Yesha 
Yadav, The Problematic Case of Clearinghouses in Complex Markets, 101 GEO. L.J. 387, 406–12 
(2013); JOHN C. HULL, RISK MANAGEMENT AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 103–04 (3d ed. 2012)); 
Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (citing DIMITRIS N. CHORAFAS, INTRODUCTION TO 
DERIVATIVE FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS 75–94 (2008); CLYDE P. STICKNEY ET AL., FINANCIAL 
ACCOUNTING: AN INTRODUCTION TO CONCEPTS, METHODS, AND USES 581–82 (13th ed. 2010); 
STEPHEN ROSS ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATE FINANCE 743–44 (8th ed. 2008)). 
240. Alice, Mayo, and Myriad were appeals from summary judgment. Bilski was an appeal from 
the Patent Office’s rejection of a patent application. 
241. More precisely, questions of adjudicative fact. See Adjudicative Fact, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“A controlling or operative fact . . . ; a fact that is particularly related 
to the parties to a proceeding and that helps the tribunal determine how the law applies to those 
parties.”); cf. Legislative Fact, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra (“A fact . . . that helps a court . . . 
determine the law’s meaning and application. Legislative facts are not ordinarily specific to the 
parties in a proceeding.”). 
242. See, e.g., @marklemley, TWITTER (Feb. 8, 2018, 4:33 PM), 
https://twitter.com/marklemley/status/961714734335606784 [https://perma.cc/BH9L-UZQW] 
(“Blockbuster Fed Cir opinion—patentable subject matter is now frequently going to be a question 
of fact that goes to trial.”). 
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decisions reflected the potentially fact-driven nature of the eligibility inquiry. 
Many courts had denied pleading-stage eligibility motions specifically 
because of factual disputes they perceived to exist on one or both steps of the 
Alice analysis.243 Other district courts engaged in what clearly appeared to be 
factfinding—for instance, relying on expert testimony about the patent’s 
inventiveness—in resolving eligibility, either before trial244 or after trial.245 
One district court had even allowed the jury to resolve the ultimate question 
of patent eligibility.246 Though that court was an outlier, many district judges 
reconsidered pre-trial eligibility rulings after hearing the evidence and 
testimony at trial,247 or simply deferred deciding eligibility until after trial.248 
All of these cases suggest that, in Berkheimer, the Federal Circuit merely 
confirmed what many district courts knew all along: facts can be relevant to 
the eligibility determination, even if the Federal Circuit’s case law could be 
interpreted to indicate otherwise. 
Thus, the Federal Circuit’s assertion in Berkheimer that the legal 
question of eligibility “may contain disputes over underlying facts”249 
 
243. For examples, see Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Merck & Co., No. 15-560-GMS, 2016 WL 
1072841, at *1 n.1 (D. Del. Mar. 17, 2016) (finding a factual dispute about whether the patent 
contained an “inventive concept”), Cave Consulting Group, Inc. v. Truven Health Analytics Inc., 
No. 15-cv-02177-SI, 2016 WL 283478, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2016) (denying motion for 
judgment on the pleadings “without prejudice to renewal after claim construction and on a fuller 
factual record”), and Card Verification Solutions, LLC v. Citigroup Inc., No. 13 C 6339, 2014 WL 
4922524, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2014) (“The question whether a pseudorandom number and 
character generator can be devised that relies on an algorithm that can be performed by a human 
with nothing more than pen and paper poses a factual question inappropriate at the motion to dismiss 
stage.”). 
244. See, e.g., Prism Techs., LLC v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 8:12CV124, 2015 WL 6161790, 
at *3 (D. Neb. Sept. 22, 2015) (granting the patentee’s motion for summary judgment of eligibility), 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, dismissed in part, 696 F. App’x 1014 (Fed. Cir. 2017). The Federal 
Circuit reversed the decision in that case, but it relied entirely on the patent itself in finding the 
claimed invention ineligible; it did not discuss the extrinsic evidence the district court had relied on. 
Prism Techs. LLC v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 696 F. App’x 1014, 1017–18 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
245. See Veracode, Inc. v. Appthority, Inc., 137 F. Supp. 3d 17, 51–54 (D. Mass. 2015) 
(denying a post-trial motion to invalidate a patent on eligibility grounds, relying on testimony by 
both the inventor and multiple experts to find an inventive concept). 
246. VS Techs., LLC v. Twitter, Inc., No. 2:11cv43, 2012 WL 1481508, at *4 (E.D. Va. 
Apr. 27, 2012) (upholding verdict of ineligibility). 
247. As one might expect, many of these post-trial decisions reached the same result as the pre-
trial ruling. See, e.g., Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC v. Sprint Commc’ns Co., 262 F. Supp. 3d 
118, 139, 141 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (denying a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law of 
ineligibility after having previously denied a motion for summary judgment on that ground), appeal 
dismissed, No. 17-2495, 2017 WL 8220211 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Exergen Corp. v. Kaz USA, Inc., 172 
F. Supp. 3d 366, 367 (D. Mass. 2016) (similar), aff’d, 725 F. App’x 959 (Fed. Cir. 2018). But, 
possible anchoring effects aside, the courts’ mere willingness to reengage the issue illustrates the 
view that factual considerations can be relevant to the eligibility analysis. 
248. E.g., Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 100 F. Supp. 3d 371, 375 (D. Del. 
2015), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 838 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
249. Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed, No. 
18-415 (U.S. Sept. 28, 2018). 
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appears to be on solid ground.250 But the court’s discussion of the types of 
evidence that can create a factual dispute could introduce serious 
inefficiencies into litigation over patent eligibility. The court, recall, ruled 
that summary judgment was inappropriate solely because of improvements 
described in the patent’s specification. The court’s ruling that the patentee’s 
description of his own invention can create a genuine issue of material fact is 
in tension with both patent law doctrine on the law/fact distinction and with 
more general civil procedure doctrine on summary judgment. 
First, in terms of patent doctrine, the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision on 
claim construction, Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc.,251 is 
instructive. In that case, the Court ruled that “when the district court reviews 
only evidence intrinsic to the patent (the patent claims and specifications, 
along with the patent’s prosecution history), the judge’s determination will 
amount solely to a determination of law” reviewed de novo on appeal.252 As 
applied to an eligibility case like Berkheimer, Teva suggests that a dispute of 
fact that can preclude summary judgment must involve extrinsic evidence, 
such as witness testimony about the state of the art or documentary evidence 
about the prior art.253 It seems wrong as a matter of doctrine—and wasteful 
as a matter of judicial economy—to take a case to trial, possibly in front of a 
jury, when, as in Berkheimer, the only evidence of inventiveness comes from 
the patent itself, which is normally interpreted by the judge alone and which 
the judge is quite capable of doing on summary judgment. 
Careful observers of patent law might question whether it is appropriate 
to import the law/fact distinction drawn in Teva—a case about claim 
construction—to the eligibility analysis. After all, in a claim construction 
dispute like Teva, the judge is reading the patent’s specification to determine 
what the claims mean—an inquiry focused entirely on the patent itself. In an 
eligibility dispute, by contrast, a judge might use the specification to shed 
light on a question “external” to the patent, namely, whether the claimed 
invention was conventional given the state of the art.254 But at the summary 
 
250. For a pre-Berkheimer scholarly critique of eligibility doctrine lamenting courts’ inattention 
to factual considerations, see Timothy R. Holbrook & Mark D. Janis, Patent-Eligible Processes: An 
Audience Perspective, 17 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 349, 382 (2015) (noting that the test for patent 
eligibility “entitles a court to kick the hypothetical person of ordinary skill in the art to the curb in 
favor of a discretionary analysis that need not be constrained by the need to establish qualifying 
prior art evidence”). 
251. 135 S. Ct. 831 (2015). 
252. Id. at 841 (emphasis added). 
253. As the Court noted in Teva, when the court “look[s] beyond the patent’s intrinsic evidence 
and . . . consult[s] extrinsic evidence in order to understand, for example, the background science,” 
that inquiry can entail “subsidiary factual findings” that will be reviewed for clear error. Id. 
254. Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 890 F.3d 1369, 1371 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (Moore, J., concurring 
in the denial of the petition for rehearing en banc) (“[W]hether claim limitations recite activities that 
were well-understood, routine, and conventional in the relevant field at a particular point in time . . . 
is a question of historical fact, not a legal question of claim scope.”). 
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judgment stage of an eligibility dispute—the procedural posture of 
Berkheimer—the judge is not answering that question about conventionality; 
the judge is simply asking whether a factfinder could find a lack of 
conventionality based on what is in the specification. That question, much 
like claim construction, is focused on the content of the patent document 
itself. Like a claim construction based entirely on intrinsic evidence, the 
question of what a factfinder might conclude based on intrinsic evidence 
should be viewed to present a question of law.255 
Second, and even setting aside Berkheimer’s tension with Teva, the 
Federal Circuit’s decision to find a genuine dispute of material fact based 
entirely on the patentee’s own statements about its patent’s inventiveness 
conflicts with a long line of summary judgment cases decided by both the 
Supreme Court and courts of appeals besides the Federal Circuit. Those cases 
hold that statements by a party or its own witnesses that are conclusory or 
uncorroborated by other evidence cannot raise a genuine issue of material 
fact to defeat summary judgment.256 The Federal Circuit in Berkheimer 
ignored that principle by allowing the patentee to avoid summary judgment 
without offering any evidence to substantiate its patent’s assertions about 
inventiveness. 
In addition to being in tension with case law outside the Federal 
Circuit—and providing yet another example of Federal Circuit 
“exceptionalism” on procedural matters257—Berkheimer exacerbates the 
intracircuit split mentioned above on whether the specification can inform 
the eligibility analysis or whether the analysis should focus on the claims 
alone.258 Berkheimer, plainly, gives the specification significant weight in 
resolving the eligibility inquiry,259 but that mode of analysis is hard to square 
 
255. See id. at 1382 (Reyna, J., dissenting from the denial of the petition for rehearing en banc) 
(noting that “[t]he § 101 inquiry can . . . be analogized to claim construction” and contending that 
“[a] § 101 patent eligibility determination . . . resolved without . . . look[ing] beyond the four 
corners of the patent” is “solely a question of law for the court to properly decide”). 
256. See, e.g., KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 426 (2007) (noting that “a 
conclusory affidavit addressing the question of obviousness” cannot forestall summary judgment); 
Jeffreys v. City of New York, 426 F.3d 549, 554 (2d Cir. 2005) (upholding summary judgment in 
favor of the defendant where the plaintiff’s only evidence was his own affidavit and deposition 
testimony). As the Second Circuit noted in Jeffreys: 
[N]onmoving parties “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical 
doubt as to the material facts,” and they “may not rely on conclusory allegations or 
unsubstantiated speculation.” At the summary judgment stage, a nonmoving party 
“must offer some hard evidence showing that its version of the events is not wholly 
fanciful.” 
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting, among other cases, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio 
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)). 
257. See supra note 59. 
258. See supra notes 110–11 and accompanying text. 
259. Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“[T]here is at least a genuine 
issue of material fact in light of the specification regarding whether [the patent claims in suit] archive 
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with the Federal Circuit’s statements in other cases that “detail[s] in the 
specification” cannot “transform a claim reciting only an abstract concept 
into a patent-eligible system or method.”260 
Despite these flaws in the Berkheimer opinion, the Federal Circuit made 
a laudable decision to hold that eligibility is not a “pure” question of law, as 
prior precedent suggested it was. As I explain next, that holding is relevant 
not just for courts deciding eligibility on summary judgment (the procedural 
posture of the Berkheimer case itself), but also for courts deciding eligibility 
at the pleading stage on a motion to dismiss—the most popular procedural 
mechanism for resolving eligibility.261 The Federal Circuit has recently 
considered the role of facts in deciding eligibility at that earlier stage, too. 
But, just like in Berkheimer, the court has arguably made it too easy for 
patentees to prevail by allowing them to avoid dismissal by simply offering 
their own statements about their patent’s inventiveness. 
C. Deciding Eligibility on the Pleadings 
If the eligibility analysis involves factual considerations, as I argued 
above and as the Federal Circuit held in Berkheimer, then, at the pleading 
stage, eligibility is not the yes-or-no question it would be in a court that 
viewed eligibility to present a pure question of law. Rather, any factual issues 
should be resolved by reference to the Supreme Court’s decisions in Twombly 
and Iqbal, which read Civil Rule 8(a)(2) to mandate that the complaint 
contain factual allegations sufficient to justify a plausible inference of 
liability.262 Less than a week after deciding Berkheimer, the Federal Circuit 
issued another eligibility opinion, Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades 
Software, Inc.,263 again chastising a district court for giving insufficient 
weight to factual considerations, this time in a case that had been dismissed 
at the pleading stage. Though the Federal Circuit’s continued emphasis on 
the relevance of facts to the eligibility inquiry is a welcome development, this 
section argues that, like Berkheimer, the court’s decision in Aatrix may go 
too far: by ignoring the requirement from Twombly and Iqbal that factual 
allegations in the complaint must be plausible, Aatrix threatens to make it 
 
documents in an inventive manner . . . .” (emphasis added)), petition for cert. filed, No. 18-415 (U.S. 
Sept. 28, 2018). 
260. Accenture Glob. Servs., GmbH v. Guidewire Software, Inc., 728 F.3d 1336, 1345 (Fed. 
Cir. 2013); accord Two-Way Media Ltd. v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC, 874 F.3d 1329, 1338 
(Fed. Cir. 2017), cert. denied, No. 18-124, 2018 WL 3626097 (U.S. Oct. 15, 2018). 
261. See Lefstin, Menell & Taylor, supra note 16, at 578 tbl.2. 
262. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 
557 (2007). Part of the reason those decisions have been so controversial is that Rule 8(a)(2) states 
merely that a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 
pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
263. 882 F.3d 1121 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
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extraordinarily difficult for an accused infringer to obtain a pre-discovery 
dismissal on eligibility grounds. 
 
1. Pleading-Stage Motions and Patent Validity Disputes.—To explain 
that argument, it will be helpful to first discuss the general legal principles 
that govern pleading-stage motions (as I explain below, the Federal Circuit 
at least partially ignored these general principles in its Aatrix decision) and 
to examine how pleading-stage motions have historically been used in patent 
cases. A defendant can base a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) (or for 
judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c))264 on one of two grounds.265 
First, the defendant can argue that, assuming the facts alleged in the 
complaint are true, the law does not recognize the plaintiff’s claim. Or, 
second, the defendant can argue that there are not enough facts alleged in the 
complaint to “show[]” that the plaintiff is entitled to relief, as Rule 8(a)(2) 
requires.266 
Courts and commentators often say that, on a motion to dismiss, “the 
complaint is construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”267 But it 
is important to note that that axiom applies only to matters of fact,268 not to 
matters of law.269 Thus, on a motion to dismiss based on the first ground listed 
above (that the complaint recites facts that are simply not unlawful), the 
plaintiff’s legal claim of liability will receive no deference from the court. 
 
264. The only difference between the two motions is that a defendant can file a motion to 
dismiss in lieu of an answer, while a motion for judgment on the pleadings is filed after the answer. 
A. BENJAMIN SPENCER, CIVIL PROCEDURE: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 494–95 (rev. 4th ed. 
2015). 
265. See id. at 491–92. 
266. At a later stage of the case, a summary judgment motion can, similarly, take one of two 
forms, arguing either (1) that “a particular interpretation or application of the governing law . . . to 
undisputed or largely undisputed facts . . . entitles the movant to judgment” or (2) “that there are no 
material facts in dispute, so that the movant is entitled to judgment under the law.” Jonathan Remy 
Nash, Unearthing Summary Judgment’s Concealed Standard of Review, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 87, 
96–97 (2016). 
267. 5B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 1357 (3d ed. 2018); see also In re Bill of Lading Transmission & Processing Sys. 
Patent Litig., 681 F.3d 1323, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[W]e generally construe the complaint in the 
light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept its allegations as true, and draw all reasonable inferences 
in favor of the plaintiff . . . .”). 
268. See 5B WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 267, § 1357 (“[F]ederal courts have said that they 
accept the truth of a pleading’s ‘facts,’ ‘factual allegations,’ ‘material facts,’ ‘material allegations,’ 
‘well-pleaded facts,’ ‘well-pleaded factual allegations,’ and ‘well-pleaded allegations.’” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
269. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“[T]he tenet that a court must accept as 
true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” (emphasis 
added)); Bill of Lading, 681 F.3d at 1331 (“[W]e are not required to accept as true legal 
conclusions . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also 5B WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 
267, § 1357 & n.22 (citing numerous cases holding that “a pleading’s ‘legal conclusions’” “need 
not be accepted as true on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion”). 
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Also, the requirement of Twombly and Iqbal that the complaint contain 
enough “factual allegations . . . [to] plausibly give rise to an entitlement to 
relief”270 is irrelevant because the motion, by definition, does not challenge 
the sufficiency of factual allegations. A motion to dismiss based on the 
second ground listed above, however, directly raises the issue of whether the 
factual allegations in the complaint, if proven, would allow a court to infer 
liability. In that circumstance, the relevant factual allegations are assumed to 
be true, and the plausibility standard of Twombly and Iqbal is crucial to the 
analysis. 
Before the recent reemergence of the eligibility requirement, pleading-
stage motions to invalidate patents were basically unheard of. On the rare 
occasions parties filed them, they were almost always denied.271 After Bilski, 
however, some district courts began to resolve eligibility on the pleadings. 
One of the first to do so was the district court in the Ultramercial litigation 
mentioned above. In that case, the court rejected the patentee’s argument that 
eligibility could not be decided on a motion to dismiss and before the court 
had formally construed the patent’s claims, noting that “[t]he patent terms are 
clear” and that the patentee “has not brought to the Court’s attention any 
reasonable construction that would bring the patent within patentable subject 
matter.”272 Though some courts followed suit and invalidated patents on the 
pleadings,273 others were more cautious. A district judge in Ohio, for 
instance, refused to entertain an ineligibility defense on a motion to dismiss, 
criticizing the court in Ultramercial for, among other things, ignoring “the 
presumption of validity and a patent challenger’s burden to prove invalidity 
by clear and convincing evidence.”274 
 
270. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. 
271. For pre-Bilski examples of unsuccessful pleading-stage invalidity motions, see Digital-
Vending Services International, LLC v. University of Phoenix Inc., No. 2:09cv555, 2010 WL 
11450783, at *4 (E.D. Va. Aug. 12, 2010) (denying motion for judgment on the pleadings of 
indefiniteness), and Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. Civ.A. 02-11280-RWZ, 
2003 WL 21087115, at *1 (D. Mass. May 12, 2003) (denying motion to dismiss on the grounds of 
anticipation and enablement). Besides eligibility, the ground most likely to result in a pleading-stage 
invalidation (though it was and remains rare) is indefiniteness, see, e.g., In re TLI Commc’ns LLC 
Patent Litig., 87 F. Supp. 3d 773, 804 (E.D. Va. 2015), aff’d, 823 F.3d 607 (Fed. Cir. 2016); 
Lexington Luminance LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 6 F. Supp. 3d 179, 195 (D. Mass. 2014), vacated 
and remanded, 601 F. App’x 963 (Fed. Cir. 2015), probably because indefiniteness is a matter of 
claim construction that can be decided by the judge. But see infra note 410 (discussing case law 
allowing juries to decide indefiniteness). 
272. Ultramercial, LLC v. Hulu, LLC, No. CV 09-06918 RGK, 2010 WL 3360098, at *6 (C.D. 
Cal. Aug. 13, 2010), rev’d, 722 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2013), cert. granted, judgment vacated sub 
nom. WildTangent, Inc. v. Ultramercial, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 2870 (2014) (mem.). 
273. E.g., Glory Licensing LLC v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., No. 09-4252 (FSH), 2011 WL 1870591, 
at *4 (D.N.J. May 16, 2011), appeal dismissed, 459 F. App’x 916 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
274. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. Safeco Ins. Co., No. 1:10 CV 1370, 2010 WL 4698576, at *4 
(N.D. Ohio Nov. 12, 2010); accord Investpic, LLC v. FactSet Research Sys., Inc., No. 10-1028-
SLR, 2011 WL 4591078, at *1 (D. Del. Sept. 30, 2011) (“[c]hoos[ing] not to follow” Ultramercial 
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Other courts expressed reluctance to adjudicate eligibility without 
conducting claim construction.275 Because the judge’s claim construction 
delineates the patent’s exclusionary scope,276 it is potentially quite relevant 
to inquiries in the eligibility analysis, such as whether a patent claim is 
“directed to” a natural phenomenon or abstract idea.277 On the other hand, as 
the district court illustrated in Ultramercial, a judge could resolve eligibility 
without formally construing the patent’s claims by simply reading the claims 
in the manner most favorable to the patentee. 
In the first Ultramercial appeal (Ultramercial I), the Federal Circuit sent 
mixed signals about whether it is proper to resolve eligibility on the pleadings 
and before claim construction. On one hand, the court noted that it “has never 
set forth a bright line rule requiring district courts to construe claims before 
determining subject matter eligibility.”278 On the other hand, the court wrote 
that “[o]n many occasions, . . . a definition of the invention via claim 
construction can clarify the basic character of the subject matter of the 
invention.”279 The court ultimately approved the district court’s procedural 
decision to resolve eligibility on a motion to dismiss without construing the 
claims (although the Federal Circuit reversed on the merits).280 
The Supreme Court vacated the Federal Circuit’s opinion in 
Ultramercial I after Mayo,281 and it soon became increasingly common for 
district courts to decide patent eligibility on the pleadings.282 In Ultramercial 
II, however, the Federal Circuit again questioned that practice, writing that 
“it will be rare that a patent infringement suit can be dismissed at the pleading 
stage for lack of patentable subject matter.”283 For dismissal under Rule 
12(b)(6) to be proper, the court wrote, “the only plausible reading of the 
 
and Glory Licensing). More to follow on the presumption of validity and the standard of proof in 
eligibility disputes. See infra subpart II(E). 
275. E.g., Edge Capture, L.L.C. v. Barclays Bank PLC, No. 09 C 1521, 2011 WL 494573, at 
*1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 31, 2011). 
276. See supra note 48. 
277. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014). 
278. Ultramercial I, 657 F.3d 1323, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. granted, judgment vacated sub 
nom. WildTangent, Inc. v. Ultramercial, LLC, 566 U.S. 1007, 1007 (2012) (mem.). 
279. Id. 
280. Id. at 1325, 1330. 
281. WildTangent, 566 U.S. 1007. 
282. See, e.g., Vacation Exch., LLC v. Wyndham Exch. & Rentals, Inc., No. CV 12-04229 
RGK, 2012 WL 12882053, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2012) (“[W]here claim construction is not 
required for a full understanding of the basic character of the claimed subject matter, a district court 
may resolve patentable subject matter eligibility on a motion to dismiss.”); OIP Techs., Inc. v. 
Amazon.com, Inc., No. C-12-1233 EMC, 2012 WL 3985118, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 2012) 
(holding that a motion to dismiss on eligibility grounds “is not per se premature”), aff’d, 788 F.3d 
1359 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
283. Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC (Ultramercial II), 722 F.3d 1335, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2013), 
cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom. WildTangent, Inc. v. Ultramercial, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 2870 
(2014) (mem.). 
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patent must be that there is clear and convincing evidence of ineligibility.”284 
Yet the Supreme Court also vacated Ultramercial II, this time in light 
of Alice.285 And several subsequent Federal Circuit decisions affirmed 
pleading-stage dismissals under § 101.286 By 2015, a magistrate judge in 
Delaware could confidently declare that “[i]t is now well-settled that it can 
be proper to address a Section 101 motion in a patent infringement action at 
the Rule 12(b)(6) stage.”287 Shortly thereafter, the Federal Circuit backed 
away from any suggestion that patent eligibility could not be resolved on the 
pleadings, instead recognizing that it had “repeatedly affirmed § 101 
rejections at the motion to dismiss stage, before claim construction or 
significant discovery has commenced.”288 
In February 2018, however, less than a week after deciding Berkheimer, 
the Federal Circuit issued its opinion in Aatrix—another bombshell decision 
on the procedure of patent eligibility—ruling that a district court was wrong 
to grant a motion to dismiss on eligibility grounds because the patentee’s 
complaint contained factual allegations about the inventiveness of its asserted 
patent.289 
 
2. Aatrix and the Propriety of Deciding Eligibility on the Pleadings.—
Because of Aatrix’s importance to the question of when, if ever, patent 
eligibility may be resolved on the pleadings, it is worthwhile to review the 
case in some detail. The patent in Aatrix covered a computerized data 
processing system.290 Most relevant to the Federal Circuit’s decision, the 
patent recited (1) a “data file” that could populate forms and (2) a program 
operating on that data file to perform calculations, allow users to view and 
change data, and generate reports.291 The district court granted the 
 
284. Id. at 1339. 
285. WildTangent, 134 S. Ct. 2870. 
286. E.g., Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2015); 
Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, 776 F.3d 1343, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 
2014); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1352, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
287. Versata Software, Inc. v. NetBrain Techs., Inc., No. 13-676-LPS-CJB, 2015 WL 5768938, 
at *2 n.2 (D. Del. Sept. 30, 2015). 
288. Cleveland Clinic Found. v. True Health Diagnostics LLC, 859 F.3d 1352, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 
2017) (collecting cases), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2621 (2018). 
289. Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc., 882 F.3d 1121, 1130 (Fed. Cir. 
2018). 
290. The case actually involved several claims of two different patents. Id. at 1123. But because 
those patents had “essentially the same specification” and because the Federal Circuit treated one 
claim of one patent as representative of all the relevant claims, id., I refer in the text to “patent,” 
singular. 
291. See U.S. Patent No. 7,171,615, at [57] (“[A] data file containing data for populating [a] 
viewable form[] and a form viewer program operating on [a] form file and the data file to perform 
calculations, allow the user of the data processing system to review and change the data, and create 
viewable forms and reports.” (emphasis added)). 
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defendant’s motion to dismiss, ruling that the system claimed by the patent 
involved little more than “fill[ing] out forms”—an abstract idea with no 
inventive concept.292 In response to that dismissal, the patentee sought 
permission to file an amended complaint that contained additional allegations 
about how its patent improved on the prior art. The district court refused to 
consider the amended complaint,293 but the Federal Circuit, in another 
opinion by Judge Moore (the author of Berkheimer), overturned the district 
court’s ruling of ineligibility and its refusal to accept the amended 
complaint.294 
As it did in Berkheimer, the Federal Circuit in Aatrix emphasized that 
the question under Alice of “[w]hether . . . claim elements or the claimed 
combination are well-understood, routine, [and] conventional is a question of 
fact.”295 Turning to the case at hand, the court wrote that eligibility could not 
be decided on the pleadings because the plaintiff’s proposed amended 
complaint contained “factual allegations . . . that, if accepted as true, 
establish[ed] that the claimed [invention] contains inventive components and 
improves the workings of [a] computer.”296 For instance, the complaint 
alleged that the “data file” claimed in the patent made it easier to import data 
from third-party software applications.297 These allegations about the 
inventiveness of the claimed data file, in the Federal Circuit’s view, made 
dismissal improper.298 
Though the Federal Circuit in Aatrix held that the factual allegations in 
the patentee’s complaint prevented early dismissal, the court appeared to 
 
292. Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc., No. 3:15-cv-164-HES-MCR, 2016 
WL 1375141, at *11 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 30, 2016), vacated, 882 F.3d 1121 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
293. Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc., No. 3:15-cv-164-HES-MCR, 2016 
WL 7206173, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 17, 2016), rev’d, 882 F.3d 1121 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
294. Aatrix, 882 F.3d at 1130. 
295. Id. at 1128. 
296. Id. at 1125. 
297. Specifically, the complaint alleged: 
The inventions claimed in the Aatrix Patents allow data to be imported into the 
viewable electronic form from outside applications. Prior art forms solutions allowed 
data to be extracted only from widely available databases with published database 
schemas, not the proprietary data structures of application software. The inventions of 
the Aatrix Patents allowed data to be imported from an end user application without 
needing to know proprietary database schemas and without having to custom program 
the form files to work with each outside application. The inventions of the Aatrix 
Patents permit data to be retrieved from a user application and inserted into a form, 
eliminating the need for hand typing in the values and eliminating the risk of 
transcription error. 
Id. at 1127 (quoting proposed second amended complaint). 
298. Id. at 1126 (noting that the complaint’s allegations “at a minimum raise factual disputes 
underlying the § 101 analysis, such as whether the claim term ‘data file’ constitutes an inventive 
concept”); see also id. at 1129 (“The ‘data file’ limitation may reflect, as Aatrix argues, an 
improvement in the importation of data from third-party software applications.”). 
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reaffirm its ample precedent deciding eligibility on motions to dismiss or for 
judgment on the pleadings.299 Indeed, just because the test for eligibility 
involves questions of fact, as the Federal Circuit held in Berkheimer and 
Aatrix, that does not mean that all eligibility cases raise disputes of fact—a 
point the Federal Circuit explicitly acknowledged in Berkheimer.300 Under 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as consistently applied by courts 
deciding patent cases, the patent is considered part of the complaint, so if 
eligibility can be resolved by reference to the patent alone, it is appropriate 
for the judge to decide the issue at the pleading stage as a matter of law.301 In 
many cases—particularly those involving patents that were prosecuted before 
the Supreme Court’s recent invigoration of the eligibility requirement—the 
claims and specification of the patent itself indicate that the claimed 
invention involves a fundamental economic practice,302 an abstract idea,303 or 
a natural phenomenon.304 Similarly, it can be apparent from the patent itself 
that it contains no inventive concept because it merely adds generic computer 
components to an abstract idea,305 carries out an abstract idea over the 
 
299. See id. at 1125 (“We have held that patent eligibility can be determined at the Rule 12(b)(6) 
stage.”) (citing Genetic Techs. Ltd. v. Merial L.L.C., 818 F.3d 1369, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Content 
Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, 776 F.3d 1343, 1346, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). 
300. Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“[N]ot every § 101 
determination contains genuine disputes over the underlying facts material to the § 101 inquiry.”), 
petition for cert. filed, No. 18-415 (U.S. Sept. 28, 2018). 
301. See FED. R. CIV. P. 10(c) (“A copy of a written instrument that is an exhibit to a pleading 
is a part of the pleading for all purposes.”); see also CertusView Techs., LLC v. S&N Locating 
Servs., LLC, 111 F. Supp. 3d 688, 704 (E.D. Va. 2015) (resolving the “claim-centric issue of section 
101 validity” on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, citing Rule 10(c) and noting that “the 
Court finds that it need not rely on any factual matter other than that presented in the specifications 
of the patents-in-suit themselves”), aff’d, 695 F. App’x 574 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (per curiam). 
302. E.g., Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake Servs., 859 F.3d 1044, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 2017) 
(“[T]he ‘807 patent specification itself demonstrates that processing an application for financing a 
purchase is ‘a fundamental economic practice long prevalent in our system of commerce.’” (quoting 
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2356 (2014))). 
303. E.g., CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1370, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 
2011) (invalidating a patent on “a method for verifying the validity of a credit card transaction over 
the Internet,” noting: “It is clear that unpatentable mental processes are the subject matter of [the 
claim]. All of [the claim’s] steps can be performed in the human mind, or by a human using a pen 
and paper.”). 
304. E.g., Cleveland Clinic Found. v. True Health Diagnostics LLC, 859 F.3d 1352, 1361 (Fed. 
Cir. 2017) (“[T]he method starts and ends with naturally occurring phenomena with no meaningful 
non-routine steps in between—the presence of [myeloperoxidase] in a bodily sample is correlated 
to its relationship to cardiovascular disease. The claims are therefore directed to a natural law.”), 
cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2621 (2018). 
305. E.g., Mortg. Grader, Inc. v. First Choice Loan Servs. Inc., 811 F.3d 1314, 1324–25 (Fed. 
Cir. 2016) (“[T]he claims ‘add’ only generic computer components such as an ‘interface,’ 
‘network,’ and ‘database.’ These generic computer components do not satisfy the inventive concept 
requirement.”). 
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Internet,306 or employs known scientific techniques.307 Sometimes the 
information needed to resolve the issue of eligibility might be outside the 
complaint but so incontrovertible that it is subject to judicial notice.308 As the 
Federal Circuit observed in Aatrix, eligibility can be resolved on the 
pleadings, as a matter of law, if the decision is based on “sources properly 
considered on a motion to dismiss, such as the complaint, the patent, and 
materials subject to judicial notice.”309 
Before turning to a critique of the Aatrix opinion, it is worth noting that, 
even if an eligibility dispute requires the court to consider evidence extrinsic 
to the patent, a defendant can still seek relatively quick adjudication through 
an early summary judgment motion. Though the Federal Circuit did not 
discuss that possibility in Aatrix, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit 
a party to file a summary judgment motion “at any time until 30 days after 
the close of all discovery.”310 They also permit a court to convert a motion to 
dismiss or for judgment on the pleadings to a summary judgment motion if it 
involves matters outside the pleadings.311 An early summary judgment 
motion (converted or otherwise) might be particularly useful where an expert 
declaration would be helpful in countering a complaint’s allegations of 
inventiveness (or similar assertions in the patent’s specification). It would 
also be useful in cases where common-knowledge-type evidence in support 
of ineligibility is strong, but perhaps not sufficiently indisputable to be 
subject to judicial notice312—a situation that could present itself with some 
 
306. E.g., buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“The claims’ 
invocation of computers adds no inventive concept. . . . That a computer receives and sends the 
information over a network—with no further specification—is not even arguably inventive.”). 
307. E.g., Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., LLC, 275 F. Supp. 3d 306, 
307 (D. Mass. 2017) (granting a renewed motion to dismiss on eligibility grounds after having 
initially denied a motion to dismiss because “[a]t a subsequent hearing, Plaintiffs’ counsel agreed 
that a statement in the patent specification” indicating that the techniques used to detect certain 
antibodies were “standard techniques in the art” “was undisputed”), appeal docketed, No. 17-2508 
(Fed. Cir. Sept. 5, 2017). 
308. See, e.g., buySAFE, 765 F.3d at 1355 (affirming judgment on the pleadings of ineligibility, 
noting that “[t]he claims are squarely about creating a contractual relationship—a ‘transaction 
performance guaranty’—that is beyond question of ancient lineage” (citing Willis D. Morgan, The 
History and Economics of Suretyship, 12 CORNELL L.Q. 153 (1927))); see also Front Row Techs., 
LLC v. NBA Media Ventures, LLC, 204 F. Supp. 3d 1190, 1247 (D.N.M. 2016) (noting that courts 
may rely on “well-known, general historical observations” in deciding pleading-stage eligibility 
motions), aff’d sub nom. Front Row Techs., LLC v. MLB Advanced Media, L.P., 697 F. App’x 701 
(Fed. Cir. 2017) (per curiam). The Federal Rules of Evidence allow the court to take judicial notice 
“at any stage of the proceedings.” FED. R. EVID. 201(d). 
309. Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc., 882 F.3d 1121, 1128 (Fed. Cir. 
2018); see also 5B WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 267, § 1357 (noting that a “motion to dismiss 
under [Rule 12(b)(6)] raises only an issue of law”). 
310. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(b) (emphasis added). 
311. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d). 
312. See FED. R. EVID. 201(b) (“The court may judicially notice a fact that is not subject to 
reasonable dispute because it: (1) is generally known within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction; 
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frequency in technologically complex patent cases.313 In short, Aatrix, though 
recognizing the factual components of the eligibility analysis, does not 
entirely close the door on quick, pleading-stage decisions on eligibility. In 
fact, Aatrix appears to reaffirm a large body of case law deciding eligibility 
on the pleadings when the decision is based entirely on the patent itself. 
All that said, Aatrix, similar to Berkheimer, contains several serious 
flaws in the way in which the opinion applies its general pronouncement 
about the relevance of facts in the procedural posture that the case presented. 
One particularly troubling aspect of the Aatrix decision is the absolute 
deference the Federal Circuit gave to the allegations of inventiveness in the 
patentee’s complaint. On my reading of the opinion, the court appeared to 
rule that those allegations entirely foreclosed the possibility of deciding 
eligibility at the pleading stage. Though the Federal Circuit ultimately 
disposed of the case by vacating the district court’s ruling of ineligibility and 
remanding for further proceedings, the court also wrote that, based on the 
amended complaint, “the district court could not conclude at the Rule 
12(b)(6) stage that the claimed elements were well-understood, routine, or 
conventional,”314 indicating that the case must now move into discovery, with 
the possibility that the defendant could re-raise the issue of eligibility at a 
later time—likely on summary judgment.315 
But the Federal Circuit’s analysis of the sufficiency of the amended 
complaint entirely ignored an important additional requirement imposed by 
the Supreme Court in Twombly and Iqbal. Specifically, after identifying the 
 
or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be 
questioned.”). 
313. To draw an analogy, Justice Scalia in the Myriad case on the patent eligibility of DNA 
famously refused to join the “portions of the [majority] opinion going into fine details of molecular 
biology” because, he explained, “I am unable to affirm those details on my own knowledge or even 
my own belief.” Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 596 (2013) 
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
314. Aatrix, 882 F.3d at 1129 (emphasis added). 
315. That there will be no more pleading-stage litigation of eligibility is confirmed by the way 
in which the Federal Circuit addressed the issue of whether it was permissible for the district court 
to resolve eligibility without holding a formal claim construction proceeding. The Federal Circuit 
wrote that, because of its ruling that the patentee was entitled to file its amended complaint, it was 
“unnecessary to decide whether the district court erred by ruling on the § 101 motion prior to claim 
construction.” Id. at 1128–29. If the Federal Circuit anticipated further pleading-stage eligibility 
litigation, the court presumably would have left it at that, allowing the district court to decide in the 
first instance on remand whether claim construction was necessary to decide a motion to dismiss 
the newly filed amended complaint. But the Federal Circuit, in the very next sentence of its opinion, 
declared that claim construction was, in fact, necessary to decide eligibility, writing that “[t]he 
briefing and argument on appeal demonstrate a need for claim construction, to be conducted on 
remand after the amended complaint is filed.” Id. at 1129. The only way to reconcile this declaration 
that claim construction is necessary with the court’s immediately preceding statement that it was 
not going to decide whether eligibility could be resolved prior to claim construction is to interpret 
the court as instructing that any additional litigation over eligibility must occur after claim 
construction is complete, likely on summary judgment or at trial. 
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factual allegations in the complaint—which the Federal Circuit did—the 
court is supposed to ask whether those factual allegations “plausibly give rise 
to an entitlement to relief”316—which the Federal Circuit did not do. Had the 
Federal Circuit asked that second question, the outcome of the case could 
have been different. Recall that the key, substantive eligibility issue in Aatrix 
was whether a “data file” used to import data into a form was inventive.317 
Importantly, the priority date for both patents was in 2002.318 Given the 
ubiquity of computer processing and databases at the turn of the twenty-first 
century, it seems quite possible that a court could have found, based on the 
sort of common knowledge a court may appropriately consider at the 
pleading stage, that the complaint’s assertions about the claimed data file’s 
inventiveness were implausible and therefore insufficient to survive a motion 
to dismiss.319 But the defendant never had the opportunity to present that 
argument.320 And because the Federal Circuit ruled that the amended 
complaint foreclosed dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), it likely will not have 
the opportunity to do so until summary judgment. Even on an early summary 
judgment motion like I discussed above, discovery will probably have 
commenced and the parties’ litigation costs will be markedly higher than they 
would have been had the case been decided on a motion to dismiss. 
Eliminating the “plausibility” step from the pleading-stage analysis, as 
the Federal Circuit did in Aatrix, threatens to make it too easy for a patentee 
to survive a motion to dismiss.321 All the patentee must do is write a 
 
316. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 
317. Aatrix, 882 F.3d at 1129. 
318. U.S. Patent Nos. 8,984,393, 7,171,615 (both claiming a priority date of March 26, 2002). 
319. For some sources that would support taking judicial notice of the conventionality of using 
a data file from a database to populate forms, see, for example, C.J. DATE, AN INTRODUCTION TO 
DATABASE SYSTEMS 48 (8th ed. 2004) (noting that a database “is often built on top of some kind 
of file manager,” allowing a user to “perform simple retrieval . . . operations on stored records in 
such files” (emphasis omitted)), and DAVID M. KROENKE & DAVID J. AUER, DATABASE 
PROCESSING: FUNDAMENTALS, DESIGN, AND IMPLEMENTATION 15 (12th ed. 2012) (listing various 
types of database applications and noting that “[a]ll of these . . . applications . . . . may create forms 
and reports, or they may send their results to other programs”). See also Wikipedia, Database, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Database [https://perma.cc/VA4R-JFYK] (last modified Oct. 3, 2018) 
(listing as a primary function of a database, “Retrieval – Providing information in a form directly 
usable or for further processing by other applications. The retrieved data may be made available in 
a form basically the same as it is stored in the database or in a new form obtained by altering or 
combining existing data from the database.”). 
320. Judge Reyna dissented from the panel’s ruling for precisely that reason. See Aatrix, 882 
F.3d at 1131 (Reyna, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[W]e [should not] prejudge 
whether the [amended complaint] survives a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss in the first instance, 
particularly when the defendant . . . has had no opportunity to present arguments with respect to the 
new pleading.”). 
321. In an opinion concurring in the denial of the petition for rehearing en banc, Judge Moore 
again applied a truncated, one-step analysis under Rule 12(b)(6). Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green 
Shades Software, Inc., 890 F.3d 1354, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (Moore, J., concurring in the denial of 
the petition for rehearing en banc) (concluding that because “nothing in the limited record we could 
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complaint asserting that its patent is inventive, in that it does more than apply 
knowledge or techniques that are conventional in the field. Under Aatrix, 
those allegations will be assumed to be true and will prevent dismissal, even 
if they seem farfetched,322 and possibly even if the intrinsic record (such as 
the patent’s specification) indicates that the patent actually lacks the required 
inventive concept.323 
Another problematic aspect of Aatrix is that, just like Berkheimer, it is 
in tension with prior Federal Circuit case law. Earlier in the Article, I 
criticized two Federal Circuit eligibility decisions that reversed pleading-
stage dismissals, McRO and Visual Memory, because, rather than remanding 
to allow the accused infringer to develop a factual record in support of its 
ineligibility defense, the Federal Circuit definitively decided eligibility in 
favor of the patentee as a matter of law.324 The ruling in Aatrix is consistent 
with my criticism of McRO and Visual Memory: in Aatrix, unlike in those 
cases, the court did not definitively resolve the question of eligibility; it held 
only that the amended complaint precluded a ruling of ineligibility at the 
12(b)(6) stage.325 But the decision in Aatrix to remand for further fact 
 
consider at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage refuted” the complaint’s allegations about inventiveness, “there 
was no legal basis to affirm the dismissal of the complaint”). 
322. See, e.g., GroupChatter, LLC v. Agile Sports Techs., Inc., No. 8:18CV35, slip op. at 16 
(D. Neb. June 20, 2018) (post-Aatrix decision denying a motion to dismiss based on the complaint’s 
allegations of inventiveness and without assessing the plausibility of those allegations, noting that 
“at this stage of the proceedings, the Court, though dubious of [the patentee’s] allegations, accepts 
[the patentee’s] factual contentions and finds an ordered combination that is sufficient to create an 
inventive concept”); Kaniadakis v. SalesForce.com, Inc., No. 8:17-cv-1346, slip op. at 1–2 (M.D. 
Fla. Oct. 9, 2018) (noting that “[u]pon review of the operative complaint . . . , the Court’s first 
instinct was to grant the motion to dismiss, primarily because the patent is poorly written as a matter 
of English usage, and it is difficult to decipher exactly what it does from a concrete ‘invention’ 
standpoint” but concluding that the complaint met the “low bar” set by Aatrix for “surviv[ing] a 
§ 101 eligibility analysis under Rule 12(b)(6)”). 
323. As Judge Reyna noted in dissent in Aatrix: “One effect of [the majority’s] approach is that 
a plaintiff facing a 12(b)(6) motion may simply amend its complaint to allege extrinsic facts that, 
once alleged, must be taken as true, regardless of its consistency with the intrinsic record.” Aatrix, 
882 F.3d at 1130 (Reyna, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Fortunately, in at least one 
post-Aatrix eligibility opinion, the Federal Circuit has acknowledged the plausibility requirement. 
See SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1169 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (noting, in affirming a 
judgment on the pleadings of ineligibility, that the complaint contained “no factual allegations from 
which one could plausibly infer” an inventive concept). Nevertheless, some district courts have 
refused to even consider the “inventive concept” question at the pleading stage because of the mere 
potential for the case to raise the fact questions identified by the Federal Circuit in Berkheimer and 
Aatrix. See, e.g., Kroy IP Holdings, LLC v. Groupon, Inc., No. 17-1405, 2018 WL 4905595, at *31 
(D. Del. Oct. 9, 2018) (finding that the patent was directed to an abstract idea but denying the 
defendant’s motion to dismiss without conducting any analysis under step two of the Alice test; the 
magistrate judge asserted that “questions of fact remain as to whether the asserted claims . . . were 
conventional at the time of the patent” but did not explain what those questions were), report and 
recommendation adopted by No. 17-1405 (MN), 2018 WL 5724013 (D. Del. Nov. 1, 2018). 
324. See supra notes 213–19 and accompanying text. 
325. See Aatrix, 882 F.3d at 1129. 
 
GUGLIUZZA.HEADERFIXED (DO NOT DELETE) 2/14/2019 11:26 PM 
2019] The Procedure of Patent Eligibility 623 
 
development is in obvious tension with McRO and Visual Memory, which 
held inventions to be patent eligible as a matter of law at the pleading stage 
without giving the defendant an opportunity to present facts in support of its 
defense. 
A final flaw in the Aatrix opinion is that it contributes to ongoing 
confusion about how to handle issues of claim construction that arise on 
pleading-stage eligibility motions. In its opinion, the Federal Circuit noted 
that “[i]f there are claim construction disputes at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage,” a 
court has two options: it can either “resolve the disputes to whatever extent 
is needed to conduct the § 101 analysis” or it can “adopt[] the non-moving 
party’s constructions.”326 For reasons I will explain shortly, the first option—
construing the claims in order to conduct the eligibility analysis—can be 
difficult for a court to do without moving beyond the pleadings, though the 
Federal Circuit has done it in some cases.327 
The second approach—adopting the patentee’s proposed claim 
construction—is a more common practice in both the Federal Circuit328 and 
the district courts.329 On first glance, that practice appears consistent with the 
general notion that the court should read the complaint in favor of the plaintiff 
when deciding a motion to dismiss.330 And it makes sense as a policy matter, 
at least to the extent we think of eligibility as a quick look test for disposing 
of only the most blatantly invalid patents.331 
Yet, as I explain next, neither of the procedural approaches to claim 
construction suggested in Aatrix are easy to justify as a matter of the existing 
doctrine governing the issue of claim construction itself. To embrace either 
approach would require the Federal Circuit to recognize that claim 
construction is a much more fact-driven exercise than its current case law 
indicates. Such a change to claim construction law would, interestingly, have 
several benefits for the patent system more broadly: it would increase 
appellate deference to district court interpretations of patent claims, increase 
the predictability of litigation outcomes, and decrease litigation costs. 
 
326. Id. at 1125. 
327. See infra note 335. 
328. See, e.g., Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, 776 F.3d 1343, 
1349 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[E]ven when construed in a manner most favorable to [the patentee], none 
of [the] claims amount to ‘significantly more’ than the abstract idea of extracting and storing data 
from hard copy documents using generic scanning and processing technology.”). 
329. See, e.g., Cogent Med., Inc. v. Elsevier Inc., 70 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1065 (N.D. Cal. 2014) 
(“[U]sing the constructions most favorable to [the patentee], the ‘879 Patent claims no more than a 
computer automation of what ‘can be performed in the human mind, or by a human using a pen and 
paper.’” (quoting CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 
2011))). 
330. See supra note 267 and accompanying text. 
331. See Vishnubhakat, supra note 119, at 72. 
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D. The Role of Claim Construction in the Eligibility Analysis 
After quickly recapping what courts have said about the role of claim 
construction in deciding patent eligibility, this section shows how that case 
law underscores the factual nature of the claim construction task. If the 
Federal Circuit viewed claim construction to more frequently involve 
questions of fact, rather than as a pure question of law (which is the court’s 
usual practice), patent litigation would be changed profoundly, and probably 
for the better. It would also make the assessment of patent eligibility more 
consistent with the general principles of pleading law discussed above, which 
give the patentee the benefit of the doubt on questions of fact but not on 
questions of law. 
 
1. The Prevailing Approach: Give the Patentee the Benefit of the 
Doubt.—As discussed, early Federal Circuit cases suggested that claim 
construction was, if not required, at least strongly recommended before 
resolving patent eligibility.332 However, for as long as district courts have 
been deciding eligibility on the pleadings, they have also claimed the 
flexibility not to do formal claim construction if there is no plausible reading 
of the patent’s claims under which the patentee could prevail.333 In Aatrix, 
consistent with prior Federal Circuit opinions, the court embraced that 
approach of reading the claims in the manner most favorable to the 
patentee.334 In another line of eligibility cases, however, the Federal Circuit 
has simply construed the claims itself on appeal rather than giving the 
patentee the benefit of the doubt.335 
 
332. See, for example, Bancorp Services, L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada (U.S.), 
687 F.3d 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2012), in which the Federal Circuit stated: 
[C]laim construction is not an inviolable prerequisite to a validity determination under 
§ 101. We note, however, that it will ordinarily be desirable—and often necessary—to 
resolve claim construction disputes prior to a § 101 analysis, for the determination of 
patent eligibility requires a full understanding of the basic character of the claimed 
subject matter. 
Id. at 1273–74. 
333. See, e.g., DietGoal Innovations LLC v. Bravo Media LLC, 33 F. Supp. 3d 271, 289 
(S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“Nor would claim construction shed light on any dispositive legal issue; the . . . 
[p]atent is invalid under § 101, under any reasonable construction.”), aff’d, 599 F. App’x 956 (Fed. 
Cir. 2015) (per curiam). 
334. See Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc., 882 F.3d 1121, 1125 (Fed. Cir. 
2018); see also Bascom Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1352 
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[C]onstrued in favor of [the patentee] as they must be in this procedural posture, 
the claims of the ‘606 patent do not preempt the use of the abstract idea of filtering content on the 
Internet or on generic computer components performing conventional activities.”). 
335. See, e.g., McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 
2016) (observing that, “in this case, claim construction is helpful to resolve the question of 
patentability under § 101” and adopting the claim construction urged by the patentee); Bancorp, 
687 F.3d at 1274 (“Although the district court declined to construe the claims, that does not preclude 
us from making that legal determination on appeal.”). 
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2. The Factual Nature of Claim Construction.—Under the prevailing 
doctrine on claim construction, combined with general principles of pleading 
law, it is arguably improper for courts to slant claim meaning in the patentee’s 
favor when resolving eligibility on the pleadings. Some background will help 
illuminate that argument. In the Teva case discussed above,336 the Supreme 
Court overturned Federal Circuit case law that had treated claim construction 
as entirely a question of law and instead held that claim construction can in 
some circumstances involve factual inquiries.337 Yet the Supreme Court also 
made clear that claim construction remains a purely legal issue if it is 
unnecessary to consult extrinsic evidence, such as expert testimony, 
dictionaries, or scientific literature, to determine claim meaning.338 Perhaps 
not surprisingly, most Federal Circuit decisions after Teva continue to treat 
claim construction as a legal question subject to de novo review.339 The 
Federal Circuit frequently downplays factual considerations, even in cases in 
which the district court considered extrinsic evidence in the course of 
construing the claims.340 Indeed, in its claim construction rulings, the Federal 
Circuit has often denigrated the salience of extrinsic evidence as compared 
to the intrinsic record (that is, the patent’s claims, specification, and 
prosecution history).341 
 
336. See supra notes 251–53 and accompanying text. 
337. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 839, 841 (2015) (overruling, 
among other decisions, Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1455–56 (Fed. Cir. 1998) 
(en banc)). 
338. Id. at 841. 
339. See Jason Rantanen, Teva, Nautilus, and Change Without Change, 18 STAN. TECH. L. 
REV. 430, 448–51 (2015) (collecting examples); Sheri L. Gordon & Larry S. Nixon, Claim 
Construction Post-Teva: 1st Year of Fed. Circ. Review, LAW360 (Mar. 8, 2016), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/766331/claim-construction-post-teva-1st-year-of-fed-circ-
review [https://perma.cc/WW6W-5WKY] (same); see also Richard Zhang, Fed. Circ. Applies Teva 
Deference in 2 Types of Cases, LAW360 (May 16, 2018), 
https://www.law360.com/ip/articles/1042052/fed-circ-applies-teva-deference-in-2-types-of-cases 
[https://perma.cc/GJR2-G55Q] (finding that, in the three years following Teva, the Federal Circuit 
applied a deferential standard of review in only eight of the twenty-four claim construction decisions 
that involved extrinsic evidence). 
340. See, e.g., CardSoft, LLC v. VeriFone, Inc., 807 F.3d 1346, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (holding 
that “the district court must have actually made a factual finding in order to trigger Teva’s deferential 
review” and that the Federal Circuit may ignore “findings on [extrinsic] evidence” and review claim 
construction de novo as a question of law “if the intrinsic record fully determines the proper scope 
of the disputed claim terms” (alteration in original) (quoting Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc., 
789 F.3d 1292, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2015))); Eidos Display, LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 779 F.3d 1360, 
1365 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (applying a de novo standard of review, noting that “[t]o the extent the district 
court considered extrinsic evidence in its claim construction order or summary judgment order, that 
evidence is ultimately immaterial to the outcome because the intrinsic record is clear”); see also 
MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 15, at 704 (“Not surprisingly, given its prior preference to review 
claim constructions de novo, the Federal Circuit has taken the position that district courts should not 
often resort to extrinsic evidence.”). 
341. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (“[E]xtrinsic 
evidence may be useful to the court, but it is unlikely to result in a reliable interpretation of patent 
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As discussed above, on a motion to dismiss, general principles of 
pleading law dictate that the plaintiff does not receive the benefit of the doubt 
on questions of law, only on questions of fact.342 Thus, if the Federal Circuit 
is correct that claim construction usually remains a pure question of law, 
courts deciding eligibility disputes at the pleadings stage should not construe 
claims in favor of the plaintiff/patentee. Rather, they should normally use the 
other option listed in Aatrix: simply performing the legal task of claim 
construction when deciding the motion to dismiss. Under general principles 
of pleading law, courts would slant the analysis in the patentee’s favor only 
when factfinding based on extrinsic evidence is necessary to understand 
claim meaning, which, under Federal Circuit precedent on claim 
construction, is a rare occurrence. 
From a normative standpoint, however, it would not be ideal to have 
district judges rule on claim meaning based on the complaint and the patent 
alone. Claim construction is a complex and contentious question, and it is 
often the most important issue in a patent case.343 Despite the Federal 
Circuit’s skepticism of extrinsic evidence, the reality is that, before 
interpreting patent claims, district judges regularly consider expert testimony 
and affidavits, technology tutorials presented by the parties, and even the 
advice of court-appointed technical advisors.344 The technologically complex 
and esoterically written patent document is simply too difficult for a 
generalist judge to understand without that extra help. 
Accordingly, the courts that give the patentee the benefit of the doubt 
on claim meaning when deciding pleading-stage eligibility motions are, as a 
matter of pure policy, sensibly waiting to construe the claims until the 
evidentiary record is more complete. But, as noted, that practice is hard to 
square with the Federal Circuit’s current precedent on claim construction, 
which downplays the salience of facts. The key point, then, is this: the 
procedural uncertainty about how to resolve disputes over claim construction 
on pleading-stage eligibility motions arguably highlights shortcomings in the 
law of claim construction itself. If the judge cannot (or will not) construe the 
claims by simply reading the patent and without considering extrinsic 
 
claim scope unless considered in the context of the intrinsic evidence.”). 
342. See supra notes 268–69. 
343. See Greg Reilly, Patent “Trolls” and Claim Construction, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1045, 
1051 (2016). 
344. See PETER S. MENELL ET AL., PATENT CASE MANAGEMENT JUDICIAL GUIDE 5-15 to -21 
(3d ed. 2016). For a recent opinion by a magistrate judge recognizing the importance of extrinsic 
evidence to the question of claim construction in an eligibility dispute, see Kroy IP Holdings, LLC 
v. Groupon, Inc., No. CV 17-1405-MN-SRF, 2018 WL 4905595, at *16 (D. Del. Oct. 9, 2018) (“In 
the case at bar, . . . issues of claim construction could potentially bear on the [eligibility] analysis. 
Consequently, I recommend that the court deny Groupon’s motion to dismiss pending consideration 
of additional evidence outside the scope of the pleadings.”), report and recommendation adopted 
by No. 17-1405 (MN), 2018 WL 5724013 (D. Del. Nov. 1, 2018). 
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evidence, then it seems doubtful to say, as the Federal Circuit’s case law 
suggests, that claim construction usually presents a pure question of law. 
Courts’ hesitance about performing claim construction on the pleadings, in 
other words, highlights the often-factual nature of the claim construction 
exercise.345 
Indeed, although the Federal Circuit’s precedent in disputes over claim 
construction suggests that the exercise is mostly a matter of law, the court 
seems more inclined to acknowledge that determining claim meaning 
involves factual inquiries when the court is not reviewing a claim 
construction order as such. For example, in Aatrix, as discussed, the court 
stated that it can be appropriate at the pleading stage to read a patent’s claims 
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff—a mode of analysis usually limited 
to questions of fact, not law. Likewise, in a recent case that involved the 
sufficiency of a complaint’s allegations of infringement, the Federal Circuit 
criticized a district court for not drawing inferences about claim meaning in 
favor of the patentee—a mode of analysis that is, again, appropriate for 
questions of fact but not for questions of law.346 
To be sure, in some eligibility cases, the court might avoid construing 
the claims not because questions of fact exist, but because the patentee has 
not offered any proposed claim construction at all. In a case such as that, the 
patentee might be worried that any claim construction sufficiently narrow to 
satisfy the eligibility requirement will not be sufficiently broad to establish 
that the defendant infringes.347 But other courts have absolved patentees from 
proposing claim constructions at the pleading stage, reasoning (correctly 
under general principles of pleading law) that the burden is on the defendant 
to show that there is no plausible reading of the patent under which the 
claimed invention satisfies the eligibility requirement.348 In any event, in 
 
345. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim 
Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743, 1755–56 (2009) (discussing “[t]he fiction that claim 
construction is a question of legal interpretation for judges, not an exercise in understanding 
technology”). 
346. See Nalco Co. v. Chem-Mod, LLC, 883 F.3d 1337, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“It is not 
appropriate to resolve these disputes . . . without the benefit of claim construction. . . . The 
plausibility standard . . . ‘simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that 
discovery will reveal evidence’ to support the plaintiff’s allegations.” (emphasis added) (quoting 
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007))). 
347. For a possible example, see Whitepages, Inc. v. Isaacs, 196 F. Supp. 3d 1128, 1135 (N.D. 
Cal. 2016) (noting that the patentee “neither explained how any particular construction would alter 
the section 101 analysis, nor proposed any constructions that might be viewed in a favorable light 
given the posture of this motion”), aff’d, 698 F. App’x 613 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (per curiam). This 
tension between validity (for which a narrow claim construction is helpful) and infringement (for 
which a broad claim construction is helpful) is a fundamental feature of patent litigation. As patent 
jurist Giles Rich famously quipped, “The stronger a patent the weaker it is and the weaker a patent 
the stronger it is.” Giles S. Rich, The Proposed Patent Legislation: Some Comments, 35 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 641, 644 (1967). 
348. See, e.g., Data Distribution Techs., LLC v. BRER Affiliates, Inc., No. 12-4878 
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many cases, the patentee has offered a proposed claim construction at the 
pleading stage, and courts have, as noted, adopted that claim construction for 
the purpose of deciding eligibility—a mode of analysis that is inappropriate 
if claim construction usually presents a pure question of law. 
If the suggestion in Aatrix that the court, in deciding eligibility at the 
pleading stage, should adopt a construction favorable to the patentee is hard 
to justify as a matter of claim construction doctrine, what about the other 
approach mentioned in the opinion: construing the claims to the extent 
needed to conduct an eligibility analysis? The Federal Circuit noted that this 
could be “less than a full, formal claim construction,”349 perhaps suggesting 
that a court could issue a tentative construction, good for the pleading-stage 
eligibility motion only. A potential analogy is to preliminary injunction cases, 
in which the Federal Circuit has held that any claim construction on the 
preliminary injunction motion is not binding in subsequent proceedings.350 
While a “tentative” approach to claim construction, like reading the claims 
in favor of the patentee, makes sense as a policy matter, it, too, is hard to 
square with the notion of claim construction as a mostly legal inquiry. In its 
preliminary injunction cases, the Federal Circuit has emphasized that “courts 
may engage in a rolling claim construction, in which the court revisits and 
alters its interpretation of the claim terms as its understanding of the 
technology evolves.”351 That conception of altering claim construction based 
on changed understanding of technology makes the exercise of determining 
claim meaning, again, sound factual, not legal. 
In short, if claim meaning were treated as the fact-driven issue it often 
appears to be, the correct approach to resolving disputes about claim 
construction on pleading-stage eligibility motions would be clearer. The 
patentee would usually receive the benefit of the doubt, but early dismissal 
would remain appropriate if there is no plausible reading of the patent that 
would satisfy the eligibility test. Though the Federal Circuit in Aatrix 
endorsed resolving claim construction in that fashion, it stopped short of 
saying that resolving doubts in favor of the patentee is justified because of 
claim construction’s factual underpinnings. But explicitly recognizing the 
often-factual nature of claim construction would increase the appellate 
deference given to district court decisions in many patent cases and remove 
 
(JBS/KMW), 2014 WL 4162765, at *7 (D.N.J. Aug. 19, 2014) (denying motion to dismiss on 
eligibility grounds, noting that, although the patentee “has not provided proposed constructions,” it 
“has no obligation to do so at this time”); see also 5B WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 267, § 1357 
(“All federal courts are in agreement that the burden is on the moving party to prove that no legally 
cognizable claim for relief exists.”); id. n.14 (collecting cases). 
349. Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc., 882 F.3d 1121, 1125 (Fed. Cir. 
2018). 
350. E.g., Jack Guttman, Inc. v. Kopykake Enters., Inc., 302 F.3d 1352, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
351. Id. 
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a widely recognized source of cost and uncertainty in patent litigation more 
generally.352 
E. Applying the Presumption of Validity to the Eligibility Analysis 
The preceding discussion of the distinction between law and fact leads 
to a final question about eligibility procedure that has deeply divided the 
lower courts, including judges and panels of the Federal Circuit: in 
determining patent eligibility, does the statutory presumption of validity 
apply? This section outlines the various perspectives on that issue and, 
building on the Federal Circuit’s recent decisions in Berkheimer and Aatrix, 
sketches a modest role for the presumption of validity in eligibility cases. 
 
1. The Presumption of Validity and How Courts Have Applied It (or Not) 
in Eligibility Decisions.—Section 282(a) of the Patent Act states, simply, that 
“[a] patent shall be presumed valid.”353 The Supreme Court confirmed in its 
2011 decision in Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Partnership354 that the 
presumption requires a patent challenger to prove invalidity by clear and 
convincing evidence.355 In a concurring opinion attempting to clarify the 
scope of the presumption, Justice Breyer suggested that the presumption 
applies only to questions of fact underlying the validity inquiry, not to the 
overall legal question of patent validity.356 In practice, however, most courts 
simply apply the presumption to the overall question of validity, as the 
majority opinion in i4i suggested was proper.357 On nonobviousness, for 
example, courts often instruct the jury that patents are presumed valid and 
that the challenger must therefore prove invalidity by clear and convincing 
evidence.358 But then, rather than allowing the jury to decide only subsidiary 
factual questions, courts will often let the jury render a general verdict on 
 
352. For a thorough explication of this argument in favor of increased appellate deference to 
district court claim construction rulings, see J. Jonas Anderson & Peter S. Menell, Informal 
Deference: A Historical, Empirical, and Normative Analysis of Patent Claim Construction, 108 
NW. U. L. REV. 1, 70 (2013) (noting that de novo review of claim construction as a question of law 
can lead to, among other effects, “lower quality decisionmaking at both the trial and appellate levels, 
higher costs of litigation as a result of more appeals and retrials following reversals, greater 
uncertainty regarding the litigation, [and] longer case pendency and litigation costs as a result of 
fewer and delayed settlements”). 
353. 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012). 
354. 564 U.S. 91 (2011). 
355. Id. at 95. 
356. Id. at 114 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“Where the ultimate question of patent validity turns 
on the correct answer to legal questions—what these subsidiary legal standards mean or how they 
apply to the facts as given—today’s strict standard of proof has no application.”). 
357. Id. at 111 (majority opinion) (referring to “the challenger’s burden to persuade the jury of 
its invalidity defense by clear and convincing evidence”). 
358. E.g., FED. CIRCUIT BAR ASS’N, supra note 221, § 4.1. 
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validity.359 That verdict is of course subject to review by the judge on a post-
trial motion for judgment as a matter of law. But if the verdict being reviewed 
is a general one, as it often is, separating factual considerations from legal 
conclusions (and applying the presumption of validity as Justice Breyer 
envisions) can be nearly impossible.360 
The Federal Circuit in Berkheimer appeared to adopt Justice Breyer’s 
approach of identifying a narrow, fact-centered role for the presumption of 
validity in the analysis of patent eligibility, stating that, because “[t]he 
question of whether a claim element or combination of elements is well-
understood, routine and conventional to a skilled artisan” is a question of fact, 
it “must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.”361 But older Federal 
Circuit case law appeared to apply the presumption of validity to the overall 
legal conclusion of eligibility. For instance, I discussed above the Federal 
Circuit’s 1992 decision in Arrhythmia Research, a rare pre-Berkheimer 
opinion that recognized eligibility’s potential factual underpinnings.362 
Though the court determined that, on the record before it, “there were no 
disputed facts material to the issue,” Judge Newman’s opinion for the court 
nevertheless cited § 282 and stated that the Federal Circuit would review the 
district court’s decision de novo, “with appropriate recognition of the burdens 
on the challenger of a duly issued United States patent.”363 Similarly, 
although the en banc Federal Circuit splintered on the merits in the Alice case, 
a majority of the court’s judges actually agreed that the presumption of 
validity applied to the eligibility inquiry, despite appearing to view the issue 
 
359. See, e.g., McGinley v. Franklin Sports, Inc., 262 F.3d 1339, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2001) 
(upholding a general jury verdict of obviousness); see also Mark A. Lemley, Why Do Juries Decide 
If Patents Are Valid?, 99 VA. L. REV. 1673, 1690 (2013) (“Today we tend to give juries 
responsibility for deciding ultimate questions [of validity] as long as those questions involve issues 
of fact.”). Many model patent jury instructions allow the jury to render the ultimate decision on 
obviousness. E.g., AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, supra note 221, §§ 4, 7 (noting only that 
“[c]areful consideration should be given to the Court’s and the jury’s respective roles in 
determining” obviousness); FED. CIRCUIT BAR ASS’N, supra note 221, § 4.3c. One exception is the 
model patent jury instructions for the Northern District of California, which make clear that the 
ultimate question of obviousness should be resolved by the judge. N.D. CAL. MODEL PATENT JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 221, § 4.3b. 
360. See McGinley, 262 F.3d at 1363 (Michel, J., dissenting) (“I am concerned that after reading 
the majority opinion, trial courts and our panels will hereafter consider . . . general verdicts on 
obviousness immune from meaningful review and that serious legal errors by juries will thus go 
uncorrected.”); see also Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 839 F.3d 1034, 1075 (Fed. Cir. 2016) 
(en banc) (Dyk, J., dissenting) (arguing that, by upholding a general verdict rejecting an obviousness 
challenge, “the majority turns the legal question of obviousness into a factual issue for a jury to 
resolve”). 
361. Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed, No. 
18-415 (U.S. Sept. 28, 2018). 
362. Arrhythmia Research Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1056 (Fed. Cir. 
1992); see also supra notes 201–03 and accompanying text. 
363. Arrhythmia Research, 958 F.2d at 1056. 
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as lacking any factual aspects.364 A subsequent Federal Circuit panel opinion 
took a similar approach,365 and some district court opinions have likewise 
indicated that the presumption applies to the eligibility analysis even when 
eligibility is considered to present a purely legal question.366 
In contrast to these decisions embracing a broad role for the presumption 
of validity, other judges and panels of the Federal Circuit have taken the 
opposite approach—also in tension with Berkheimer—expressing doubt 
about whether the presumption of validity is relevant to the eligibility 
analysis at all. For instance, in a concurring opinion in Ultramercial III (the 
one Federal Circuit opinion in that litigation the Supreme Court did not 
vacate), Judge Mayer argued that the presumption was entirely irrelevant.367 
He reached that conclusion not because eligibility lacked factual aspects, but 
because of the policy rationale that the Patent Office “has for many years 
applied an insufficiently rigorous subject matter eligibility standard” and 
because the Supreme Court “has never mentioned—much less applied—any 
presumption of eligibility” in its § 101 decisions.368 Other Federal Circuit 
panels deciding eligibility issues before Berkheimer similarly raised the 
possibility that the presumption might not apply.369 And a handful of district 
 
364. CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d 1269, 1276, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc) 
(Lourie, J., concurring) (“[I]t bears remembering that all issued patent claims receive a statutory 
presumption of validity.”), aff’d, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014); id. at 1304 (Rader, C.J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (“[W]e believe the presumption of validity applies to all challenges to 
patentability, including those under Section 101 and the exceptions thereto . . . .”). For additional 
examples of the Federal Circuit applying presumptions to questions of law, see Timothy R. 
Holbrook, Patents, Presumptions, and Public Notice, 86 IND. L.J. 779, 821–22 (2011) (discussing 
various presumptions the court has employed in determining claim construction and noting that “it 
seems strange to speak of . . . presumptions in an inquiry that is entirely a legal analysis”). 
365. Tranxition, Inc. v. Lenovo Inc., 664 F. App’x 968, 972 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“We are not 
persuaded that the district court was correct that a presumption of validity does not apply.”). 
366. See DietGoal Innovations LLC v. Bravo Media LLC, 33 F. Supp. 3d 271, 277 (S.D.N.Y. 
2014) (“The determination of whether a claim is drawn to patent-eligible subject matter is a pure 
question of law. . . . The party challenging the validity of a patent bears the burden of proving 
invalidity by clear and convincing evidence.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)), 
aff’d, 599 F. App’x 956 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (per curiam); Lumen View Tech. LLC v. Findthebest.com, 
Inc., 984 F. Supp. 2d 189, 204 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (stating that “[w]hether a patent is valid under 
Section 101 is a pure question of law” but concluding that “[i]t is evident by clear and convincing 
evidence that the patent is invalid”). 
367. Ultramercial III, 772 F.3d 709, 720 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (Mayer, J., concurring) (“[N]o 
presumption of eligibility should attach when assessing whether claims meet the demands of section 
101.”). 
368. Id. at 720–21. 
369. See, e.g., Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. CQG, Inc., 675 F. App’x 1001, 1004 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 
2017) (“The parties dispute whether the district court erred in requiring proof of ineligibility under 
§ 101 by clear and convincing evidence. Because our review is de novo, and because under either 
standard the legal requirements for patentability are satisfied, we need not address this dispute.”). 
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court opinions, also decided before Berkheimer, explicitly refused to apply 
the presumption of validity when deciding eligibility.370 
Even after Berkheimer, confusion about the presumption’s role has 
persisted in the district courts. On a single day in July 2018, two district 
courts entered orders deciding motions for attorneys’ fees under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 285371 in cases in which the underlying patents had been invalidated for 
lacking eligibility. One court granted the motion for attorneys’ fees, noting 
that “[a]lthough issued patents are presumed valid, they are not presumed 
eligible under Section 101.”372 The other court, by contrast, denied the motion 
for attorneys’ fees, emphasizing that “[n]o matter how weak the [p]atents 
appeared at the time the case was filed, they were entitled to a presumption 
of validity” when challenged under § 101.373 
 
2. A Modest Role for the Presumption of Validity.—Despite ongoing 
confusion in the district courts, the Federal Circuit’s opinion in Berkheimer, 
read in light of i4i, appears to remove some of the ambiguity in the case law 
about the presumption of validity. The Supreme Court’s opinion in i4i, 
though less than pellucid on this point, can be read to suggest that the 
presumption is triggered only when the validity analysis entails 
factfinding,374 and in Berkheimer, the Federal Circuit made clear that 
deciding eligibility can entail factfinding about whether a claimed invention 
is impermissibly “conventional.” Yet providing a more complete picture of 
the presumption of validity’s role in eligibility analysis requires answering 
two difficult definitional questions. 
First, what, precisely, are the fact questions embedded in the eligibility 
analysis that would trigger the presumption? We know from Berkheimer that 
 
370. See, e.g., Wireless Media Innovations, LLC v. Maher Terminals, LLC, 100 F. Supp. 3d 
405, 411 (D.N.J. 2015) (“With no authoritative law binding the Court as to an applicable standard, 
the Court adopts Judge Mayer’s approach [from Ultramercial III] and will not afford Plaintiff’s 
Patents the presumption of subject matter eligibility.”), aff’d, 636 F. App’x 1014 (Fed. Cir. 2016) 
(per curiam); OpenTV, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., No. 14-cv-1622-HSG, 2015 WL 1535328, at *3 (N.D. 
Cal. Apr. 6, 2015) (similar). 
371. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2012) (“The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney 
fees to the prevailing party.”); see also supra note 23 (discussing recent Supreme Court case law 
making it easier for parties to recover attorneys’ fees in patent cases). 
372. Cellspin Soft, Inc. v. Fitbit, Inc., No. 4:17-CV-5928-YGR, 2018 WL 3328164, at *4 (N.D. 
Cal. July 6, 2018) (citing Ultramercial III, 772 F.3d at 721 (Mayer, J., concurring)), appeal 
docketed, No. 18-2178 (Fed. Cir. July 23, 2018). 
373. Sweepstakes Patent Co. v. Mosely, No. 14-cv-62354, slip op. at 3 (S.D. Fla. July 6, 2018). 
374. See Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 96–97 (2011) (emphasizing the factual 
underpinnings of various invalidity defenses); see also LAWSON, supra note 168, at 46 (“When 
garden-variety questions of domestic law are at issue, the American legal system does not generally 
use the language and concepts that dominate discussion of questions of fact. Almost no one . . . 
speaks of proof, evidence, admissibility, standards of proof, [or] burdens of proof . . . in connection 
with questions of law . . . .”). 
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the Federal Circuit considers the question of whether claimed activity is 
“well-known” or “conventional”—part of the second step of the analysis 
under Alice—to be a question of fact. Similarly, aspects of the first step of 
Alice seem factual, such as whether the claimed invention is something that 
occurs in nature375 or is an abstract idea because it is a “fundamental” or “long 
prevalent” economic practice.376 One catch, however, is that the Federal 
Circuit often says that the way to determine whether a patent is directed to an 
abstract idea in particular is to compare the patent to the patents involved in 
prior decisions by the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court—a mode of 
analysis that seems legal, not factual.377 Thus, whether the first step of the 
Alice analysis entails factual questions might depend on the precise judicial 
exception to eligibility at issue: determining whether a claimed invention 
occurs in nature might be a question of fact; determining whether a patent 
claims an abstract idea might be a question of law.378 
The second question is which types of evidence relevant to the eligibility 
question trigger an actual, factual dispute to which the presumption would 
apply? In Berkheimer, the court held that statements in the specification alone 
created a factual dispute suitable for trial—an aspect of the decision I 
criticized above as inconsistent with Supreme Court case law and as 
inefficient more generally.379 If my argument is correct that factual disputes 
arise only when the court is deciding eligibility based on extrinsic evidence, 
then the Federal Circuit was wrong to suggest in Berkheimer that the 
 
375. See, e.g., Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 590–91 
(2013). 
376. See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010). 
377. See, e.g., Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“The 
Supreme Court has not established a definitive rule to determine what constitutes an ‘abstract 
idea’ . . . . Rather, both this court and the Supreme Court have found it sufficient to compare claims 
at issue to those claims already found to be directed to an abstract idea in previous cases.” (citation 
omitted)); see also MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, supra note 144, § 2106.04(a) 
(“[T]he courts have declined to define abstract ideas. Instead, they have often identified abstract 
ideas by referring to earlier precedent, e.g., by comparing a claimed concept to the concepts 
previously identified as abstract ideas by the courts.”). 
378. A recent Supreme Court decision grappling with the appropriate standard of appellate 
review for mixed questions of law and fact provides a helpfully analogous framework. In U.S. Bank 
National Ass’n v. Village at Lakeridge, LLC, the Court ruled that the applicable standard of review 
turns on whether “answering [the mixed question] entails primarily legal or factual work.” 138 S. 
Ct. 960, 967 (2018). If “applying the law involves developing auxiliary legal principles of use in 
other cases,” the standard of review is de novo (as it would be for a pure question of law). Id. But if 
answering the mixed question “immerse[s]” the court in “case-specific factual issues,” the lower 
court’s decision receives deference on appeal (as would be the case for pure findings of fact). Id. 
Returning to eligibility, the determination of whether a patent is directed to an abstract idea—which 
entails analogizing, distinguishing, and thereby developing precedent—seems like more of a legal 
question; determining whether a patent is directed to something that occurs in nature seems more 
like the type of “case-specific” issue the Supreme Court’s case law on appellate review would treat 
as factual. 
379. See supra section II(B)(2). 
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presumption of validity applied because that case involved only intrinsic 
evidence. When an eligibility analysis involves only evidence intrinsic to the 
patent, eligibility, I have argued, remains an entirely legal question—just like 
a claim construction or a motion to dismiss decided based entirely on intrinsic 
evidence.380 Indeed, some district court opinions that pre-date Berkheimer 
appear to embrace a similar regime, indicating that the presumption of 
validity applies only when the court relies on extrinsic evidence to decide 
eligibility.381 
In sum, the better view seems to be that the presumption of validity 
applies only when the eligibility analysis implicates questions of fact and—
contrary to Berkheimer—only when the court relies on extrinsic evidence to 
decide those factual questions. As the discussion above illustrates, the lines 
between questions of law and questions of fact are not always easy to draw. 
In the final part of the Article, I consider whether drawing those lines is worth 
the cost in added complexity, and I sketch ways in which courts might reduce 
the importance of making fine distinctions between law and fact in close 
cases, including by limiting jury involvement in eligibility disputes. 
III. Rethinking the Law/Fact Boundary: Implications for Eligibility 
Doctrine and Beyond 
This part concludes the Article by exploring the consequences of 
recasting the eligibility inquiry as at least partly factual. Drawing on literature 
skeptical of the conventional distinction between law and fact, it first 
 
380. See Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 841 (2015) (“[W]hen the 
district court reviews only evidence intrinsic to the patent (the patent claims and specifications, 
along with the patent’s prosecution history), the judge’s determination will amount solely to a 
determination of law . . . .”); 5B WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 267, § 1357 (noting that a “motion 
to dismiss under [Rule 12(b)(6)] raises only an issue of law”); see also Aatrix Software, Inc. v. 
Green Shades Software, Inc., 882 F.3d 1121, 1128 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (noting that the “sources 
properly considered on a motion to dismiss, [include] the complaint, the patent, and materials 
subject to judicial notice”). 
381. Cf. Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 6:15-CV-0029-WSS-JCM, 2015 
WL 3757497, at *5 & n.6 (W.D. Tex. June 12, 2015) (noting that “[t]o the extent that questions of 
fact exist, the Court will apply the clear and convincing evidence standard” and concluding that “no 
factual issues are present” because the court decided eligibility “without considering materials 
outside of the pleadings”), report and recommendation adopted by No. W-15-CV-029, 2015 WL 
11622489 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 23, 2015), aff’d, 838 F.3d 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Compare also Modern 
Telecom Systems LLC v. Earthlink, Inc., No. SA CV 14-0347-DOC, 2015 WL 1239992 (C.D. Cal. 
Mar. 17, 2015), in which the court stated: 
[T]he clear and convincing evidence standard is not necessarily applicable in the 
context of determining patent-eligibility under § 101, which is a question of law. . . . 
Because, ordinarily, no evidence outside the pleadings is considered in resolving a 
motion to dismiss or a motion for judgment on the pleadings, it makes little sense to 
apply a “clear and convincing evidence” standard—a burden of proof—to such 
motions. 
Id. at *7. 
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explains—in terms of policy—how treating eligibility as a question of law 
potentially based on facts should help ensure efficient and accurate patent 
adjudication. It then considers the institutional implications of the Article’s 
analysis of eligibility procedure, arguing that confusion around the law/fact 
boundary may be an adverse effect of centralizing appeals in the Federal 
Circuit. 
A. Patent Eligibility and the Myth of the Law/Fact Distinction 
One of this Article’s primary arguments is that determining patent 
eligibility can require courts to resolve disputes that the legal system would 
normally call disputes of fact, not law—a point the Federal Circuit embraced 
in Berkheimer. But, as skeptics of the law/fact distinction have pointed out, 
a fact, just like the law, is simply “something in the world” that the parties 
must prove in a given case.382 As Gary Lawson has observed in his work on 
“proving” the law, propositions of law and propositions of fact are 
“epistemologically equivalent” in that they are both “object[s] of proof” in 
legal proceedings.383 Accordingly, Lawson argues, the applicable standards 
of proof should be dictated by considerations of policy, not “epistemology or 
[legal] metaphysics.”384 Extrapolating from that argument, a comprehensive 
analysis of whether the law should treat patent eligibility as a legal question, 
a factual one, or a mix of both must consider not only how the law would 
conventionally label the eligibility issue but also gauge the consequences of 
attaching one label or another. 
Drawing on the analysis in the previous part of the Article, at least five 
consequences of labeling eligibility as partly factual are worth highlighting. 
First, labeling eligibility as factual should help courts resolve eligibility at the 
optimal time in any given case. Though I have suggested that a key policy 
function of eligibility doctrine is to provide courts with a mechanism to 
quickly invalidate patents that are plainly invalid, it is of course also 
important to ensure that courts do not rush to an inaccurate decision on an 
inadequate record. Treating eligibility as a purely legal question, as many 
courts did prior to Berkheimer, risks favoring speed over accuracy: a court 
that views eligibility as lacking any factual component can always resolve it 
on the pleadings, even if extrinsic evidence might shed light on the patent’s 
scope or inventiveness as compared to the prior art. 
It is possible that district courts applying Berkheimer will push things 
too far in the other direction. As we saw above in the discussion of 
nonobviousness, if a ground of patent validity is at least partly factual, courts 
 
382. Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Myth of the Law-Fact Distinction, 97 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1769, 1802 (2003). 
383. LAWSON, supra note 168, at 9–10. 
384. Id. at 10. 
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tend to punt the entire issue to the jury.385 A similar approach to eligibility 
would nullify the doctrine’s useful function of permitting quick decisions in 
easy cases. Patent law already contains numerous fact-driven doctrines, 
including novelty, nonobviousness, and various disclosure requirements, that 
are, like eligibility, designed to eradicate patents that are too broad or not 
sufficiently inventive. If, after Berkheimer, eligibility is frequently taken to 
trial, criticisms of eligibility doctrine’s redundancy386 will hold more weight 
than they currently do. 
Thus, courts deciding eligibility post-Berkheimer should be careful to 
recognize that it is a question of law potentially based on facts. That would 
give courts flexibility to invalidate patents on the pleadings when evidence 
outside the pleadings is unlikely to bolster the case for eligibility. But it 
would also force courts to acknowledge that aspects of the Alice inquiry, such 
as the comparison of the patent to previously existing technology, can 
sometimes be decided more accurately on a better developed record.387 
A second, related consequence of acknowledging eligibility’s factual 
underpinnings relates to the examination process. If an examiner may only 
reject an application under step two of Alice when it claims well-understood, 
routine, and conventional activity, and if that determination is a question of 
fact, then a rejection under step two must be supported by factual evidence. 
As the Patent Office indicated in its post-Berkheimer guidance to examiners, 
a finding of conventionality must be supported in at least one of four ways: 
by “[a] citation to an express statement in the specification” indicating the 
conventionality of the relevant aspects of the invention, by a citation to a 
court decision recognizing the conventionality of those aspects, by “[a] 
citation to a publication that demonstrates the well-understood, routine, 
conventional nature of” the claimed invention, or by a statement from the 
examiner that the examiner is taking “official notice” of conventionality.388 
 
385. See supra notes 358–60 and accompanying text. 
386. See supra notes 20–22 and accompanying text. But see supra note 121 (citing literature 
challenging redundancy arguments). 
387. In thinking about the consequences of the law/fact label, it should be noted that the 
preclusive effects of a judgment on patent eligibility would not change depending on whether the 
doctrine is considered to present a question of law, a question of fact, or a mixed question. See 
18 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE § 4417 (3d ed. 2018) (providing the following example: “the plaintiff who failed 
to prove the light was red is apt to be held precluded not only as to the color of the light but also as 
to the ‘issue’ of negligence”). Thus, regardless of how the eligibility question is characterized, 
subsequent defendants accused of infringing a particular patent can rely on a prior judgment of 
ineligibility defensively, see Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 350 
(1971), but a patentee may not use a prior favorable ruling of eligibility offensively against a 
different defendant in a later case, see Paul R. Gugliuzza, (In)valid Patents, 92 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 271, 279 (2016) (citing cases). 
388. Memorandum from Robert W. Bahr, Deputy Comm’r for Patent Examination Policy, U.S. 
Patent & Trademark Office, to Patent Examining Corps 3–4 (Apr. 19, 2018), 
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This demand for evidentiary support could make it more difficult for 
examiners to reject applications at step two of Alice, but it seems like a 
faithful application of the Berkheimer decision: to support a rejection, either 
the specification itself must indicate conventionality (an unlikely prospect for 
patents being prosecuted after Mayo, Alice, and their progeny), or there must 
be some other reliable evidence to support that conclusion. 
Turning back to litigation, a third beneficial consequence of treating 
eligibility as a question of law potentially based on facts is that it provides an 
appropriately limited role for the statutory presumption of patent validity. I 
argued above that, as a matter of doctrine, the presumption of validity should 
apply to eligibility analysis, but only if the court must make findings of fact 
based on evidence outside the patent itself. This relatively limited role for the 
presumption of validity also aligns with various policy considerations. The 
presumption of validity originated as a common law doctrine reflecting the 
deference courts usually give to an expert agency such as the Patent Office.389 
Today, however, deference to the agency is arguably unwarranted given the 
minimal scrutiny most patent applications receive.390 Many studies report 
that patent applications receive, on average, less than twenty hours of 
attention from an examiner.391 That said, § 282(a) of the Patent Act 
unequivocally states that patents are presumed valid. And, of course, the 
presumption of validity protects the reliance interests of those who have 
invested in commercializing the patent.392 A limited role for the presumption 
of validity in the eligibility analysis—applying it only when a case involves 
findings of fact based on extrinsic evidence—strikes a balance. On one hand, 
it respects the unambiguous statutory language enacted by Congress and 
offers some protection to reliance interests. On the other hand, it also 
accounts for the lenient nature of examination in the modern patent system 
and the general principle that standards of proof apply only when questions 




389. Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who’s Afraid of the APA? What the Patent System 
Can Learn from Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269, 281–82 (2007). 
390. See Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law’s Presumption of Validity, 
60 STAN. L. REV. 45, 49–51 (2007) (proposing to limit the presumption of validity to situations 
where patent owners have submitted to a more rigorous initial examination or where a court, the 
International Trade Commission, or the Patent Office has already reevaluated validity and found in 
the patentee’s favor). 
391. E.g., Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Is the Time Allocated to Review Patent 
Applications Inducing Examiners to Grant Invalid Patents?, 99 REV. ECON. & STAT. 550, 552 
(2017); Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1500 
(2001). 
392. See Stephen Yelderman, Coordination-Focused Patent Policy, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1565, 
1602 (2016). 
393. See supra note 356 and accompanying text. 
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A fourth consequence worth noting is that labeling eligibility as a 
question of law potentially based on facts would make a real difference in the 
outcomes of certain litigated cases. To be sure, the change in label will not 
affect every case. As discussed, many eligibility disputes are resolved based 
on the patent itself, and those cases could still be resolved on the pleadings 
because they implicate no factual disputes.394 However, cases that have 
definitively resolved eligibility against the accused infringer at the pleading-
stage, such as the McRO and Visual Memory cases discussed above,395 would 
come out differently. Rather than definitively resolving eligibility as a matter 
of law on a limited record, as the Federal Circuit did in those cases, the 
accused infringer’s motion to dismiss would be denied, but the infringer 
would be allowed to subsequently develop a factual record in support of its 
eligibility defense and to raise that defense again on summary judgment or at 
trial. In a similar vein, viewing eligibility as at least partly factual casts doubt 
on the decisions made by some district courts making credibility 
determinations about witness declarations and deposition testimony on 
summary judgment rather than setting the issue for trial,396 as well as 
decisions refusing to reconsider pre-trial eligibility rulings after hearing 
evidence at trial.397 
A final, potential consequence of labeling eligibility as a question of 
law, fact, or both is that the choice of label could determine who decides 
patent eligibility—the judge or a jury. Most courts and lawyers assume that 
the Seventh Amendment enshrines a right to a jury trial on fact questions 
relevant to patent validity.398 Thus, in the wake of Berkheimer, the prevailing 
wisdom seems to be that patent eligibility will now often be decided by a 
jury.399 
The overall merit of having juries decide technologically complex issues 
of patent validity is beyond the scope of this Article.400 For my purposes, it 
 
394. See supra notes 302–07 and accompanying text. 
395. See supra note 324 and accompanying text. 
396. See, e.g., 01 Communique Lab., Inc. v. Citrix Sys., Inc., 151 F. Supp. 3d 778, 787, 794, 
796 (N.D. Ohio 2015) (granting the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment that the patent was 
eligible, relying upon the court’s interpretation of expert testimony); Prism Techs., LLC v. T-Mobile 
USA, Inc., No. 8:12CV124, 2015 WL 6161790, at *3 (D. Neb. Sept. 22, 2015) (similar), aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part, dismissed in part, 696 F. App’x 1014 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
397. See, e.g., ContentGuard Holdings, Inc. v. Apple Inc., No. 2:13-CV-1112-JRG, 2016 WL 
1637280, at *6 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 25, 2016) (denying Apple’s post-trial motion for JMOL of 
ineligibility, noting that “[p]erhaps [Apple’s] motion is actually a motion for reconsideration” of the 
court’s denial of Apple’s motion for judgment on the pleadings), aff’d, 701 F. App’x 957 (Fed. Cir. 
2017). 
398. Lemley, supra note 359, at 1715. 
399. See, e.g., Ryan Davis, Getting Juries to Ax Patents Under Alice May Be Hard Sell, 
LAW360 (Mar. 5, 2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/1017998/getting-juries-to-ax-patents-
under-alice-may-be-hard-sell [https://perma.cc/T8V7-AVWX]. 
400. For a sample of scholarship exploring the respective abilities of juries or judges to decide 
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is sufficient to note that recognizing eligibility’s potential factual 
underpinnings will not inevitably lead to juries deciding the issue. Mark 
Lemley and John Duffy have both recently raised questions about whether a 
jury-trial right on patent validity is justified as a matter of history and 
doctrine.401 The Supreme Court’s recent decision in the Oil States case, which 
confirmed the constitutionality of Patent Office procedures allowing the 
agency to review the validity of issued patents, squarely rejected the 
argument that those jury-less procedures violated the Seventh Amendment.402 
Moreover, as discussed above, before Berkheimer, district judges regularly 
decided what appeared to be questions of fact when resolving eligibility 
disputes.403 And, in Teva, the Supreme Court approved of judges alone 
deciding factual questions relevant to patent claim construction.404 In short, 
simply labeling eligibility as partly factual by no means guarantees extensive 
jury involvement in eligibility disputes. 
B. Law, Fact, and the Federal Circuit 
To conclude the Article, it is worth noting that eligibility doctrine is not 
the only area of patent law in which the Federal Circuit has made 
questionable decisions distinguishing between law and fact. As noted above, 
the court has allowed juries to make the ultimate decision on nonobviousness, 
even though the final determination of nonobviousness is, under Supreme 
Court precedent, a question of law.405 The court has also refused to 
 
patent cases accurately, see Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases—An Empirical 
Peek Inside the Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 368, 409 (2000) (collecting critiques of the use 
of juries in patent cases and finding some evidence of “flaws in juror comprehension”), and Peter 
Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2, 17 (2010) (“While district judges possess 
specialized legal training, they, like most jurors, are generally laypersons in terms of technological 
sophistication. Ultimately, lay actors in the patent system, including district judges, experience 
difficulties in understanding the technologies at the heart of patent cases.”). See also David L. 
Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study of Claim Construction Reversal Rates in 
Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223, 225–26 (2008) (finding that the Federal Circuit reverses with 
similar frequency the claim construction orders of district judges who have heard many patent cases 
and the orders of judges who have heard few patent cases). 
401. See Lemley, supra note 359, at 1720; see also Duffy, supra note 193, at 299 (noting that 
the modern process of reviewing patent validity “is quite distant from the traditional role of a jury 
as a de novo fact-finding body” and that, accordingly, “jury review of patent validity . . . might . . . 
soon be replaced by judicial review of patent validity”). 
402. Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1379 
(2018) (holding that, because Article III permitted the Patent Office to adjudicate the validity of 
issued patents, “a jury is not necessary in these proceedings” (emphasis added)). 
403. See supra notes 244–45 and accompanying text. 
404. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 838 (2015). 
405. The Federal Circuit’s practice of allowing juries to decide the issue of nonobviousness—
and the significant deference the court gives to those jury decisions on appeal—has been the subject 
of several recent high-profile cert. petitions, none of which have been granted. See Paul R. 
Gugliuzza, Elite Patent Law, 104 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 23 n.65) (citing 
examples). There is, to be sure, a plausible normative argument that ultimate determination of 
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acknowledge the factual considerations that seem to permeate determinations 
of claim meaning. Other examples abound of troublesome Federal Circuit 
doctrine around the border between law and fact. 
Take indefiniteness. Under that doctrine, which stems from § 112’s 
command that the patent’s claims must “particularly point[] out and distinctly 
claim[]” the invention,406 a patent is invalid if its claims, specification, and 
prosecution history “fail to inform, with reasonable certainty, those skilled in 
the art about the scope of the invention.”407 The Federal Circuit has 
acknowledged that determining whether a patent satisfies the definiteness 
requirement is a task of construing the patent’s claims.408 So, under the 
Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Markman,409 it should be done 
exclusively by the judge. But many district courts—with the Federal Circuit’s 
approval—allow juries to decide indefiniteness.410 
Another doctrine in which the Federal Circuit has drawn questionable 
distinctions between matters of law and fact is the written description 
requirement.411 To determine whether a patent complies with that 
requirement, the court compares the inventor’s original application with the 
patent’s issued claims to ensure that, at the time of filing, the inventor had 
actually invented what the patent ultimately claimed.412 Like a claim 
construction based entirely on intrinsic evidence, this comparison of two 
documents—the original application and the issued patent—would seem to 
present a question for the judge. Yet the en banc Federal Circuit, surprisingly, 
 
nonobviousness (and of patent validity more generally) is not strictly a question of law, as the 
Supreme Court has said, but a mixed question of law and fact, which could defensibly be decided 
by a jury. See Lawson, supra note 190, at 882 n.68 (distinguishing “pure” questions of law, such as, 
“What is the appropriate formulation of the legal standard for negligence?” from mixed questions 
of law and fact, such as, “Was X’s conduct negligent?”). For suggestions that key issues in patent 
doctrine that are often characterized as questions of law actually present mixed questions of law and 
fact, see J. Jonas Anderson, Specialized Standards of Review, 18 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 151, 176 
(2014) (characterizing claim construction as “the ultimate mixed question of fact and law in the . . . 
field of patent law”), and Craig Allen Nard, Deference, Defiance, and the Useful Arts, 56 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 1415, 1437 n.83 (1995) (“[A] nonobviousness determination is actually a mixed question of 
law and fact . . . .”). 
406. 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (2012). 
407. Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2124 (2014). 
408. See Sonix Tech. Co. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 844 F.3d 1370, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
409. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996). 
410. See, e.g., Koninklijke Philips N.V. v. Zoll Med. Corp., 656 F. App’x 504, 527–28 (Fed. 
Cir. 2016) (vacating jury verdict of no indefiniteness because of a legally incorrect instruction and 
remanding for another trial); see also J. Jonas Anderson & Peter S. Menell, Restoring the Fact/Law 
Distinction in Patent Claim Construction, 109 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 187, 200 (2015) (arguing 
that, under Markman and Teva, indefiniteness should be decided exclusively by the judge at the 
same time the judge conducts claim construction). 
411. Like indefiniteness, the written description requirement stems from § 112 of the Patent 
Act. See 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (“The specification shall contain a written description of the 
invention . . . .”). 
412. Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d 1473, 1479 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
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has held that written description is a factual question that can be given to the 
jury.413 
As far as I can tell, the Federal Circuit has never attempted to justify this 
rule (which, to reiterate, is in tension with the Supreme Court’s repeated 
statement that patent validity is a question of law). If you trace the case law 
back far enough, the Federal Circuit’s predecessor reasoned that written 
description is a factual question because the original application and the 
issued patent must be read from the perspective of a person having ordinary 
skill in the art.414 But many patent law doctrines are applied from that 
perspective, most notably claim construction415 and the ultimate 
determination of obviousness,416 yet those doctrines are (or are supposed to 
be) applied by the court as a matter of law.417 
The Federal Circuit’s troubles at the law/fact divide provide yet another 
example of the court developing questionable doctrine on transsubstantive 
issues—that is, issues such as jurisdiction or procedure that arise not only in 
patent cases. The Federal Circuit has received substantial attention for its 
frequent reversals by the Supreme Court in recent years,418 and many of those 
reversals have been on issues far from the substantive core of patent law such 
as standing, venue, standards of appellate review, subject matter jurisdiction, 
standards of proof, and more.419 And there are many examples of 
 
413. Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
Despite this en banc precedent, a recent panel decision has added to the confusion by suggesting 
that written description is, in fact, a purely legal question for the judge in certain circumstances. In 
Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Motorola Mobility LLC, the panel stated: 
Whether a patent claim is adequately supported by the written description under 35 
U.S.C. § 112 is a question of fact that we review for substantial evidence following a 
jury trial. To the extent that the issue of written description turns on claim construction 
based solely on intrinsic evidence, however, it is a legal question subject to de novo 
review. 
870 F.3d 1320, 1324–25 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). 
414. See In re Wertheim, 541 F.2d 257, 262 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The primary consideration [of 
the written description doctrine] is factual and depends on the nature of the invention and the amount 
of knowledge imparted to those skilled in the art by the disclosure.”). 
415. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
416. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 422 (2007). 
417. For another example of questionable Federal Circuit doctrine involving the law/fact 
distinction and documentary evidence, see Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 
SMU L. REV. 123 (2006): 
[T]he issue of whether a piece of prior art incorporates another piece by reference is a 
question of law. . . . whereas the question of whether there is a motivation to combine 
prior art references is one of fact. This disparity is bizarre because in both 
circumstances, the court is in essence doing the same thing—reading . . . documents 
from the perspective of the [person having ordinary skill in the art]. 
Id. at 172 n.275 (citations omitted). 
418. See Timothy B. Dyk, Thoughts on the Relationship Between the Supreme Court and the 
Federal Circuit, 16 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 67, 71–72 (2016). 
419. See Paul R. Gugliuzza, How Much Has the Supreme Court Changed Patent Law?, 16 CHI.-
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questionable procedural-type doctrines developed by the Federal Circuit that 
have thus far eluded Supreme Court review, such as the Federal Circuit’s 
statement in Berkheimer that a plaintiff’s own uncorroborated statements are 
sufficient to withstand summary judgment,420 the limits placed by the court 
on involuntary joinder of patent co-owners,421 and the court’s restrictions on 
patent challengers’ standing to appeal from Patent Office rulings in post-
issuance proceedings.422 The consistent pattern of Supreme Court reversals 
on similar issues, coupled with the Federal Circuit’s habitual resistance to 
applying general principles of federal procedural law in patent cases, raises 
serious questions about whether the court has succeeded or failed as an 
“experiment” in judicial specialization.423 
Conclusion 
This Article has highlighted several ways the procedures through which 
courts decide patent eligibility could be reformed to better balance the need 
for quick invalidations of bad patents with the danger of erroneously 
invalidating meritorious patents. Looking at the law of patent-eligible subject 
matter through a procedural lens has also illuminated several broader 
problems with—and potential reforms of—patent doctrine, particularly in 
areas that implicate the law/fact divide, such as claim construction. Eligibility 
doctrine is, as I have shown, not the only area of patent law in which the 
Federal Circuit has arguably made mistakes in its decisions attempting to 
distinguish law from fact. The analytical framework developed in this Article 
hopefully provides a useful starting point for future scholarship critically 
reassessing the law/fact distinction in those other areas. 
That reassessment is sorely needed. As I have tried to make clear, the 
 
KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 330, 335 (2017) (collecting cases). 
420. See supra note 256 and accompanying text. 
421. See STC.UNM v. Intel Corp., 767 F.3d 1351, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (O’Malley, J., 
dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) (arguing that, by refusing to apply Rule 19 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court has “once again simply exempt[ed] patent law from the 
rules that govern all federal litigation”). 
422. See Gaia Bernstein, The End User’s Predicament: User Standing in Patent Litigation, 96 
B.U. L. REV. 1929, 1935 (2016); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Giving the Federal Circuit a Run for 
Its Money: Challenging Patents in the PTAB, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 235, 295 (2015); Megan M. 
La Belle, Public Enforcement of Patent Law, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1865, 1871 (2016); see also Sapna 
Kumar, Standing Against Bad Patents, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 87, 136 (2017) (defending the 
Federal Circuit’s limits on standing as a matter of existing doctrine but proposing a legislative 
change). 
423. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Continuing Experiment in 
Specialization, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 769, 770–72 (2004) (collecting critiques and praise of the 
Federal Circuit as an institution); see also Laura G. Pedraza-Fariña, Understanding the Federal 
Circuit: An Expert Community Approach, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 89, 95 (2015) (hypothesizing 
that “expert communities,” such as the Federal Circuit, “will be more likely to defy solutions 
imposed by non-expert generalists,” such as the Supreme Court, “than communities of non-
experts”). 
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law/fact distinction is essentially dispositive of several important procedural 
issues in patent cases: it determines the stage at which a given issue can be 
resolved, it dictates the standard of proof, and it potentially allocates 
decision-making authority between the judge and jury. All of those 
procedural features affect decisions by patentees about whether or not to 
pursue litigation and by accused infringers about whether to settle or continue 
the fight. Those litigation dynamics, in turn, have consequences for 
innovation: if patents are too difficult or costly to enforce, they will not 
provide much of an incentive for invention, but patents that are too easy to 
enforce can discourage innovation by those who fear the threat of 
infringement suits. By reassessing the law/fact divide in the realm of patent 
eligibility, this Article has tried to sketch a procedural structure that 
accommodates those competing objectives better than the patent system 
currently does. 
 
